Deuteronomy and Rhetoric: The Art of Practical Argumentation in Ancient Israel by Rosenstein, David Jonathan
 
         
 “DEUTERONOMY AND RHETORIC: 
   THE ART OF PRACTICAL ARGUMENTATION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL” 
 
 
                  By 
                 David Jonathan Rosenstein 
 
 
                
 
     A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 
                 requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
              Baltimore, Maryland 





          
                                                  © 2020 David Jonathan Rosenstein 
                  All Rights Reserved 
 




  Abstract 
 
 The composition of the book of Deuteronomy reflects a phase of Israelite history 
when the Judean kingdom was undergoing an existential crisis that threatened its survival  
as a nation and the Israelites as a distinct people. The writers had the task of constructing 
a religious, social and legal program that would insure the survival of their people. As 
such, the book of Deuteronomy has long been recognized as a rhetorical work, as its aim 
is to persuade the Israelites to adhere to a set of laws, instructions, and teachings 
attributed by the writers to both God and Moses. The writers offered both strong 
incentives for compliance and equally strong disincentives for non-compliance. This core 
feature of Deuteronomy that requires the audience to make existential choices about 
preferred values and societal outcomes is what makes the discourse in Deuteronomy fully 
rhetorical. 
 Previously, scholarship has treated Deuteronomy’s rhetorical character in 
piecemeal fashion. Comprehensive rhetorical analysis of Deuteronomy was hampered 
because the only available conceptual framework for understanding rhetoric and 
persuasion was that offered by the classical Greeks. This study concludes that while the 
descriptive categories of classical rhetoric are still useful, they insufficient for describing 
rhetorical argumentation in Deuteronomy. This study makes use of contemporary 
rhetorical critical method, literary critical thought and a significant revision to classical 
rhetorical theory proposed by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in 1958 
called The New Rhetoric. Their theory of argumentation provides a set conceptual tools 
iii 
 
that can be used to establish a rhetorical framework for the entire corpus of Deuteronomy 
based upon the use of informal logic and the establishment of value hierarchies.                                             
This study unravels the rhetorical structure of Deuteronomy, and addresses the 
dual vision of its writers who in used rhetorical arguments to address the particular 
situational needs of their Israelite audience, as well as a universal audience that lay 
beyond that of the Israelite nation. In addition to Deuteronomy having become a basis of 
later Judaism, it was the ultimate success of the writers’ vision that their appeal to a 
universal audience became one of Deuteronomy’s most enduring legacies. 
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                                                           Introduction: 
          Deuteronomy and Rhetoric:   
The Art of Practical Argumentation in Ancient Israel 
The Origins of this Case Study 
 
The origin of this study on the use of rhetorical argumentation and the art of 
persuasion in Deuteronomy evolved from research on the language of derision, 
rejection and separation found throughout the text of Deuteronomy. In my review, I 
cataloged the numerous instances of rejection towards other gods in general, foreign 
religious practices- e.g; places of worship, cultic objects, making idols and bowing 
down to them, the making of any types of images, divination, astral worship, false 
prophecy, necromancy, soothsaying, sorcery, dream diving, casting lots, magic spells, 
astrology, passing children through the fire, intermarriage, the ways of the foreign 
nations, and, a host of specific derogatory terminology associated with such practices. 
The narrator/authors of Deuteronomy reported that many of these practices were both 
abominable in the eyes of Yahweh and worthy of death and expulsion for anyone 
engaging in them. I identified ninety-eight negative references1 to the rejected items 
just mentioned above, spread out over nineteen chapters and appearing in every 
recognized division of the text.2 Present in the text is a derisive and rejecting polemic 
against all forms of apostasy together with a call for the rejection, destruction and utter 
obliteration of all mental and symbolic representations of it. No special argumentation 
                                                          
1 See section 2.3: Categories of Apostasy. 
 
2 The Prologue (Dt.1-4); the Covenant at Horeb (Dt. 5-11); the Law Code (Dt. 12-26); Blessings and 
Curses (Dt. 27-28); First Supplement (Dt. 29-30); Second Supplement (Dt. 31-34). 
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is required to see that the polemic against idolatry, in all its forms, was of paramount 
importance to the worldview of Deuteronomy's narrator/authors. Because of its 
importance to the narrator/authors, I suspect that this polemic against all forms of 
apostasy, given in specific detail, was meant as both a signpost and crossroads for the 
Israelites and as a challenge to the worldview of those that embraced such practices 
both inside and outside the Israelite community. Among the other purposes we may 
identify, the narrator/authors seem to be attempting to lay down an intellectual marker 
on this particular matter that puts the audience on notice that important changes are 
underway. We will have occasion to explore this idea in this study, and further 
consider what part apostasy plays in Deuteronomy's rhetorical design. 
Apostasy as a Rhetorical Problem in Deuteronomy 
Upon reflection about the data I have referred to above, and looking at them 
within their narrative context, I had two realizations. The first was that the 
narrator/authors of Deuteronomy were expressing a high degree of anxiety about 
apostasy. This anxiety focused on certain specific behaviors they considered as 
existential breaches in Israel's spiritual boundaries and that were therefore identity 
negating. The wide range of rejected practices seems to be an imminent threat in 
Deuteronomy, and a matter close-at-hand to the lives of the narrator/authors. We may 
observe that it was a constraint upon their thoughts and actions. This conveys the 
rhetorical impression that these rejected ideas and practices were, no doubt, existing 
contemporaneously with the compositional efforts of the narrator/authors and 
considered by them to be a huge problem. It is important to note, however, that the 
impression given about the vast differences between Israelite and Canaanite religion on 
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display in the rhetoric of Deuteronomy is not necessarily an accurate reflection of 
reality of this relationship. Current scholarship tends to see Israelite religion as a subset 
of West Semitic religions generally.3 Nonetheless, at the same time they were railing 
against apostasy in clear and unmistakable language, they were also creating rhetorical 
counter-arguments for specific types of behaviors that they did want the Israelites to 
engage in, namely, following the laws of Moses and all his rules, instructions, statues 
and ordinances. This second line of argumentation served to make the polemic against 
apostasy part of a larger rhetorical design. The purpose of this study, then, is to unravel 
the structure of this rhetorical design and describe it in terms of a rhetoric of practical 
argumentation based in modern critical approaches to situation and audience. 
These preliminary gleanings about Deuteronomy's rhetorical nature spurred 
further research on the general topic of rhetoric and rhetoric in the ancient world. The 
gold standard of rhetoric in the ancient world is, of course, classical Greek rhetoric. I 
found, however, that Greek traditions of formal reasoning, dialectic and rhetoric as 
they have come to be understood have only limited utility when it comes actually 
analyzing the rhetorical argumentation that occurs in Deuteronomy. The reasons for 
this limited utility stems not only from a temporal dislocation of several centuries but 
also because Greek ideas about the scope and purpose of rhetorical argumentation are 
fundamentally different from the methods used and goals of the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy. In saying that Deuteronomy engages in a different type of rhetorical 
argumentation we need also to observe that it does not engage in argumentative 
                                                          
3 Niehr (2010: 23-36), Smith (1990: xix-xxxiv), Smith (2001), Gnuse (1997: 62-128), Zevit (2001), Van 




discourse in the Greek sense of using formal reasoning to determine the validity of its 
conclusions.4 Neither does Deuteronomy engage in the dialectical form of 
argumentation. 5 However, it is not entirely realistic, or useful, to sue for a divorce 
from Greek ideas and concepts when it comes to rhetoric, dialectic and formal 
reasoning, as they can be descriptively useful and many modern researchers still use 
them in Bible studies.  
My research led me to become aware of the existence of a Hebrew rhetorical 
tradition quite apart from and independent of classical Greco-Roman tradition that 
has been explored in Biblical scholarship only to a limited degree.6 Therefore, if we 
assert that the Hebrews had their own rhetorical traditions, we need another, non-
Greek theory or method of argumentation that is able to apprehend what occurs in 
Deuteronomy. This is the case because while the Hebrews did not formally 
conceptualize their approach to rhetorical argumentation as did the Greeks, this does 
not mean that the Hebrews lacked an understanding of the nature and use of rhetoric 
argumentation for persuasive purposes. 
The subject of the existence of rhetorical compositions across the entire 
Hebrew Bible is so broad that it is beyond the scope of this study. My focus, 
                                                          
4 Formal reasoning (or logic) is based on argument involving deductively necessary relationships and 
including the use of syllogisms and mathematical symbols. Formal reasoning (or logic) is what we think 
of as traditional logic or philosophical logic, namely the study of inference with purely formal and 
explicit content, such as the rules of formal logic that have come down to us from Aristotle. 
Arguments are determined to be either valid or invalid based solely on whether their conclusions 
necessarily follow from their explicitly stated premises or assertions. L e v i  ( 2 0 0 1 : 4 5 0 - 4 6 1 )  
 
5 Dialectic is the guided attempt to move to a higher understanding by engaged method of question and 
answer in which the soul and opinions of a single interlocutor are probed. Kastely (2001: 221). 
 
6 Zulick (2003: 195-207), Watts (1995: 3-22), Watts (2009: 39-66), Rofe (1985:434-445), Metzger 
(2004: 165-181), Thurin (2002:77-92), O’Connell (1992: 492-509), Gitay (1996: 218-229), Frank 
(2003: 163-194),  Edelman (2003: 113-125),  Rofe (1985:434-445). 
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therefore, is to explain by what methods rhetoric and rhetorical argumentation in 
Deuteronomy can be understood and described. In my research, I became aware of 
a range of modern approaches to rhetoric, argumentation and rhetorical criticism 
that do not originate in religious studies departments, some of which began finding 
application to Bible studies starting in the late 1980s.7 I will review and apply 
some of these modern critical approaches to rhetoric, dialectic and rhetorical 
argumentation in this study of Deuteronomy. In particular, I will use the work of 
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric. Their writings 
on rhetoric, dialectic and rhetorical argumentation in the mid twentieth century 
reoriented the general topic of rhetoric in important new directions which have a 
direct applicability to the type of  argumentation one encounters in Deuteronomy.8 
I found these new approaches to rhetoric and rhetorical analysis valuable in that 
they provided insight and utility for understanding how Deuteronomy was 
structured, and how it went about the task of persuading the generation of Israelites 
that witnessed its creation to follow its program. 
The Rhetorical Character of Deuteronomy 
The definition of rhetoric embodies the art and means of persuasion and this 
is the meaning of the term that comes down to us from antiquity.9 Deuteronomy is a 
rhetorical text in- so-far-as it engages in extended argumentation aimed at 
                                                          
7 Bitzer (1968:1-14), Dozeman (1992: 712-715), Frank (2011:239-252), Greenwood (1970:418-426), 
Katz (1996: 1-12), Kennedy (1980: 120-160). MacDonald (2006: 203-224), Mazor (1986: 81-88),  
Mathews (2015: 145-162), O'Connell (1992: 492-509), Radzinowcz (1989: 77-89) Black (1978), 
Muilenburg (1969: 1-18). 
 
8 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 1-564). 
 
9 Bryant (1953:410-424). 
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persuasion and gaining the adherence of the Israelite audience(s) throughout the 
corpus. Deuteronomy intends to persuade its audience(s) to accept and embrace a 
broad set of laws, rules, ordinances, instructions, teachings, and religious practices 
for a future life in the land of Israel, all of which are to apply to all succeeding 
generations. It  also offers strong disincentives for not adhering to its program as the 
narrator/authors have designed it. It  was the intention of the narrators/authors of 
Deuteronomy to establish and convey their program for rhetorical purposes, based 
on the widest social basis of the population as the narrator/authors understood it in 
the era of Deuteronomy's creation.10 Near  the conclusion of Deuteronomy, in Dt. 
30: 11-14, the narrator/authors describe the instructions that Moses had given as "not 
too baffling, not in the heavens, not beyond the sea, but something very close in the 
mouth and heart." In other words, they were something accessible and also 
necessary to embrace and observe. Something so close to the mouth and heart was 
something that must have touched the wellsprings of collective memory. In other 
words, something already well known to the populace, and not, something 
incomprehensible, or alien to them. If one wants to propose that Deuteronomy 
represents something "new'' in the religious life of the Israelites then it was the 
narrator/authors reconfiguration of certain elements of Israel’s cultural memory to 
create an obligation to follow the Mosaic teachings and at the same time tying this 
obligation to their ability to continue to possess the land. The narrator/authors 
employed a broad range of argumentative and persuasive strategies to accomplish 
very specific ends, but it was their engagement with and reorientation of collective 
                                                          




memory that underpins the entire narrative enterprise. This was done in order to 
guide and assist the Israelite audience in realizing what was required of them to 
overcome their present historical circumstances. We will refer to these 
circumstances as their "rhetorical situation."11 I will explore and attempt to validate 
the forgoing ideas in this study. 
 
The Nature of Deuteronomy 
S. Dean McBride wrote in his now classic 1987 paper on "The Purpose of 
Deuteronomy" that the book of Deuteronomy represented a new literary genre, 
which has no true peer or parallel in the legal corpora preserved in the preceding 
books of the Pentateuch. With it, he wrote, the narrator/authors created something 
quite distinct––a comprehensive social charter, perhaps uniquely appropriate to the 
particular covenantal identity it claimed for itself.  One of McBride's most insightful 
and still pertinent comments was his view that Deuteronomy was the product of a 
mature reflection on Israelite identity. 12 His idea that Deuteronomy was a "mature" 
reflection of its identity leads in the direction of seeing Deuteronomy as more of a 
cultural preservation and existential rescue operation, given its historical context, 
                                                          
11 Lloyd Bitzer (1968: 1-14) defined the term rhetorical situation by stating that a particular discourse come 
into existence because of some specific situation or exigence, which invites an utterance. He observed that 
every discourse has a context and a background of factors that brought the rhetor to the point where 
he/she felt required to say something. Rhetorical words, he wrote, belong to a class of things, which 
obtain their character from the circumstances of the historical context in which they occur. These factors 
can also be sociological, psychological or cultural. Bitzer believed that the situation controls the 
rhetorical response in the same way that the question controls the answer and the problem 
controls the solution. 
 




than an identity formation project of the first instance.13 In Deuteronomy, Israel's 
spiritual identity appears to be a well-formed matter, with a kind of knowledge that 
is shared both by the narrator/authors, and the audience. If this were not the case, it 
would be hard to present a program like Deuteronomy that had no currency in the 
population at large and expect the successful outcome that the narrator/authors 
obviously hoped would result. In Deuteronomy, the audience does not need to be 
taught about who they are; rather, they need to be persuaded to adhere to the full 
extent of the Mosaic teachings and to actively engage others to learn about it and 
follow it too. Identity formation, to the extent that it is involved in Deuteronomy, 
applies to the teaching of the written traditions to the children and the generations to 
come, not the generation that received it. 
 
The Flow of this Study 
Chapter One:  From Ancient Rhetorics to Modern Rhetorical Criticism. In 
this chapter, I will briefly review how we got from the rhetorics of the classical 
Greeks and the Hebrew writers in the mid first millennium BCE,   to the revival of interest 
in rhetoric in American academic circles in the early twentieth century. From there 
we will discuss the birth of rhetorical criticism and explain how and when it began 
to intersect with Hebrew and Christian bible studies.14  We will explore the 
                                                          
13 Deuteronomy's historical context is a highly debated topic. My focus here is rhetorical argumentation 
and issues mostly internal to the corpus. I simply note that Israelite society experienced a number of 
major crises and military destructions in the eighth through the sixth century BCE including the exilic 
period. Good arguments for its origin may be constructed for many parts of this two-hundred year period 
but I will not directly address this issue in this study. 
 




reasons for the development of  new rhetorical critical approaches to Biblical 
studies, the directions in which they developed in subsequent decades and the 
methods and aims that they pursued. 
Chapter Two: The Rhetorical Situation and the Audiences of Deuteronomy. 
In this chapter, I discuss four critical views that shed light on the mindscape that 
both rhetors and audiences cohabit in a narrative text. In this regard, I explore the 
work of Lloyd Bitzer,15 Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford,16 and Walter Ong.17 As 
we will see, the work of these scholars provides useful insights into the dynamics 
of the rhetor/audience relationship that help us understand Deuteronomy. Bitzer's 
introduction of the concept of the rhetorical situation describes the two-way 
communication and situational mutuality that exists between rhetors and the 
various audiences they address. Ede and Lunsford make the useful distinction 
between 'invoked' and 'addressed' audiences. This distinction helps us differentiate 
and clarify which audience is being addressed at any particular moment in a 
narrative text. Walter Ong's ideas reveal a process of mutual fictionalization,18 
which facilitates deep comprehensibility between a rhetor and their audiences. 
Ong's views are useful for understanding how and why a rhetorical text becomes 
effective and have a direct applicability to what we find in Deuteronomy. The 
                                                          
15 Bitzer (1968: 1-14). 
 
16 Ede and Lunsford (1984: 155-171). 
 
17 Ong (1975: 9-21). 
 
18 Ong (1975:9-21) describes 'mutual fictionalization' as one of the major goals of persuasive 
argumentation. It  fosters the creation of a deep bond of identification between the writer and the 




concepts of these scholars provide useful analytical tools for understanding the 
dynamic nature of the rhetorical transaction19 that occurs in Deuteronomy 
Chapter Three: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric: How 
Their Revival and Redefinition of Rhetoric Helps Us Understand Argumentation in 
Deuteronomy.  In this chapter, I explore an important twentieth century theory of 
practical argumentation which sets out the concepts of non-formal and practical 
argumentation in contingent circumstances. Chaim Perelman and his colleague 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca discovered what they called The New Rhetoric. 20 Their 
theories became very influential in the late twentieth century, and I will explain 
why this was the case. The heart of their model was their Argument Schemes.21 
We will review Perelman's ideas about rhetoric and argumentation and will see 
that many of the components of his Argument Schemes can comfortably find 
application to a text like Deuteronomy and thereby unlock the rhetorical design of 
the work. David A .  Frank calls The New Rhetoric a "Jewish Counter-Model"22 of 
rhetorical argumentation. In drawing from Jewish thought in creating the New 
Rhetoric, Perelman sought a rapproachment between Greek and Jewish thought. He 
did this by turning to Talmudic reasoning for notions unavailable or latent in 
                                                          
19 Black (1974: 134) defines a rhetorical transaction as consisting of three parts: strategies, situations 
and effects. Rhetorical strategies refer to the characteristics of discourse, rhetorical situations refer to 
extra- linguistic influences on an audience and effects refer to responses to the strategies in the 
situations. The fact that these three factors interact suggest they are constituents of the same 
phenomenon. We call this phenomenon a rhetorical transaction. 
 
20 Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). 
 
21 See section 3.8: Argument Schemes. 
 




classical thought. Talmudic thought, Perelman observed, presented a view of truth, 
reason and logic that was meant to co-exist with the demonstrative reasoning found 
in classical thought, and which expanded dialectic with forms of reasoning not 
bound to propositional logic and the syllogism.23 His work opened up a connection 
between rhetoric and non-formal reasoning about human value choices that was 
not previously recognized. I will explore the significance of this development for 
understanding argumentation in Deuteronomy. 
Chapter Four: Application of The New Rhetoric to Deuteronomy. In this 
chapter, I will apply the theoretical ideas reviewed in Chapters Two and Three to the 
text of Deuteronomy to show how this furthers our understanding of Deuteronomy's 
style of argumentation and reveals its overall rhetorical design. We will be able to 
see how the narrator/authors used and modified important elements of Israel's 
spiritual reality and collective memory to counter the overwhelming threat of 
apostasy that they feared would lead to national disappearance. 
Chapter Five: Conclus ion–The Endur ing  Legacy  o f  
Deuteronomy:  Embracing  the  Par t icu lar  and  Reaching  for  the  
Universa l .  In this concluding chapter, we will discuss the significance for 
Deuteronomy of the address to a universal audience made by the narrator/authors in 
Dt. 4:6. The idea of a universal audience in Deuteronomy stands in stark 
contrast to a corpus addressed mainly to the particular audience of Israelites. We 
will explore how the narrator/authors constructed their universal audience and what 
important issues they raised in the process. We will explore the implications 
                                                          
23 Frank (1998: 117). 
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of the universal audience evaluating the effectiveness of Deuteronomy as a rhetorical 
treatise. 
The aims of this Study: 
 
(a) To evaluate and apply a number of contemporary rhetorical 
critical approaches to Deuteronomy to see how they may 
help to clarify the specifics of its rhetorical argumentation 
and design. 
 
(b) To define and explain Deuteronomy’s main premises, its style 
and the methods of  rhetorical argumentation that it uses in 
the book. 
 
(c) To explore multiple levels of meaning that analyzing the 
rhetorical structure of Deuteronomy might reveal with 
regard to the particular and universal audiences addressed 





 Chapter One 
From Ancient Rhetorics to Modern Rhetorical Criticism:   
A Brief Sketch of the Origins of Rhetoric in Antiquity through its Revival in   
the Twentieth Century––The Origins of Modern Rhetorical Criticism in Bible 
Studies   
Abstract 
In this Chapter, I will briefly trace how we got from ancient rhetoric to modern 
rhetorical criticism of the New Testament and Hebrew Bible. This review will discuss the 
origins of rhetoric in the Greek tradition and contrast that with rhetoric found in 
Deuteronomy. I will highlight the conflict between the Sophists and Plato and Aristotle in 
order to bring into focus the reasons why rhetoric got a bad reputation and how this 
reputation has affected rhetoric’s status as a valid form of reasoning and argumentation 
from ancient times until the modern era. I will explore the modern revival of interest in 
the Sophists as well as the observation by numerous scholars that Sophistic methods and 
concerns are more well aligned with the concerns of a modern rhetorical critical approach 
than is generally acknowledged. This chapter will also explain why neo-Aristotelean 
methods of analysis while still important, are not well suited for rhetorical analysis of a 
Hebrew Bible text like Deuteronomy. I will also preview the choices I have made in 
selecting the work of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric 
for analyzing rhetorical argumentation in Deuteronomy. This chapter will discuss the 
general scope and methodology of modern rhetorical criticism, as well as establish the 
overall approach of this study. 
1.1   The Origins of Rhetoric in the Western Traditions 
As a historical matter, rhetorical teaching and practice was in evidence from the 
time of Homeric and Hesiodic epics (ca. 750-650 BCE) to that of the Sophists, orators, 
dramatists, and philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE to Roman speakers and 
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writers beginning in the second centuries BCE to speeches, sermons, rhetorical poetry, 
and handbooks of composition dating from the time of the Roman Empire.24 From those 
times until the present day, rhetoric has been a powerful force in public affairs and an 
important topic of consideration and inquiry. Rhetoric was, first and foremost, the art of 
persuasive speaking. As to the question of what rhetoric is, and what rhetoric can be, 
answers throughout history have varied pending on who was expressing an opinion on 
the subject.25  The period of classical Greek rhetoric begins with the pre-Socratic26 
Sophistic Movement27 during the fifth century BCE and ends with Saint Augustine (d. 
430 CE). A “conceptualized” rhetoric, that is a self-conscience use of technique, is 
traditionally connected with fifth century BCE teachers, Tisias and Corax of Syracuse, 
who wrote handbooks on forensic or judicial oratory for the purpose of helping ordinary 
citizens argue cases in the law courts of Sicily. Another Sicilian, Gorgias of Leontini, is 
credited with introducing the art of rhetoric to Athens in c. 423 BCE with great success.28   
A working definition of rhetoric might be that it selects from the vast realm of 
human discourse occasions for speaking and writing that can be considered persuasive in 
                                                          
24 Kennedy (2001: 92-93), Lawson-Tancred (2004: 1-14). 
 
25 Lucaites and Condit (1999:19-24), Bryant (1953: 401-424). 
 
26 Bizzell and Herzberg (2001:19). Among the pre-Socratics were: Homer (c. 751-651 BCE), Solon (c. 630-
560 BCE), Thales of Miletos (c. 624-546 BCE), Anaximader (c. 610-546 BCE, Pythagoras (c .570-490 
BCE),   Heraclitus (c. 535-475 BCE), Parmenides (c. 510-440 BCE), Zeno of Elea (c. 490-430 BCE), 
Gorgias (c.487-376 BCE), and others. Socrates is believed to have lived in the period (c. 470-399 BCE). 
 
27 Poulakos (1999: 32) identifies the major recognized Sophistic teachers of rhetoric as: Protagoras (c. 490-
420 BCE), Gorgias (c. 490-380? BCE), Prodicus (c. 465-395 BCE), Antiphon (c. 480-411 BCE), Hippias 
(c. 460-399? BCE), Critias (c. 460-403 BCE), Thrasymachus (c. 459-400 BCE) and Isocrates (c. 426-338 
BCE) and others).  
 
28 Kennedy (1980: 15-17). 
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intent. It categorizes the types of discourse it has selected, analyzes each of those types in 
terms of structure and purpose, and identifies the means for successfully constructing 
each type. In pursuing these goals, rhetoric comes to endorse codes for linguistic 
correctness and make taxonomies of artful ways to use language. It suggest resources for 
evidence and argument and gives rules for accurate reasoning. And it divides the mind 
into faculties to which persuasive appeals, both logical and psychological, can be 
addressed.29  
As a theoretical body of knowledge, classical rhetoric was intended to teach 
public speaking. It was further conceptualized between the fourth century BCE and the 
early Middle Ages.  Aristotle (384-322 BCE) systematized classical rhetoric and his 
system became rhetoric’s touchstone. To a considerable extent it became a central part of 
western education up until the present, encompassing his trivium: (rhetoric, logic and 
grammar).  The Sophists, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, philosophers of the Hellenistic 
period, and critics of the time of the Roman /Empire  made contributions to this theory 
but the writings of Cicero, the anonymous Rhetoric to Herennius, and Quintillian’s  
Education of the Orator, have been the primary sources for this in the Western 
tradition.30 Thus, to speak of classical rhetoric is to speak of Aristotle’s system and its 
elaboration by Cicero and Quintillian. Bizzell and Herzberg have written that the 
fundamental concerns of rhetoric in all ages appear to be those defined in the classical 
period: purpose, audience, composition, argumentation, organization and style. The 
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classical categories of rhetoric have persisted, and the larger theoretical questions of the 
status of knowledge as true or contingent remains unsettled.31   
Certain early Greek philosophers were not of the same mind on the subject of 
rhetoric.  A struggle ensued between the Sophists on the one hand and Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle on the other hand, on the nature, role and methodology of rhetoric in public 
discourse. This dispute had a monumental impact on the reputation of the Sophists, and 
an equally significant impact on how rhetoric was understood and used, which has 
persisted and reverberated throughout the entire span of Western intellectual history. This 
debate between the Sophists and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, which I will briefly 
outline below, was still influential in the revival of interest in rhetoric that began in the 
early twentieth century in the American academy. The direction of the twentieth century 
rhetorical revival eventually intersected with and influenced the development and 
application of the rhetorical critical methods currently used by many researchers who 
work in the field of the Hebrew and Christian Bible studies.   
1.2   Early Greek Rhetoric: The Pre-Socratics in the Homeric-Sophistic Tradition 
  The pre-Socratics left a certain legacy to Western habits of thought by their 
emphasis on common sense, distance and curiosity. Lawrence Rosenfield has written that 
this constellation of terms confirms the fundamental theme of Greek civilization, that 
man is a social animal who achieves unique dignity in the act of speech. It was this 
presumed degree of common sense among members of the polis that the arts of discourse 
                                                          




(rhetoric, poetics and dialectic)32 became possible.33 Both dialectic and rhetoric were 
forms of critical activity practiced in association with others, Rosenfield explains, and as 
such opened directly into the public and political realms of human activity. Common 
sense, in the way that the pre-Socratics understood it, Rosenfield observes, rested on the 
idea that being and appearance were fundamentally related. This gave rise to a “common 
sense” feature of reality which could be disclosed to all those who shared a comparable 
experiences.  Rosenfield thought that this common foundation for public discourse was 
inseparable from its public expression.  Rhetoric which addressed the entire membership 
of the polis depended upon this common sense as a precondition for public activity. 34  
On the subject of distance, Rosenfield writes, that the pre-Socratics cultivated a 
sense of critical detachment from objects under consideration. This sense of distance 
became realized through the direct apprehension of reality as it was given to the mind 
through the senses. Further, he writes, an observer achieved a sense of critical detachment 
or distance by taking the stance of one who brings a sense of tranquility, objectivity and 
impartiality in recognizing the order inherent in phenomena. This mental attitude would 
allow the observer to interpret and evaluate the reality given to his reason through his 
senses.35 Where rhetoric as an activity sprang from the political grounds of common 
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discussion or debate. For the sake of debate, one of the interlocutors assumes a thesis, deduces a conclusion 
from this assumed thesis, a which conflicts with it and, on the basis of this contradiction, rejects the thesis. 
Dialectical argumentation is thus the art of arguing for and against something (van Eemeren 1996: 37). 
 
33 Rosenfield (1971: 65). 
 
34 Rosenfield (1971: 66). 
 




sense, Rosenfield wrote, it attained theoretical characteristics from the possibility of 
distance, which afforded consciousness in the Greek mind. Curiosity was the counterpart 
of commonsense and distance in the sense that it expressed a sense of wonder at the 
possibilities of what was achievable through mental effort based on common sense and 
distance. The pre-Socratic Greek mind exalted the intellect through acts of discourse, and 
held that thought was commensurate with its public display.  Rhetorical theory as 
originally conceived was a discourse about discourses and was both political and 
theoretical. 36 
George A. Kennedy, a scholar of classical rhetoric who was instrumental in the 
development of modern rhetorical criticism in New Testament studies, observed that the 
sixth through fourth centuries in Greece was one of the most creative periods in history. 
Kennedy thought that the ferment of those centuries set the intellectual and artistic basis 
for western civilization and featured developments in rhetoric, philosophy, science, 
literature and the arts. According to Kennedy, Greek rhetoric had two distinct strands: 
towards general statements of rules applicable in all situations, and toward breaking 
down universals into categories and subcategories that better define the particulars.  
Kennedy observed that there were three distinct approaches to Greek rhetoric have 
persisted with varying degrees of prominence through western intellectual history.37   The 
first was technical rhetoric, also thought of as a technê.38 This strand of rhetoric was the 
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37 Kennedy (1999: 13).  
 
38 Technê is a term derived from Greek that is often translated as “craftsmanship,” “craft” or “art.” Technê 
is also a term in philosophy which resembles epistēmē in the implication of knowledge of principles, 
although technê differs in that its intent is making or doing as opposed to disinterested understanding.  
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most conceptualized and is the ancestor of the rhetorical handbooks of Roman antiquity. 
This type of pragmatic rhetoric grew out of the needs of the democracies of Athens and 
Syracuse and remained primarily concerned with public address. It focused on the role of 
the speaker at the expense of the audience and was characterized as the art of persuasion 
within its public context. A second approach was Sophistic rhetoric which emphasized 
the speaker rather than speech or the audience.  Kennedy writes that Sophistic rhetoric 
was responsible for the image of the ideal orator leading society to noble fulfillment of 
national ideals. Some Sophistic rhetoric was deliberative and some was epideictic. The 
third strand, philosophical rhetoric, began with Socrates’ objections to technical and 
Sophistical rhetoric in dialogues by Plato.39 Philosophical rhetoric tended to de-
emphasize the speaker and to stress the validity of the message and the effect on the 
audience. This type of rhetoric has close ties to dialectic and logic, to ethics and political 
theory, and to psychology. Its natural topic, Kennedy writes, is deliberation about the best 
interests of the audience, but the philosophical strand in discussions of rhetoric is often 
found in combination with technical or Sophistical rhetoric.40 We can understand from 
the above discussion that the main types of rhetoric were closely related and, in many 
ways, overlapped with each other’s methods and concerns. 
The Sophistic movement coalesced in early fifth century BCE Athens and found 
its fullest expression in public discourse in a political or civic context.41  The Sophists 
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were also  known as paid itinerant teachers who wandered from city to city and used the 
tools of epideictic demonstration, which were elaborate show speeches on mythological, 
historical, or philosophical subjects illustrating forms of argument and furnishing 
examples of stylistic experimentation.42  Sophists were interested in natural philosophy 
but their main interests were in rhetoric, ethics, political theory and morality, and the 
theoretical epistemology of these subjects.43   
The Sophists’ main focus was on rhetoric and their doctrines were instrumental in 
shifting attention from the cosmological speculations of the pre-Socratics to 
anthropological investigations of a decidedly more practical character. Their goal was to 
turn a man into an effective citizen.44 The collective thinking of the Sophists, John 
Poulakos has written, can be stated in several doctrines, which are oriented to being in 
this world. According to this orientation, man is the measure of all things. Knowledge is 
grounded in human perception and language. Words differ from the things they name.  
Language can represent both that which exists and that which does not.  People are 
capable of and subject to persuasion. Social and political arrangements are the function of 
collective agreements brought about through persuasion. For every issue there are at least 
two arguments opposing one another. Justice in practical affairs is proscribed and 
regulated by the powerful.  The existence of the gods is outside the capabilities of human 
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knowledge; as humans understand them, the gods are human creations intended to 
exercise control over human behavior.45  
The Sophists had some radical views for their time. For instance, Gorgias, one of 
the greatest Sophists, held that nothing really existed, that anything that existed would be 
unknowable, and if anything were knowable, it could not be communicated to others.  
Protagoras held that there was no such thing as objectively right or wrong conduct, 
simply conduct that was ‘profitable’ or ‘useful’ and that which was not–– for which 
views Plato would portray him as an immoralist. But, Protagoras would dispute that he 
was opposed to there being any such thing as Platonic Form of Justice, Self-Control or 
Beauty–– all of which concepts are based on convention and compromise.46 They also 
thought that there was no such thing as a good argument.47 G. B Kerford has written that 
Sophists were among the intellectual leaders of the age in which they lived. Kerferd also 
argued that Socrates was among the Sophists. This idea may seem paradoxical, Kerferd 
thought, but the problems with which Socrates was concerned were, to a very large 
extent, the same, as those discussed by the Sophists and this is why he is always depicted 
as spending much of his life arguing with and against the Sophists.48 
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1.3 Plato’s Opposition to the Sophists 
Plato (c. 427-347 BCE), who lived contemporaneously with a number of the 
Sophists, had strong differences of opinion with them over how rhetoric ought to be 
defined and practiced. The context for Plato’s opposition to the Sophists is to be found in 
the details of the struggles within the democratic political environment of fifth century 
BCE Athens that are beyond the scope of this study. Sophistry, however, represented all 
that was worst about democracy, in Plato’s eyes, especially the cynical emphasis it placed 
on the shameless exploitation of the techniques of mass persuasion.49 Plato was not 
against the use of rhetoric, as is sometimes said, but rather he was against how the 
Sophists understood and used it.50 In fact, Edwin Black has written that Plato conceived a 
true art of rhetoric to be a consolidation of dialectic with psychology that would be 
applicable to all discourse, public and private, persuasive and expository, which aims to 
influence men’s souls. Plato’s modus operendi was to try to understand pure Form51of the 
structure of reality through the use of the dialectical method.52 Emile Janssens writes that, 
it may be said that for Plato dialectic is no longer a method but a system which 
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50 Black (1958: 361-374).  
 
51 Plato’s theory of forms, also called his theory of ideas, holds that there is another world separate from the 
material world that we live in called the “eternal world of Forms.” That world of “eternal Forms” was to 
Plato more real than the one we live in. 
 
52 The dialectical method is not formal logic but consisted of the study of the structure of the real world of 
Forms. Its technique of collection and division operates on that structure. Of these operations, the first was 
preliminary to the second, in the attempt to reach the indivisible definition of a species––a Form, by genus 




constitutes the whole of his philosophy.53 Dialectic, Black wrote, was Plato’s general 
scientific method; rhetoric was a special psychological application of it.54   
Plato’s views on rhetoric are mainly found in his dialogues Gorgias and Phaedrus. 
In Gorgias, Plato refutes an understanding of rhetoric that was shared by many influential 
and knowledgeable Sophists. The commonly held view was that rhetoric was that kind of 
persuasion which was exercised before public assemblies and was concerned with the just 
and the unjust.  Plato understood that Gorgias shared that definition of rhetoric as having, 
of necessity, a connection with just and unjust matters. Plato, through his dialogue with 
Gorgias and using his dialectical method, showed him that this was not the case. In 
Gorgias, it was not so much the amorality of rhetoric (that was under attack), but rather 
the inability of its teachers and practitioners to give a coherent account of it that 
delegitimizes its rhetoric in Plato’s view. Beneath Plato’s ethical critique was an attack 
on sophistic pedagogic pretensions and lack of substance which stemmed from its 
nomadic and rootless qualities and origins.55 Jonathan Barnes has written that the 
appellation “Sophist” became a term of abuse when Plato categorized them as tradesmen 
of cleverness and lovers of cash.56 Plato thought of rhetoric as practiced by the Sophists 
as a form of flattery that functions similarly to cookery, which masks the undesirability of 
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unhealthy food by making it taste good. He also thought of it as persuasion of ignorant 
masses within courts and assemblies.   
In Plato’s dialogues, he made use of three semi-technical terms, Dialectic, 
Antilogic and Eristic. Plato used the term Eristic as meaning to seek victory in argument 
and the art that cultivates and provides appropriate means and devices for securing 
victories. Antilogic meant the opposing of one Logos to another Logos, or drawing 
attention to the presence of such an opposition in an argument or state of affairs, in order 
to reveal their mutually contradictory relationship.  Plato considered that Antilogic could 
be a potent weapon in the practice of Eristic and thought of this combination as typical of 
how the Sophists conducted their arguments.57 He opposed the Sophists, in part, because 
of their willingness to engage in argumentation for the purpose of winning and not with 
the intention of arriving at the “truth.” In fact, Plato criticized the Sophists for privileging 
appearances over reality, making the weaker argument appear the stronger, preferring the 
pleasant over the good, and favoring opinions over the truth. 
Plato also differed with the Sophists in other ways as well. For the Sophists, the 
foundations of man’s humanness was the impulse to associate with his fellows within the 
social institution of the polis. In contrast, Plato claimed that that kind of social intercourse 
destroyed the philosophical act. For Plato, solitude became a precondition for thought and 
contemplation, and this was best done in isolation. Rosenfield wrote that Plato’s idea 
flew in the face of Greek experience, which thought that association with the community 
was the necessary means to achieve a superior life. For Plato, the sense world was a 
                                                          




distraction and caused confusion for the philosopher and he thus rejected the realm of 
appearances, which meant a rejection of reality as perceived through the senses. The 
effect of this was to bifurcate reality, and this notion had a disastrous effect on the entire 
concept of human communication as it led Plato to disclaim the validity of logos as an 
instrument of thought.58 For Plato, language was only an approximation of reality and it 
was thus was bound to mislead. Therefore, effective discourse about philosophical 
matters was impossible in Plato’s view.  In Plato’s way of thinking, rhetoric and the 
world of common sense and distance were separated from any legitimate connection to 
genuine thought. Thus by divorcing the ideas of common sense and distance from 
everyday reality, emotion became the dominant feature of the philosophical act.  
Philosophy became a compulsive pursuit of knowledge that was both lonely and 
dogmatic.59 The result of Plato’s way of thinking was that dialectic became alienated 
from its importance as a language art and thus detached from human experience.60   
The views of the Sophists and Plato’s opposition to them have shaped in 
important ways the history of rhetoric. To this day that conflict is an important source of 
significant insights on issues pertaining to language, ethics and education.61 At the heart 
of this controversy is the fact that from the time of Plato and Aristotle through the 
Enlightenment, dialectic had become conflated with formal logic and demonstration and 
                                                          
58 Rosenfield (1971: 68) 
 
59 Rosenfield (1971: 68). 
 
60 Rosenfield (1971: 68) 
 




rhetoric, argumentation and probable opinions held by audiences had been denied a 
relationship with reason or logic.62 Nonetheless, the Sophists can be said to have filled a 
necessary gap in Athenian education at the time and that by raising a multitude of 
questions in the fields of ethics, politics, psychology, epistemology, logic, and linquistics, 
they provked a great outburst of inquiry into those subjects by thinkers such as Plato and 
Aristotle.63 
1.4   Aristotle: The Student becomes the Master 
 Aristotle (384-322 BCE) broke with his master Plato on a number points related 
to dialectic and rhetoric. Before dialectic appeared in Plato as a science, Jannsen writes, it 
had come to be appreciated as an art, a sort of general technique, which in certain 
measure related to the rhetoric of the Sophists. Thus, for Plato’s contemporaries dialectic 
was not understood as the foundation of knowledge, but as an eristic, that is as a critical 
activity which was used to open the way to a deeper and more fruitful treatment of 
concepts. At that time, the arts of oratory and sophistic, rhetoric and dialectic seemed at 
the same time to complement and exclude one another. But, Plato had delimited and 
restricted the meaning of dialectic while at the same time giving it a precision accepted 
mostly by his followers. 64 One of Plato’s main purposes in founding his Academy was to 
repudiate all forms of enquiry, whether practical or theoretical, that might distract 
students from the proper business of philosophy—the contemplation of the entirely 
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rational and formal structure of reality revealed by the dialectical method. It was this 
position that was wholeheartedly rejected by the followers of Isocrates, Plato’s main 
counterpart among the Sophists, who saw nothing wrong with the pursuit of political 
influence by the use of techniques of persuasion.65 This significant difference of opinion 
was a source of confusion and Aristotle, who had been Plato’s student for twenty years, 
wanted to clarify the confusion surrounding sophistic, rhetoric and the Socratic method of 
dialectical reasoning.   
Aristotle is said to be one of the forefathers of modern logic because he wrote two 
volumes on Analytics.  Aristotle divided argumentation into two sorts syllogisms: 
deductive 66 and inductive.67  What we now call “formal logic” Aristotle called 
“analytics.” The method of Aristotle’s dialectical reasoning was a predicative logic,68 
based on three laws of thought: identity (A is A); non-contradiction (A cannot be both A 
and B), and the excluded middle (Either A is B or A is not B). Nevertheless, Aristotle 
made a distinction between analytical reasoning and dialectical reasoning. The former, 
characterized as a “first philosophy,” begins with premises that conform to the necessary 
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66 Deductive reasoning is a basic form of valid reasoning that starts out with a general statement, or 
hypothesis, and examines the possibilities to reach a specific logical conclusion. The conclusion is one that 
necessarily follows from two or more premises, one major and one minor premise. 
 
67 Inductive reasoning is opposite deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning makes broad generalizations 
from specific observations. Basically there are data and then conclusions are drawn from those data. 
 
68 Predicative logic, or first order logic, is a formal system used in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, and 
computer science. It uses quantified variables over non-logical objects and allows the use of sentences that 
contain variables, so that rather than propositions such as” Socrates is a man” one can have expressions in 





laws of formal logic, while the latter is characterized by its probable premises, namely 
starting points that are rooted in the probable beliefs and common sense of others.69 In his 
Rhetoric, the Topics and his Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle discussed his view that 
dialectical reasoning was concerned with opinions, a position that differed from the 
methods of Socrates. Dialectical, in Aristotle’s opinion, had the primary goal of 
defending one’s opinions, attacking others, and persuading an audience. In his Rhetoric, 
he held forth the idea that a speaker may impose his own authority (ethos) or arouse the 
emotions of the audience (pathos), and that dialectical was a justifiable mean of 
persuasion.70 Interestingly, Aristotle located the difference between the demonstration of 
formal logic and dialectical reasoning in the kind of premises used and held the opinion 
that the nature of reasoning in both cases was the same, consisting of drawing 
conclusions from propositions posited as premises.71 This distinction will become 
important when we discuss how Chaim Perelman exploited Aristotle’s views on dialectic 
to expand the realm of reason and argumentation in developing The New Rhetoric. In this 
regard, Perelman observed that dialectical reasoning was not important for metaphysics, 
where one is searching for realities presumed to be immutable,  but it is crucial when one 
comes to practical philosophy, where the concerns are those of ethics, politics and 
economics. Its importance lies in the fact these philosophies show us how to act, choose 
and decide in situations that are contingent in nature. It was Perelman’s opinion that 
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Aristotle had been influenced by both Plato and the Sophists and occupied a middle 
ground between the two.72 
On the question of rhetoric Aristotle narrowed its focus by defining three genres 
of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial or forensic and epideictic and by extending its definition 
by calling it the ability to identify the appropriate means of persuasion in any given 
situation. Aristotle’s starting point was the assumption that all knowledge, insights, and 
opinions, in so far as they arise from rational thought, are based on existing knowledge, 
insights and opinions.73 Aristotle thought rhetoric to be a counterpart of both logic and 
politics, and is credited with its best-known definition: 
Let rhetoric be defined as an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available 
means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art: for each of the others is 
instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example, medicine about 
health and disease and geometry about the property of magnitudes and arithmetic 
about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences. But, 
rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive about “the given” so to speak. 
That, too, is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, 
defined genus [of subject].74   
Aristotle’s redefinition had the effect of extending rhetoric’s scope to all fields 
and not just political discourse. He also identified three steps of rhetoric; invention, 
arrangement and style, as well as three types of rhetorical proofs: ethos, pathos, and 
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logos.  For Aristotle, the domain of rhetoric like the Sophists was civic affairs, but 
practical decision making and persuasion in all fields was within its scope. 
1.5   A Closer Look at the Sophists: The Legacy of the Sophists in Modern Rhetorical 
 Critical Theory 
For over two millennia, the Western view of rhetoric has focused on Platonic and 
Aristotelian formulations of it.  Regrettably, no writings survive from any of the Sophists 
and we have had to depend on inconsiderable fragments and often obscure or unreliable 
summaries of their doctrines or upon Plato’s profoundly hostile treatment of them.75 As a 
result, the views of the Sophists are not well known. Such being the case, the Sophistic 
position has been regarded as something of an obscure and interesting footnote. This 
diminished status presents the student of rhetoric with an incomplete picture and 
consequently, the rhetorical perspective of the Sophists has not received adequate 
attention.76  Taking a closer look at Sophistic ideas, however, will bear dividends, as their 
thinking is in some important respects in alignment with concepts and concerns embraced 
by modern rhetorical critical scholarship.  
Kennedy argued that the Sophistic position, which reached its fullest development 
by Isocrates (436-338 BCE), was revived in the Second Sophistic of Roman times, 77  and 
was converted to Christianity by preachers like Gregory of Nazinazus (329-390 AD). In 
Byzantine tradition it was a stronger force than in the western Middle Ages and 
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reemerged as a powerful force in the Renaissance era.78 Hegel (1770-1831 AD) tried to 
re-animate the Sophists by giving them both a place in the history of philosophy and by 
endowing their views with intellectual integrity. Hegel pointed out that the Sophists were 
a natural link between the Pre-Socratics and Platonic thought.79 Notwithstanding Hegel’s 
and others’ efforts to rehabilitate the Sophists, Western thought remained wedded to the 
two views of rhetoric represented by Plato’s Idealism and Aristotle’s system of 
Development.80 As a result of this imbalance, Poulakos has argued that Greek rhetoric 
should more correctly be viewed as a trilogy, wherein the first part has been ignored, in 
part because of its fragmentary nature, and in part because of an ill-deserved bad 
reputation.81  Nonetheless, Roger Moss wittily wrote that all the attacks on Sophistry 
inadvertently confirmed the tendency, as with sin, for it to keep cropping up!82 And it did 
in fact “crop up” again in the modern era in a number of important ways.    
G.B Kerferd has written that the modernity of the range of the problems 
formulated and discussed by the Sophists in their teaching is startling. Among the topics 
that the Sophists addressed Kerferd writes were the theory of knowledge and perception, 
the degree to which sense-perceptions are to be regarded as infallible and incorrigible, the 
nature of truth and above all the relations between what appears and what is real or true, 
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the relation between language, thought and reality, the sociology of knowledge, what is 
justice,  what the attitude of the individual should be on the subject values imposed by 
others, particularly in organized society requiring obedience to the laws of the state, the 
problem of punishment, and the nature and purpose of education among other topics.83  
Their concerns included correctly assessing the rhetorical situation, adapting to the needs 
of the audience, the nature of persuasion, the use of informal reasoning in argumentation 
and the temporality of rhetorical discourse.  
John Poulakos has written that although they were not rigorous systematizers as 
were Plato and Aristotle, the Sophists were the first to infuse rhetoric with life. They 
were not indebted to any formal rhetorical theory and therefore were free to experiment 
with form and style in fashioning their words.84 They were aware of the human 
limitations on the acquisition of knowledge and thus sought to ground the abstract 
notions of their predecessors in the actuality of everydayness. The Sophists were aware of 
the effect and power of words on people’s minds, and so they taught eloquence with the 
aim to show multiple points of view exist and to give force to those which harmonize 
with what appears to be most useful.85  Poulakos has offered a definition of rhetoric with 
which he thinks the Sophists might have agreed: Rhetoric is the art, which seeks to 
capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that 
which is possible.86 Inherent in this definition are concepts of rhetoric as an art, the 
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temporality of the rhetorical situation, the use of premises that are acceptable to the 
audience, and the contingent nature of future outcomes.  Poulakos writes that the Sophists 
thought of rhetoric as primarily a techné (art) whose medium was logos and whose 
double aim was terpsis (aesthetic pleasure) and pistis (belief). Seeing rhetoric as an art 
was important, Poulkakos writes because on the one hand it designated the S4ophistic 
view proper, and on the other, it helps place the controversy between Plato and the 
Sophists in the right light. Poulakos argues that rhetoric as ‘art’ does not admit criteria 
appropriate to strictly epistemological87 or axiological88  matters; nor does it call for the 
same considerations as does formal argumentation. With regard to episteme, rhetoric does 
not strive for cognitive certitude, affirmation of logic, or the articulation of universals. As 
a product conditioned by the people who create it, rhetoric moves beyond the domain of 
logic, and satisfied with probabilities, it lends itself to the flexibility of the contingent. 89  
The Sophists had been criticized by Plato who saw their emphasis on style as a liability 
and were held in contempt for being preoccupied with the non-essentials of rhetoric. 
However, the Sophist probably would have answered these charges, Poulakos thinks, by 
reminding their detractors that, if what is said must be said somehow, and that how is a 
matter of the speaker’s choice, then style merely represents the speaker’s mastery of the 
language and is a reflection of his personality.90   
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 The Sophist were interested in time in relation to speaking. They stressed that 
speech must show respect for the temporal dimension of the situation it addresses, that is, 
it must be timely. Speech must take in to account and be guided by the temporality of the 
situation in which it occurs.91  What compels the speaking in the Sophist view, Poulakos 
writes, is a sense of urgency that occurs in a situation that may be deemed out of control 
and where there appears to be a pressing need to speak or intervene with the power of the 
word in order to end a crisis, redistribute justice or restore order.92 The Sophistic sense of 
temporality does not come, Poulakos thinks, from a philosophical position regarding the 
nature of logos but from the observation that if what is said is timely, its timeliness 
renders it more sensible, more rightful, and ultimately more persuasive.93 It was in these 
many aspects that Sophistic ideas about the nature of rhetoric above, that alignment with 
modern rhetorical critical thinking and methods are found.  This is particularly the case 
with the views of two scholars whose work we will examine at length in the next 
chapters: Lloyd Bitzer and Chaim Perelman.  It is of particular importance for this study 
that Chaim Perelman, whose theory of practical argumentation is the basis upon which I 
will analyze Deuteronomy, traced its roots, in part, to Sophistic ideas.  Alonzo 
Tordesillas has written: 
Theoretical interest in Perelman is linked, for the main part, to the way in which 
he analyzes justice. This analysis is based on a preliminary positon defined in 
reference to the Greek philosophy as represented by Plato and Aristotle, in 
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contrast to the assertions of the Sophist and rhetors. He makes a careful and 
assiduous separation between the notion of demonstration and that of 
argumentation and supports the premises of his thesis regarding philosophical 
debate about justice with non-formal logic, not dissimilar to the arguments of the 
Sophistic period and the glorious moments of rhetoric. This logical retreat, leads 
him from the analyses of positive Right back to the positions defended by the 
Sophists.94 
1.6   The Widespread Phenomena of Rhetoric in the Ancient World: 
It comes as no surprise that rhetoric did not originate in Greece or in Israel. What 
we can say, however, is that the first systematic conceptualization of rhetoric did occur in 
Greece. Nevertheless, George Kennedy is of the opinion that the categories of rhetoric we 
associate with Greek thought are to be found in the speech of all cultures and that they 
inhere respectively in speaker, audience, and discourse.95  Carol Lipson and Roberta 
Binkley published two volumes which have explored the existence of long-standing 
rhetorical traditions that originate in many parts of the ancient world, including, 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, Israel India and Ireland.96 William Hallo has explored the 
birth of rhetoric in the ancient Near East and attempted to identify and isolate the 
categories and techniques of rhetorical expression found in extant early Akkadian, 
Sumerian and Egyptian writings. He found rhetoric well enough in evidence in these 
literary traditions that he was prepared to defend the notion that rhetoric was in fact, born 
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in Mesopotamia.97  Consequently, we are justified in saying that neither the rhetorical 
forms nor the literary genres which appear in the Hebrew Bible appeared out of a 
vacuum.  According to Tremper Longman it is best to see the rhetorical and literary 
genres found in the Hebrew Bible in light of their Near Eastern counterparts. Longman 
has written in this regard:  
Reading and writing take place in the context of literary conventions exploited by 
both readers and authors. Genre is a convention and, writers may not always be 
conscious of the generic tradition that is driving their writing. Indeed, readers 
would be lost of an author utilized a writing vehicle that was unique with no 
literary connections with what preceded it. It is hard to imagine what such a 
writing would look like. Authors thus naturally write within a generic tradition to 
give the reader some guidance as to “how to take” the writing on the page. In a 
sentence, writing triggers reading strategy. Genre signals are embedded in the text 
to evoke in the reader the proper response.98 
Thus no controversy is raised when we say that the writers of the Hebrew Bible, whose 
context was the ancient Near East, drew upon the broad traditions of Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, Canaan for guidance. Of course, we must also allow for original Hebrew 
innovations as well. I do not intend, however, to pursue this area of comparative rhetoric 
as it relates to literary and rhetorical antecedents from the ancient Near East. 99 
Whether or not the Hebrew writers might have engaged in some intellectual cross-
fertilization with the Greek thinkers of the Homeric-Sophistic era is a matter that John 
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Pairman Brown and others have investigated extensively.100 He has written that there 
were deep connections both culturally and linguistically between the Greeks and the 
peoples of the coastal Mediterranean including the Phoencians and Hebrews. He wrote: 
So, as Thebes was an inland city with a literary culture over against maritime 
Corinth. Jerusalem and Israel were the inland literary phase of the culture of 
which the Phoenician cities were the maritime. The traders of “Yawan,” however 
illiterate, must have conveyed hints of new cultural enterprises at Athens and 
Thebes. And, so, Phoenician traders surely conveyed hints of new beginnings at 
Jerusalem. The culture of the Phoenicians proper included much not in their own 
records. To fill the gap, the Hebrew Bible is by far the best witness. Since from 
Homer onwards Greeks were in regular contact with Phoenicians, a vast new area 
of demonstrable Helleno-Canaanite relations is revealed. We only need to open up 
Hebrew and Greek books side by side.101  
 Brown raises intriguing questions about what were the connections between 
Hebrews and the Greeks, two societies that came to birth in the same centuries, a week’s 
voyage apart with favorable winds.  Brown observes, however, that scholarship which 
ought to be exploring the connections between Israel and Hellas to a greater extent, seem 
to be hermetically sealed-off from one another for the most part. This has occurred in 
part, he says, because these two traditions make mutually exclusive claims for themselves 
through those two institutions, university and church.102 While this topic is of great 
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interest, and a lot can be said of the contacts between these two cultures starting in the in 
the first half of the first millennium BCE, it is beyond the scope of the present study.103 
1.7   Points of Comparison:  Deuteronomy and the Pre-Socratic-Sophist Movement 
 
 Until the present moment, we have focused mainly on the origins of Greek 
rhetorical traditions. This was necessary because those traditions have exerted profound 
influence on the academic study of rhetoric and still play an important role in our 
contemporary discussions of the topic as the revival of interest in the Sophists reveals.  
We cannot neglect their descriptive insights even when analyzing a rhetorical text like 
Deuteronomy that, arguably, has no trace of the Classical Greek rhetorical tradition in it. 
Rhetoric in the Hebrew Bible is an enormously large topic, and I will not attempt a 
general description of the topic. In this study, whose focus is rhetorical argumentation in 
Deuteronomy, we can begin to make certain comparative observations about the era of its 
compostion in relation to the range of Greek rhetorical traditions that we have reviewed. 
The first is that if we choose to locate Deuteronomy’s composition and redactions in the 
late First Temple and Exilic eras (ca. 750-539 BCE), one can rightly observe that the 
methods of rhetorical argumentation that appear in this corpus would precede the 
conceptualization of classical Greek rhetoric by a number of centuries.104 The second, is 
that, if we wish place the composition of Deuteronomy in a contemporaneous era in 
Greek culture, we would need to place the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy as living in 
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the pre-Socratics period of Homer (c. 751-651 BCE), Solon (c. 630-560 BCE), Thales of 
Miletos (c  610-546) and Pythagoras (582-496) and others.105  This means that if any 
alignments in rhetorical ideas existed between the Greeks and the Hebrews, one should 
search for them in that era. We have already mentioned a few similarities without 
drawing any explicit inference with regard to direct or indirect influences. 
1.8   The (Re) Discovery of the Hebrew Rhetorical Tradition 
 Simplistically, for heuristic purposes only, the history of Hebrew rhetoric can be 
roughly subdivided into four distinct periods: the classical Biblical period (1000-334 
BCE), the Hellenistic period (333 BCE -70 CE), the Talmudic period (70-600CE), and 
the Medieval period (600-1500 CE). Using a broad brush, Samuel Edelman has written 
that what characterizes the Biblical period is that it saw the development of a series of 
model speeches of topics in a “rhetorical narrative” approach.106 He further wrote: 
Biblical narrative is rhetorical because it establishes the credibility of religious 
and social practices for its audience as it features God without form, unitary and 
singular among social systems that worshipped pantheons of gods. The text of the 
Bible acts rhetorically in proving through metaphor and example the ascendency 
of a unitary, omnipotent, God over all other gods. In addition, the narrative of the 
Bible provides essential policies and laws designed to regulate behavior. During 
the biblical period, the rhetoric of the prophets focused on the ethics and morality, 
in essence, setting social boundaries of the new society being crafted under the 
vision of a monotheistic world.107 
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Edelman was of the opinion that the Hebrew Bible provided strong models of 
oratory and general communication, between people and God, people and people, and 
between people and their monarchs and religious leadership. Edelman is correct in his 
views up to a point, but does not take into account the many types of writing found in the 
Hebrew Bible, particularly poetry,  and the long period of time it took to complete them. 
His views may be more accurate if we think of them as describing a narrative text like 
Deuteronomy. 
These very general characteristics of Hebrew rhetoric in the Biblical period can 
help us to draw some tentative comparisons between Greek and Hebrew rhetoric.  George 
Kennedy has pointed out that the rhetoric found in the Hebrew Bible is pre-conceptual. 
By pre-conceptual Kennedy meant that the Hebrews did not have a theory of rhetorical 
discourse upon which they drew when composing their texts. In this sense, the Hebrew 
writers were similar to the pre-Socratics and the Sophists in their freedom to experiment 
with the use and power of oral and written language.  
The Jews of the pre-Christian era, Kennedy writes, seem never to have 
conceptualized rhetoric, though the importance of speech among them is everywhere 
evident.108 Phyllis Tribble makes an important and perceptive point about the Hebrew 
rhetorical tradition when she writes: 
However that we choose to explain it, the Hebrew concept of persuasion draws 
our attention to the fact that the Greek elevation and rationalization of rhetoric, 
cannot be considered a universal norm, not even in our own culture, which is 
based on both Hebrew and Greek traditions. Instead, it (Hebrew rhetoric) is a 
                                                          




particular development in a small society at a certain point in history that needs to 
be heard again with newly estranged ears. Hebrew rhetoric is in the paradoxical 
position, in our culture, of being at one, and the same time, foreign and 
foundational; an unassimilated other at the heart of western rationality. It is the 
foreigner’s perspective that a new encounter with the Hebrew tradition brings to 
the critical study of rhetoric.109 
 Tribble asserted that finding rhetorical argumentation in the Hebrew Bible is like 
the rediscovery of something fascinating that has been hiding in plain sight, only to be 
recognized once again, in the modern era.  But if we are proceeding on the premise that 
the rhetorical traditions found in the Hebrew Bible are not indebted to the Greeks, how 
shall we comprehend their methods and aims?  Margaret D. Zulick, writing about the 
methods of rhetoric and the art of persuasion in the Hebrew Bible has astutely 
commented: 
It is certainly true that the Hebrew Bible does not contain abstract rational 
reflection analogous to that of the Greeks. It does, of course, represent 
consummate rhetorical practice, containing recognizable forms of invention, 
arrangement and style, which were studied as rhetoric from the age of Origen (c. 
184-c. 253 AD) through the eighteenth century. Yet there is no speculation on the 
nature of rhetoric as with the classical Greeks. It is almost as if there is little room 
for rational abstraction of any kind, for the Hebrew conceptual sphere is totally 
occupied with deity---rich, close, and powerful. An ancient Hebrew rhetorical 
theory would be restricted to rules of a practical nature, concerning matters of 
truth and falsehood, speech and silence: “A soft answer turns away wrath,” and 
                                                          




the like. Conceptual abstraction of any sort, on the other hand, veers toward 
personification: rather than logical structures, sentient powers.110 
1.9   Points of Contrast: Differences in Metaphysics and Differences in How Persuasion 
Occurs 
 In addition to the aspects of Hebrew rhetoric that I have already mentioned above, 
I want to explore two aspects of rhetoric found in Deuteronomy that highlight certain 
characteristics of Hebrew rhetoric that we find in Deuteronomy that provide a good 
contrast with Greek rhetoric.  The first contrast is a metaphysical one that is, it concerns 
the source of authority (ethos) of the rhetor and this, of course, affects the willingness of 
an audience to listen. The second concerns the question of how persuasion occurs in a 
Hebrew Bible text like Deuteronomy even if we can detect informal logic in the 
discourse. In other words, is the informal logic or argumentation the source of persuasion 
or does it occur by some other mechanism?    
Phyllis Tribble has pointed out that some of the categories contained in the Greek 
five canons111 of rhetoric, as well as in counterparts of Aristotle’s three modes of artistic 
proof are in the Hebrew Bible.112  If we examine the source of ethos in Aristotle’s 
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establish in his work. The audience is induced to trust what he says because they trust him, as a good man 
or an expert on the subject; Pathos inheres in the audience and may be defined as the emotional reactions 
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category and compare it with how Deuteronomy presents this form of artistic proof, we 
will discover an important difference.  This difference between the ethos of a Greek 
orator and the ethos of Moses as a prophetic orator in Deuteronomy is a metaphysical 
one. 113 For example, a speech act like the ones that Moses utters in Deuteronomy, or as 
we might find in Hebrew Bible prophetic discourse generally, is one that is uttered by a 
speaker addressing an audience or an individual in the name of the divine. We may also 
find God speaking directly to an audience or an individual. The aim of this type of 
utterance is either to persuade, reprimand, provide an example, issue a command about 
something or someone or, offer a promise, or a threat to name a few reasons.  In the 
Greek case, the speaker’s aim, understood as seeking to persuade an audience in a court 
of law, civic assembly or Academy of learning, speaks in his own name. It is by virtue of 
the strength of his reason, logic and/or method that a certain judgment is made or some 
eternal “truth” revealed. The audience accepts his ethos to address them in the manner 
that he does because of his reputation, character and words.  
The civic context of the Hebrew and Greco-Roman writers and orators 
notwithstanding, the speaker, in the case of the Hebrew Bible, functions on a different 
metaphysical level from that of the Greek rhetor. The latter speaks only in his own name, 
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and with only his character and reputation (ethos) and his logic (logos) and method 
available to accomplish his purposes with an audience while the former presumes to 
speak in the name of a high unimpeachable authority.  Deuteronomy seems to distrust the 
type of speech, which comes from the mouth of humans without divine warrant, 
suspecting as did Plato, with regard to the Sophists, that it might well be meant to convey 
deceitful or wrongful intentions.114  In both cases of persuasive speech, the ethos or 
authority of the rhetor is a critical element, the difference being in the nature and source 
of the authority and intent of the rhetor. This distinction stands as a key feature that 
differentiates ethos in the Hebrew rhetorical tradition from that of the Greek. In both 
cases, there is the ethos of the rhetor, the act of persuasion, or the desire to influence the 
audience to reach a judgment of some kind, but the nature of the speech is profoundly 
different.  
According the biblical understanding, when God speaks directly to a prophet or 
person informing him what he must do or say, there is no higher authority than that 
authority, because His motives are thought to be unassailable and it is this inclination that 
makes the words persuasive. Thus, prophetic speech, being announced speech, is 
authoritative and persuasive because of its divine source, notwithstanding, any other 
forms of reasoning that many be present.115 For example, Dt. 5:4-7 conveys both divine 
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and prophetic speech and establishes Moses’ prophetic authority116 by God allowing his 
words to be conveyed by Moses to the assembled Israelites even at a moment when God 
himself is actively and visually present in the narrative: 
Dt. 5:4: Face to face, the Lord spoke to you on the mountain out of the fire---                                            
Dt. 5:5: I stood between the Lord and you at that time to convey the Lord’s words 
to you, for you were afraid of the fire and did not go up the mountain---saying: 
Dt. 5:6: I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the 
house of bondage. 
             Dt. 5:7: You shall have no other gods beside me. 
This is the type of rhetoric which is authoritative for the reasons described above 
and was also meant to engage the audience’s senses of hearing, seeing, and imagination. 
The narrative is at the same moment, close, personal, direct, numinous and authoritative. 
Looking again at the above passages, we see that the narrator/authors engage the eyes and 
the ears of the audience as well as their emotions of fear and loyalty. The two concepts of 
seeing and hearing are key to the kind of rhetorical persuasion that we find in 
Deuteronomy. 117  
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In Hebrew thought, the “heart” (lēb) carries a special meaning for the rhetor. It is 
not simply the heart organ but rather the seat of one’s inner-self, inclinations, disposition, 
will, intention, the mind in general and, as a whole, the conscience, but the respondent 
must be ready to listen and “hear.”118 When it involves divine or prophetic discourse, 
persuasion takes place in the heart of the listener. Persuasion occurs first with hearing the 
words, and then by taking them to (lēb) heart.  Zulink suggests that the Hebrew concept 
of persuasion creates a dilemma. She asks if the Hebrew Bible presents us with only two 
choices, true words from a divine source whose action in the heart is independent of the 
speaker, or pernicious attempts (by humans) to deceive themselves with smooth words? 
She writes: 
The Hebrew Bible contains a powerful theistic ideology. But that ideology is 
couched in a reservoir of ordinary speech and prosaic context, whether 
consciously or unconsciously transmitted. Admittedly, the theme of speech as 
divine revelation, and the consequential suspicion of speech as a human art, is 
pervasive.  But even if we bracket the explicit argument for the divine origin of 
words, there is still the whole range of ordinary speech, exemplified in the story 
of Judah and his brothers (Gen 37:26-27) in which the rhetorical act is 
accomplished by the hearer.119  
Ronald Katz has written that the core of the rhetorical transaction places the 
maintenance or disruption of Israelite spirituality in the control of the individual. It was 
central to Deuteronomic rhetoric that the Israelite sees in the “heart” a willful human 
operation which may disrupt the operation of Israelite spirituality. It was Katz’ view that 
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this was the point of Moses’ valedictory oration in Dt. 32:1-47 the point of which is 
expressed at its conclusion. 
Dt. 32:45: And when Moses had finished speaking all these words to all Israel,  
Dt. 32:46: he said to them, “Take to your heart all the words with which I have 
warned you this day. Enjoin them upon your children that they may observe 
faithfully all the terms of the teaching. 
Dt. 32:47: For this is not a trifling thing for you: it is your life; through it you 
shall long endure on the land that you are to possess upon crossing the Jordan. 
Katz argues here that these passages indicate the view that the audience has the 
intellectual control over the will to adhere to and nurture the covenantal spiritual 
conditions under which they are to possess the land. This occurs only when the teaching 
is “laid upon” the Israelites’ heart; then it can be conveyed to the children by the father as 
model and teacher. 120 
 Dt. 29:17-18 is another good example that shows how the narrator/authors 
engage the sense organs of the human body in the persuasive act, particularly engaging 
the sense of hearing and action of the heart. We see that this occurs when the 
narrator/authors, through the voice of Moses, requests that the Israelites take his 
exhortations to heart. 
Dt. 29:17:  Perchance there is among you, some man or woman, or some clan or 
tribe whose heart is even now turning away from the Lord our God to go and 
worship the gods of those nations— 
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Dt. 29:18:  When such a one hears the words of these sanctions, he may consider 
himself blessed in his own heart saying, “I shall be safe, though I follow my own 
willful heart,” to the ruin of moist and dry alike. 
In both sets of passages, we can see how the authoritative narrator/authors engage 
the senses and appeal to the heart of the individual Israelite in order to accomplish the 
persuasive act.  We can begin to see from the above discussion that the premises upon 
which the persuasive act occurs and is accomplished is very different.  We have briefly 
reviewed aspects of both the Greek and Hebrew rhetorical traditions.  Before we advance 
to a discussion of the revival of rhetoric in the 20th century, we may simply observe that 
in reception history these two traditions co-existed over the entire span of western 
civilizations but directly interacted only to a limited degree as independent rhetorical 
traditions.  
1.10   Rhetoric’s Ups and Downs Over the Centuries 
 
John D. O’Bannon has written that the classical rhetorical traditions of Greeks and 
Roman became displaced by two successive kinds of “certainty.” The first “certainty” 
was narratival and the second was logical. The church, convinced of the universality of 
its story, O’Bannon writes, restricted the use of invention, narration and proof to serve 
the activities of scriptural investigation. Later when scientific thinking rose to 
prominence, it tended to dislodge the church as the central institution of Western 
civilization. Science elevated logical methodology to a position virtually unquestioned 
and directly competed with the Christian narrative it began to replace.121  The existence 
                                                          




of a Hebrew rhetorical tradition, on the other hand, was a barely recognized phenomenon 
outside of Rabbinic or clerical circles.   
Rhetoric has had its ups and downs over the centuries. And in this regard, Jim 
Corder has constructed a skeletal set of crises that provides a limited but useful 
perspective on the history of rhetoric, especially since such crises continue to influence 
contemporary rhetoric and attitudes toward rhetoric.  Corder has written that historically 
rhetoric has gone through five crises: 
1. In the fourth century BCE, Plato’s charge that rhetoric was at best sophistry 
and calculation and at worst deception, falsehood, and immoral gave rhetoric a 
bad name. This charge was never wholly defeated. Plato did admit, however, 
that there could be such a thing as a “true rhetoric,” but it would come about 
only if rhetoricians were to probe for the truth in all matters, attempt to 
formulate essential definitions of particulars, and study man’s psychological 
dispositions so that they could adapt and arrange their arguments to suit the 
temper of the audience. Plato’s attack, however, led to the rhetoric of Aristotle 
and later to Cicero and Quintillian. 
2. In the third and fourth centuries, the Christian Church questioned whether to 
adopt the contemporary culture that the Romans had taken over from Greece. 
One of the issues was the contrast between the Verbum (Word of God) and 
Verbum (Word of Man). This debate over the appropriateness of rhetoric were 
variations of the old charge against sophistic rhetoric, stylistic calculations and 
eloquence without substance. Rhetoric emerged enlarged from this crisis with 
the value of Cicero’s work reaffirmed and with rhetoric well established at the 
center of education. 
3. The sixteenth and seventeenth century saw rhetoric fragmented by a focus on 
rhetoric as the art of speaking, that is, elocution and pronunciation. The effect 
was to sever invention and arrangement from rhetoric. This trend was fostered 
and hastened by Peter Ramus who argued that invention and arrangement 
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belonged to logic rather than to rhetoric, this leaving to rhetoric only style and 
delivery.  
4. The eighteenth century might be described as rhetoric in search of its substance 
and method. Debate centered around whether to preserve classical rhetoric 
whole or to persist in the fashion of the stylistic rhetoricians of the renaissance, 
or to focus on elocution. Others sought to explore rhetoric along the 
philosophical or psychological theories of John Locke, Frances Hutcheson, 
David Hume and Adam Smith. As a result of these developments, rhetoric as a 
persuasive art became scattered. 
5. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it may be argued that the crisis of 
rhetoric may be reduced to a single crux: in the face of opposing arts and other 
appeals, rhetoric became irrelevant. In the modern era one cannot think of 
rhetoric in the same way that the ancients did. We cannot write Aristotle’s 
rhetoric. If Aristotle were to be miraculously brought among us, Aristotle 
himself could not write Aristotle’s rhetoric. Modern rhetoric lowers the barrier 
between speaker or writer and audience. It shifts the emphasis toward 
cooperation, mutuality and social harmony.122 
Importantly, Corder observes that it was still the case half way through twentieth 
century that rhetoric had not overcome its bad reputation. Rhetoric retained the label of 
empty language, or language meant to deceive as Plato thought of it, or of emphasizing 
style at the expense of thought. As a result, rhetoric seemed to have very little practical 
utility, and it was in that sense that the “old” rhetoric seemed to be irrelevant to modern 
discourse.123 This was about to change in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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1.11   The Revival of Rhetoric in the American Academy and the Rhetorical Turn in the  
20th Century 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, interest in rhetoric had undergone a 
decline primarily due to the rise of scientific inquiry and the consequent drive to view 
knowledge as founded upon observable fact rather than upon logic or persuasion.124 
Notwithstanding this preference for scientific inquiry and millennia of controversy about 
the place of and role of rhetoric, the early part of the twentieth century saw a revival of 
interest in rhetoric.  This interest coalesced as a formal discipline within the United States 
in the field of speech communication and within the context of Progressive-era 
politics.125 The immediate impetus for this development stemmed from a desire on the 
part of some forward-looking intellectuals and educators like John Dewey to prepare the 
citizenry to participate fully in the mass transformation of democratic society they saw 
about to occur. Interestingly, public education and public speaking became their central 
focus, because they were considered essential to being an effective citizen.  
The initial study of rhetorical theory within the twentieth century field of speech 
communication focused on the historical examination of classical and humanist models 
of communication, persuasion and governance. Such study had a dual function. On the 
one hand, it bestowed legitimacy on the new discipline by demonstrating its ancient and 
historical roots in the writings of respected philosophers such as Plato, Isocrates, 
                                                          
124 Tull (1999: 157). 
 
125 Lucaites and Condit (1999: 7-8). The Progressive Era was a period of widespread social activism and 
political reform across the United States that spanned the 1890s to the 1920s. The main objectives of the 
Progressive movement were eliminating the problems caused by industrialization, urbanization, 




Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, St. Augustine and others.  At the same time, the 
treatises written in classical antiquity, the Renaissance and up until the nineteenth century 
provided sources of effective strategies for teaching the art of rhetoric to college students. 
126 In this context, Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric once again became very influential in 
shaping the disciplines’ perception of the meaning of rhetoric, its roles as a strategic art 
and as a philosophy of communication. Scholars treated the subject of rhetoric, in this 
period, as a topic in intellectual history, and this way of thinking prevailed in the 
American academy from the nineteen-twenties until mid-century.127 In fact, colleges and 
universities that host speech and communications programs which offer advanced 
degrees in rhetorical theory are still widely available in the United States as of 2019. 
By mid-century, scholars realized that “new” rhetorical theories were needed that 
could be adapted to the changing conditions of a new era.  Between the late 1950s until 
1976, the fundamental focus of rhetorical theory shifted from a concern with intellectual 
histories and simple classical models of rhetorical pedagogy to an interest in 
understanding the relationship between rhetorical and social theory.128 These factors 
were, in part, the academic and intellectual milieu that formed the backdrop to interest in 
applying aspects of critical theory to Biblical studies.  
David A. Frank has written that some philosophers and scholars began to 
recognize a “rhetorical turn” in the nineteen fifties but failed to contextualize it 
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historically. Frank points out how 1958 was a critical year in this regard, as it saw a 
number of landmark books published that either implicitly or explicitly engaged with 
rhetorical theories and models. Frank explains this “turn” as these, and others authors, 
working through and responding to questions raised by the traumas of the twentieth 
century including the Holocaust, the destruction wrought by the totalitarian governments 
of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, the cold war and the threat of nuclear 
war.129  In addition, there were a number of other important social phenomena that 
appeared in the post-World War II era that required new thinking as well. The first was 
the meteoric rise of television as a mass communications medium of public discourse. 
The second was the rise of grassroots social movements. These phenomena became the 
subject of a rethinking by rhetorical theorists of what changes in public discourse might 
become associated with these phenomena.130  
1.12   The Seeds of Ferment and the Birth of Rhetorical Criticism 
In the intellectual context we have just reviewed, scholars in the field of speech 
communication attempted to outline and amplify a theory of rhetoric suitable to 
twentieth-century concepts and needs.  They drew on a variety of sources including the 
classical tradition of rhetorical thought, aesthetic theory, literary theory and criticism, and 
various forms of critical social theory.131 In so doing, they identified four separate 
objectives with regard to the subject of rhetorical criticism: (1) articulate the nature of 
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rhetorical criticism, (2) identify the object of this form of critical activity, (3) identify 
specific procedures or methods for practicing criticism, and (4) specify the particular 
function(s) or purpose(s) of rhetorical criticism.132  In 1973, D.C. Bryant offered a 
definition of rhetorical criticism that seemed to provide a sense of its nature: 
Rhetorical criticism… is directed to (1) discovering and explicating the elements 
and form of particular discourses; (2) generalizing particular discourses, or their 
informative-suasory dimensions into the wider phenomena of the rhetorical, 
especially public address; (3) showing how particular discourses participate in 
families of didactic and suasory discourses to which they may be related; and 
finally (4) supporting value judgments.133 
In the formative period of rhetorical criticism, scholars spent a great deal of 
energy trying to decide how they were to go about their work in the absence of an over-
arching theory upon which to proceed (as the Wingspread Conference in 1970 stands 
tribute).134  In the end the field seemed to settle on a set of objectives.  Rhetorical 
criticism proceeds along the following lines: 
(1) It defines either implicitly or explicitly its object. 
(2) It classifies its object in a specific category or genre.  
(3) It analyzes as it seeks to describe how an object is  put together and how it 
works. This involves the careful reconstruction and unpacking of an object’s 
structure, design and constituent features. 
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 (4) It interprets by a process of decoding and translating. It takes something that 
may be opaque or confusing, a word, phrase, passage or text and makes it 
intelligible by bringing out its latent meaning and. 
 (5) It evaluates and assesses the effectiveness of the object of study.135  
The above criteria can be said to form the background to any of the work in 
rhetorical criticism that has taken place in the later-half of the twentieth century and this 
also applies to rhetorical criticism of the Hebrew Bible. 
1.13   The Beginnings of Rhetorical Criticism in Biblical Studies in the Late Twentieth 
Century 
Rhetorical criticism in Biblical studies is a recent phenomenon136  that traces its 
roots to a speech given by James Muilenburg in 1968 in his presidential address before 
the Society of Biblical Literature.137 Muilenburg, a form critic, felt that his chosen 
methodology had reached an impasse and that a new approach to Scripture using 
rhetorical critical methods was needed. Muilenburg was critical of the form critical 
method which he observed had “a proclivity to lay such stress upon the typical and 
representative aspects of a literary genre to such a degree that the individual, personal and 
unique features of a particular pericope were all but lost to view.” 138 While Muilenburg 
thought that form critics’ interest in the genre’s role in the life of Israel was theoretically 
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useful, the sought after Sitz im Leben was practically impossible to recover and 
reconstruct. It was this impasse that led Muilenburg to believe that form-critical analysis 
should be supplemented with a careful inspection of the precise verbal and thematic 
patterns in biblical pericopes. Muilenburg was particularly interested in trying to 
understand the nature of Hebrew literary composition and the structural patterns and 
devices that were used to fashion a literary unit, be it prose or poetry, into a unified 
whole. An enterprise of this nature, he thought, would qualify to be described as an 
investigation of rhetoric in general and the methodology to be employed as rhetorical 
criticism. Muilenburg, however, was not overly specific about what rhetorical critical 
methods he had in mind and his “school” worked without an identifiable method. What 
Muilenburg proposed was a rhetorical criticism that focused on the linguistic and 
structural features of a particular text, in its present form, apart from its generic rootage, 
social usage or historical development.   
Muilenburg’s proposal was criticised because his definition of rhetoric (as the 
understanding of the nature of Hebrew literary composition) and a rhetorical criticism 
based upon his ideas was not in accord with how rhetoric had been understood since the 
time of Aristotle.  Aristotle’s view held that the point of rhetoric was that of persuasion in 
the service of reaching a judgment and this was not at all what Muilenburg had in mind.  
One critic pointed out that, studying stylistic-aesthetic features of a text apart from the 
issue of ‘suasion’ did not qualify as rhetorical criticism.139  What the theorists of the 
Muilenburg school failed to realize was that the prevailing theories of rhetoric had been 
                                                          




victims of that “rhetoric restrained,” that is, victims of the fateful reduction of rhetorics to 
stylistics and of stylistics in turn to the rhetorical tropes or figures of speech.140 This is a 
“rhetoric restrained” that W. Wuellner argues, had its origins in the time of St. Augustine 
(354-430 CE) who in his De doctrina christiana established the practice of listing 
rhetorical figures of speech and figures of thought found in select parts of the Bible, a 
practice that had been tenaciously adhered to until the contemporary era.141 Apparently, 
the scholars of Muilenburg’s ueneration had not realized how rhetoric had become 
fragmented along its trajectory through western civilization.  According to Wuellner, a 
rhetoric that had becomu reduced to concerns of stylistics and with the artistry of textual 
disposition and structure had become indistinguishable from literary criticism.142   
Muilenburg’s writings on rhetorical criticism spauned in the 1970s through 1990s 
a “Muilenburg School”143 that while similar to Muilenburg’s approach, over time 
diverged from and built it up in important ways.144 The ensuing debate within the 
Muilenburg school, however,  set the stage for a more broad based view of what 
rhetorical criticism should try to accomplish. Muilenburg and his school tended to agree 
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on three basic notions.  The first was to affirm the idea that every text is both typical and 
unique and that rhetorical criticism should be concerned with a text’s unique features. 
Second, there was the presumption that form and content must be interrelated in the 
interpretation of any text. Third, there was general agreement that rhetorical criticism had 
two foci: to determine the boundaries of larger literary units and to describe rhetorical 
devices which unify particular texts. Up until that point the Muilenburg School was in 
agreement with Muilenburg’s original proposal that rhetorical criticism should be the 
study of stylistics of composition in Hebrew prose and poetry. 145 
In the 1970s, a hermenutical shift occurred among emerging rhetorical critics 
which became central to the progress of the Muilenburg School but differed sharply from 
Muilenburg’s ideas. There were three issues over which Muilenburg and his School 
differed. The first issue had to do with whether texts should be interpreted “intrinsically” 
or “extrinsically.”  Choosing to look at texts “intrinsically” the Muilenburg School 
rejected the idea that the interpreter could uncover an author’s intention, nor could any 
hermenuetic be based on this notion. Muilenberg, however, thought the opposite, 
favoring a rhetorical criticism which employed an extrinsic method which would reveal 
the texture and fabric of the writer’s thoughts.  The second issue on which the 
Muilenburg School also diverged from Muilenburg was over the question of whether 
texts should be interpreted diachronically or synchronically. For Muilenburg, rhetorical 
criticism took place within the context of form criticism which meant that it had a 
diachronic aspect to it. This was the case because Muilenburg was comparing poetic units 
                                                          




against a backdrop of “pure” Gattungen. The Muilenburg School, however, removed 
rhetorical criticism from the realm of form criticism and relocated it within the bounds of 
literary criticism.  This meant that rhetorical criticism became a method which examined 
only the presunt or final form of a text which is a synchronic approach. A third issue 
upon which Muilenburg and his School differed was over the critical question of the 
relationship between form and content.  In this regard, the Muilenburg School held that 
texts should be interpreted synchronically and intriusically, while Muilenburg held the 
opposite view that texts should be interpreted diachronically and extrinsically.  This 
disagreement affected the question of how to treat of form and content, which became a 
central issue for rhetorical criticism. The Muilenburg School held that form meant only 
the present structure of a text. On the question of content, the Muilenburg School held 
that content is not the author’s intent, but only the unique configuration of details that an 
interpreter imposes upon a text.  This meant that finding the meaning of a text could no 
longer be the goal of interpretation. Muilenburg, in fact, held the opposite view that, 
understanding the configuration of the unique details of a text ultimately yielded a 
singular meaningu Nevertheless, between Muilenburg and his School there was a 
common concern to study the stylistics of Hebrew prose and poetry. In depite of their 
differences, Muilenburg’s work and that of his School were deemed important and did 
spawn a generation of research along the lines he proposed during the 1970s through the 
1990s. In fact, it can be said that Muilenburg made rhetoric and rhetorical criticism 
fashionable.146 Ultimately, however, the practioners of rhetorical critical method settled 
                                                          




upon an approach that combined Muilenburg’s ideas with those of his School. George A. 
Kennedy, however, took the subject in new directions as we will see below. 
1.14   Approaches to Rhetorical Criticism after Muilenburg: The Influence of George A. 
Kennedy 
 
The field of rhetorical criticism after Muilenburg expanded greatly and went off 
in many different directions after Muilenberg’s address.147 In the late 1980s, Wilhelm 
Wuellner observed that rhetorical criticism had taken us [the field] beyond hermeneutics 
and structuralism148 to post-structuralism149 and post-hermeneutics. He thought a rich 
harvest was in store on account of all the efforts that were then underway in the vast 
fields of the history of western and non-Western rhetoric—fields he thought had long 
been neglected and abused.150  After Muilenberg presented his ideas and the Muilenberg 
School reworked those ideas, G. A. Kennedy, a New Testament scholar, sought to expand 
rhetorical critical methodology beyond the descriptive study of stylistics in order to probe 
the persuasive power of texts to influence action or practice.151  He thought that seeing 
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rhetorical criticism as focusing only upon styistics was a limitation and distortion of the 
discipline of rhetoric that should be set aside.  
Kennedy thought rhetorical criticism was more of a historical enterprise and that 
texts should be studied from the the point of view of the author’s intent, its final form and 
how it would have been perceived by an audience of near contemporaries.152 Kennedy’s 
reasons for redefining rhetorical criticism in the way that he did were both historical and 
hermeneutical.  His historical interest was lodged in the idea of restoring the connection 
between rhetoric and persuasion. This idea arose from his understanding of classical 
rhetoric, where argumentation for the purpose of influencing or persuading was a core 
concern. On the question of hermeneutics, Kennedy’s ideas were also related to his 
understanding of classical rhetoric. Kennedy’s emphasis on the question of persuasion in 
a text raised two questions that became crucial to rhetorical critical discussions.  The first 
was how experience was organized in a text, and second, how does the organization of a 
text precondition certain attitudes toward the world and other people in both the writer 
and the reader.153  The results of Kennedy’s work was to show that texts should not be 
treated as isolated objects of study in which sylistic features are described, but rather as 
an object to be placed and comprehended within their historical context. Kennedy further 
expanded the reach of rhetoric as embodying an inherent relationship between the text 
and the world from which it emerged. By contrast with Muilenberg, who advocated for 
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an ahistorical approach to rhetoric, Kennedy joined Chaim Perelman, Lloyd Bitzer and 
others who emphasized the importance of evaluating texts within their historical contexts.  
Chaim Perelman and his colleague Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca were interested in 
identifying the basic methods used in contingent arguments154 addressed to audiences of 
any sort. They co-produced one of the most important and influential contributions to 
modern rhetorical critical theory in their 1958 study, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation. That treatise was followed up in 1982 by Perelman in a shorter version, 
The Realm of Rhetoric which revised and updated the findings of the former. In this 
second volume, Perelman focused on two questions: (a) how claims of reasonableness 
arise in prose that is not formally logical, and (b) what does justification of values look 
like in actual verbal discourse?  These two questions will become important later in this 
study when I apply Perelman’s insights on argumentation to the text of Deuteronomy.  
Phyllis Tribble, in her 1994 survey of developments in the field of rhetorical 
criticism in the late twentieth century, explains Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
approach of The New Rhetoric: 
The authors explicated a philosophical base for the domain of argumentation. 
They held that through agreed upon principles, argumentation seeks to establish a 
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community of minds for debating issues and obtaining assent. Of the five parts of 
classical rhetoric, they privileged inventio (the material gathered) and disposito 
(the arrangment), subordinating elocutio to its function within argumentation, and 
ommitting memoria and actio as inapplicable to contemporary culture. Of the 
three elements involved in every act of communication (speaker, speech, and 
audience) they privileged the relationship of the speaker and the audience and 
thus the social historical context for rhetoric.  Of the three types of speech, they 
appealed to each: the epideictic, the deliberative and the judicial. Though they 
declared that rhetoric characterizes all human discourse, the bulk of their 
discussion classified and described techniques of argumentation.155  
The rhetorical critical approach to biblical texts that developed in the decades 
after Muilenburg, drew on Greco-Roman classical roots. This is also true for the work of 
Perelamn and Olbrechts-Tyteca as I will explain further in Chapter Three. Grounding 
rhetorical criticism in classical Greek rhetoric was particularly advantageous for New 
Testament studies because the New Testament authors were Hellenized Greek speaking 
individuals and were no doubt familiar with Greek rhetorical traditions. In the 1980s, it 
was natural for George A. Kennedy, a classics scholar, to draw upon these traditions of 
rhetorical construction for his work in the New Testament. Kennedy observed that 
rhetoric had been a systematic academic discipline universally taught throughout the 
Roman empire. Given that the books of the New Testament were written in Greek to be 
read by Greek speakers, many of them with some experience in Greek education, the use 
of Greco-Roman catagories and methods may be a better and more natural fit for New 
                                                          




Testament studies than for Hebrew Bible studies, but,  he opined this is not necessarily 
the case.156  Kennedy felt that: 
Old Testament scholars would benefit greatly from self-consciously focusing 
upon speeches and other discourses in the Bible with an eye to discerning the 
means of persuasion practiced. We may note that the point of all religious writing 
may be seen as “rhetorical” in the sense that it attempts to change behavior (and 
to convince). In that sense, the entire Bible is rhetorical and biblical rhetorical 
critics can study the arguments of any biblical author to discern the means of  
persuasion.157 
Kennedy and other scholars who were working in biblical studies in that era 
began to apply Neo-Aristotelian methods and other critical apporaches  to their rhetorical 
studies of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament texts in order to break new ground in 
their understanding of how argumentation and persuasion could be seen to proceed in 
their chosen object of inquiry. 158 
1.15 On the Rhetorical Critical Method                                 
Edwin Black,159 an important scholar of rhetoric whose work helped shape 
modern rhetorical critical methods, commented on the inherently personal nature of 
rhetorical criticism: 
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Methods, then, admit of varying degrees of personality. And criticism, on the 
whole, is near the indeterminate, contingent, personal end of the methodological 
scale. In consequence of this placement, it is not possible or desirable for criticism 
to be fixed into a system, for critical techniques to be objectified, for critics to be 
interchangeable for purpose of [scientific] replication, or for rhetorical criticism to 
serve as a handmaiden of quasi-scientific theory, The idea is that critical method 
is too personally expressive to be systematized.160  
Notwithstanding Black’s comments above, concerning the lack of a universal 
methology being available to the rhetorical critic, the debates of Muilenberg and his 
“school,” and the work of George A. Kennedy, the 1990s saw the emergence of some 
common methodological elements to rhetorical critical analysis.  There are generally 
three prominent features of the rhetorical critical method that are applied to a given text 
or corpus under review that I will follow in this study:  
1. Texts are to be addressed as a synchronic whole within their historical 
context.  
2. The scholar will normally make use of one or more modern literary or critical 
theories. 
3. An effort to understand the “meaning” or “meanings” of the text becomes an 
important goal.   
 Kennedy, whose research sought to advance the project of rhetorical criticism 
generally, developed a methodological approach to rhetorical criticism.  Kennedy thought 
that his approach would help to fill the void between form criticism on the one hand and 
literary criticism on the other hand and that it would certainly be applicable to Hebrew 
                                                          
 




Bible studies. Kennedy’s six-step model161 for rhetorical critical analysis, drawn from 
many sources including  form critcism,162 modern rhetorical critical theory,163 and 
classical Greco-Roman rhetorical catagories, provides a useful guide for rhetorical 
critical analysis. I will follow some aspects of Kennedy’s approach in this study, but will 
diverge from Kennedy’s neo-Aristotlian model by using the concepts found in The New 
Rhetoric for my analysis of the rhetorical argumentation that we will encounter in 
Deuteronomy. Nontheless, I have adapted Kennedy’s organizational system, and for the 
sake of clarity, and filled in some of details that I thought were missing from his own 
outline of his approach. Kennedy’s model may be described in the following way: 
1. Determine the rhetorical unit: The rhetorical unit must have a beginning, 
middle and an end. In some cases, a smaller unit is obvious, like for instance 
Dt. 32: 1-46––The Song of Moses. If the unit is contained within a larger 
work, it is important to bear in mind the overall rhetoric of the book. The 
rhetoric of large units often has to be built-up from smaller units. One 
rhetorical unit may be contained within a large one and serve to build up a 
structure that embraces a whole book. The rhetorical unit should have some 
magnitude with some discernable beginning and ending connected by some 
action or argument. In this study, the book of Deuteronomy will be treated a 
                                                          
161 Kennedy (1984: 33-38). 
 
162 Renz (2002: 13), According to Renz, form criticism consists of a five-step process, as follows: (1) 
isolation of the unit, (2) analysis of the structure (Form), (3) description of the genre (Gattung), (4) 
definition of the setting or settings, and (5) statement of the intention, purpose, or function of the text. The 
form critical model has some similarities with Kennedy’s model. 
 




coherent rhetorical unit notwithstanding its six recognized divisions.164 I have 
chosen to take this approach because, while Deuteronomy contains sub-
divisions or sub-units, the work as synchronic whole has strong evidence of 
thematic unities that cut across all of its internal boundaries. 
2. Define the rhetorical situation and the audience: This concept was first 
articulated by Lloyd Bitzer in 1968 and was considered by Kennedy to be a 
useful tool of practical criticism. 165 The concept of rhetorical situation goes 
beyond the notion of the Sitz im Leben.  It is concerned with the relationship 
between persons and their environment and with the origin and goal of the 
communication act as well as its historical context.  Bitzer’s concept of the 
rhetorical situation goes to the heart of the rhetor audience relationship and, 
was an important concept in Kennedy’s model.  I will employ Bitzer’s ideas 
when analyzing the relationship of the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy and 
the several audiences that exist in text. In addition to Bitzer’s ideas, I will use 
some concepts from other scholars including, Walter Ong,166 Lisa Ede and 
Andrea Lunsford,167 and Robert Polzin168 who have made significant 
contributions to understanding the rhetor-audience relationship. In Chapter 
                                                          
164 See footnote #2 in the Introduction. 
 
165 Bitzer (1968: 1-14). 
 
166 Ong (1975: 9-21). 
 
167 Ede and Lunsford (1984: 155-171). 
 
168 Polzin (1981: 193-211). 
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Two, these scholars will help us understand more clearly the dynamics of this 
relationship in Deuteronomy.  
3. Identify the overriding rhetorical problem to which the discourse is addressed: 
There are two classical frameworks for this type of determination. The first is 
to pinpoint the stasis, that is, to state what specific question is at issue. The 
second, is to specify what kind of judgment is being demanded of the 
audience. In this study, I will demonstrate that, the overriding concern on the 
minds of the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy was how to overcome the threat 
of apostasy (the stasis). The narrator/authors purpose was to persuade the 
audience to reject foreign gods and all aspects of their worship practices and 
mentality that embraced those practices so that they might live in the land the 
God had promised them (the judgment). 
4. Clarify the rhetorical genre (inventio):   What Kennedy had in mind, is that the 
critic seeks to discover the arguments that the rhetor constructed or invented 
to address the rhetorical situation. The critic needs to engage in line-by-line 
analysis in order to identify the arguments including: premises already 
accepted by the audience, assumptions, presumption and topics.  The critic 
needs to identify whether the arguments appeal to one of the three modes of 
argumentation: ethos, pathos, or logos.  The critic must also define the 
function of these arguments in addressing any exigence that may exist. This 
step involves determining what subdivisions are found, what is their 
persuasive effect, and how these parts do or do not work together for some 
unified purpose to address the rhetorical situation. Kennedy’s work in 
69 
 
rhetorical criticism is firmly lodged in classical categories because his 
interests were mainly New Testament. In this study, classical categories will 
stand in the background and not be the main means of analysis because I have 
concluded they cannot get to the heart of the arguments being made in 
Deuteronomy.  In this study of Deuteronomy, which seeks to unravel the 
rhetorical structure and argumentative techniques used by the narrator/authors 
of the work, I will be employing the analytical techniques of Chaim Perelman 
called Argument Schemes.169 These will assist us to identify the types of 
premises upon which the narrator/authors relied and techniques they used in 
their argumentation.  Perelman’s interests centered around the questions of 
how people establish value hierarchies and reach value judgments when 
informal arguments are employed in contingent situations. As Deuteronomy 
was composed outside of the orbit of classical Greek rhetoric, Perelman’s 
New Rhetoric provides a new conceptual framework to describe and 
comprehend the argumentation in Deuteronomy that fits well with its 
rhetorical situation. 
5. Identifying rhetorical techniques or style (dispostio): In this stage of the 
critical analysis, the critic needs to determine how previous rhetorical choices 
(1-4 above) worked to create a particular arrangement (dispositio) of the 
arguments. Here Kennedy combines this category with another from classic 
rhetoric, that of elocutio. 
 
                                                          




6.  Identifying rhetorical strategy as a synchronic whole: The critic at this stage 
must analyze the overall rhetorical strategy designed to move the audience or 
reader to agree with the reader or writer. Here the opportunity exists to 
describe the whole argument as something greater than its rhetorical parts. 
1.16   Summary 
 We have touched upon many aspects of rhetoric’s historical trajectory in this 
review.  We’ve gotten a feel for how things got started and how they developed. We’ve 
seen how the revival of rhetoric in the American academy in the first half of the twentieth 
century transitioned in the second half of the twentieth century into a subject of inquiry 
with broader contemporary warrant. A new type of rhetorical analysis emerged that dealt 
more broadly with theories of discourse and epistemology, investigating the relationships 
among language, persuasion, knowledge and social control.170 We have also come to 
appreciate the development of the rhetorical critical method, its aims and  concerns. Let 
us now begin to explore more closely, some of the theoretical rhetorical critical 
approaches that are available and see how they help us understand argumentation and 
persuasion in the book of Deuteronomy. We begin in Chapter Two by examining the 
Rhetorical Situation and Audiences of Deuteronomy. 
 
  
                                                          





The Rhetorical Situation and the Audience in Deuteronomy 
Abstract 
  This chapter will introduce the reader to a number of concepts that will be 
employed in my discussion: rhetorical situation, mutual fictionalization, “invoked” versus 
“addressed” audiences, and “reporting” versus “reported” speech.  At a theoretical level, 
these concepts will be helpful in arriving at a deeper appreciation of the dynamics of the 
rhetor/audience relationship, which is closely linked to understanding the nature of the 
rhetorical situation. These ideas have practical application to the rhetorical critical 
analysis of Deuteronomy in that they provide different and complementary ways of 
looking at the prerequisites to the emergence of  argumentative discourse that occurs in 
Deuteronomy. This chapter will seek to establish the idea that the problem of apostasy 
was at the heart of the problem that the narrator/authors of the work were trying to 
address and was a central element of their rhetorical strategy.  This chapter will also 
provide insight into the various audiences, or discourse communities, that the 
narrator/authors address in the text of Deuteronomy. Further, the presentation of the 
different audiences in Deuteronomy reveals how the narrator/authors framed their 
program in order to have wide social appeal to the generation of Israelites who received 
it. 
 
2.1 The Rhetorical Situation 
Let us begin by defining what we mean when use the term the rhetorical 
situation.
 
Lloyd Bitzer was the first modern major theorist to treat the rhetorical 
situation as a distinct subject. He theorized that a particular discourse comes into 
existence because of some specific situation or exigence,171 which invites an 
                                                          
171  An exigence is an imperfection marked by some degree of urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, 
something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be. It is necessarily related to 
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utterance. He observed that every discourse has a context and a background of factors 
that brought the rhetor to the point where he/she felt required to say something.172 
Rhetorical works, he wrote, belong to the class of items which obtain their character 
from the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur. Other factors can 
be sociological, psychological or cultural. Bitzer believed that the situation controls 
the rhetorical response in the same sense that the question controls the answer and the 
problem controls the solution.
 173
 Not the rhetor and not the persuasive intent, but the 
situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity.174  He defined a rhetorical 
situation as: 
A complex of persons, objects, and relations presenting an actual or 
potential exigence which can completely or partially be removed if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision 
or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence. 
Prior to the creation and presentation of discourse, there are three 
constituents of any rhetorical situation: the first is exigence; the second 
and third elements of the complex, namely the audience175 to be constrained 
                                                          
interests and valuation. An exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when 
positive modification requires discourse or can be modified by discourse. Bitzer (2016: 221). 
 
172 This is reminiscent of the Sophistical approach discussed in Section 1.5 above. 
 
173 Bitzer (2016: 217-225). This is a reprint of Bitzer's original 1968 publication. 
 
174 Bitzer has not gone without critique from other scholars concerning his ideas about the nature and 
existence of the rhetorical situation. A series of four articles on this topic are available in Porroveccehio 
and Condit (2016: 155-194): The Evolution of the Rhetorical Situation. These articles review various 
responses to Bitzer, none of which undercuts the validity of his insights on the topic. Therefore, I am using 
his original formulation in this study.  
 
175 Bitzer states with regard to the rhetorical audience, that since rhetorical discourse produces change 
by influencing decision and action of persons who function as mediators of change, it follows that 
rhetoric always requires an audience. It is also clear that a rhetorical audience consists only of those 
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in decision and action and, the constraints,176 which influence the rhetor and, 
can be brought to bear upon the audience.177 
 
2.2   Deuteronomy’s Rhetorical Situation 
In light of Bitzer’s comments, how should we describe Deuteronomy’s rhetorical 
situation? As we are focusing on matters internal to the text of Deuteronomy, we can 
observe that the narrator/authors do not directly reveal the actual historical 
circumstances that prompted their composition.  The exigencies and constraints that 
stand as silent witnesses behind the text, and which were operative, but not initially 
managed by the narrator/authors, must perforce remain behind the opaque veil of 
history to a considerable degree, notwithstanding the fact that much is known about 
the era of Deuteronomy’s creation. Nonetheless, while we are not without good 
evidence that allows us to peer behind the veil, we must apply what we know 
indirectly due to the reductionist way the narrator/authors convey their Yet,there 
information.178 Yet, can be little doubt that when it comes to the circumstances 
                                                          
persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change. Bitzer 
(2016: 221). 
176 Beside exigence and audience, every rhetorical situation contains a set of constraints made up of 
persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to 
‘constrain’ decision and action needed to modify the exigence. Standard sources of constraints include 
beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the like; and when the orator 
enters the situation, his discourse not only harnesses constraints given by situation but provides additional 
important constraints-for example, his personal character, his logical proofs, and his style. There are two 
main classes of constraints: (1) those originated or managed by the rhetor and his method, and (2) those 
other constraints in the situation which may be operative. Bitzer (2016: 222). 
177 Bitzer (2016: 220). 
178 It can be plausibly argued that Israel's unhappy encounter with Mesopotamian civilization––beginning 
in the mid-eighth century BCE, with the appearance of the Neo-Assyrians c. 745 BCE, through the period 
of the Babylonian Exile ending in c. 539 BCE––are sufficiently adverse circumstances for there to have 
been both exigencies and constraints that needed to be addressed by the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy. The text does not address these circumstances directly but accounts for them by coded 
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surrounding the composition of Deuteronomy, religious, historical, sociological, 
psychological and cultural factors all certainly came into play. These factors equal 
the exigencies and constraints of the rhetorical situation that we find reflected in 
the text. Given what we know of the historical circumstances of Israel and Judah in 
the late eighth through the mid-sixth centuries BCE, the idea that those 
circumstances might provoke a strong response like Deuteronomy should come as 
no surprise. While they left a lot unsaid about their rhetorical situation, the 
narrator/authors of Deuteronomy, nonetheless, do give unmistakable clues as to 
what was of utmost concern to them. From these textual clues, we must arrive 
at an opinion on the matter of what they were getting at. The way in which the 
narrator/authors let us know their most fulsome concerns is the extent to which 
they highlight issues in the corpus through the technique of repetition. 
 For the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy, the threat of apostasy179 was so 
palpable that they went into extensive detail about it. My use of the term 
apostasy is employed in a broad sense, as encompassing the entire range of 
practices and particularly the intellectual frame of reference or structure of reality 
that is linked to apostasy (in short, polytheistic belief).180 The level of detail they 
                                                          
literary reference. What Bitzer calls “constraints,” Edwin Black calls "extra-linguistic influences on 
an audience." Black feels that the rhetorical situation refers to the prevailing state of the audience's 
conviction, the reputation of the rhetor, the popularity and urgency of the subject–in sum, all the extra-
linguistic factors that influence an audience's reaction to a rhetorical discourse. Black (1978: 133). 
179 Apostasy is an act of refusing to continue to follow, obey, or recognize a religious faith; an act of 
refusing to continue to follow, obey or recognize a religious faith; abandonment of a previous loyalty: a 
defection. 
 




display in their narrative, reveals that the narrator/authors had a depth of 
knowledge and understanding about the subject. The origins of this exigence was 
two-fold, the first being the legacy of Canaanite religious practice in the land of 
which Israel had been a part, and the foreign political and religious presence in 
the land from the Neo-Assyrian empire. The narrator/authors, who were 
undergoing their own intellectual transformation, foresaw its potential deleterious 
influence upon Israel’s future identity, and refused to leave the matter 
unchallenged. These objective circumstances served as a constraint upon their 
actions in the sense that if the foreign presence were either not there, had never 
been there, or removed somehow, their thinking might have evolved in an 
entirely different direction. Were that the case, there would may have been no 
need to compose Deuteronomy. In other words, the facts of their rhetorical 
situation were something they were compelled to address, and it constrained 
them in both thought and action.  
There are ninety-eight verses that have connection to the topic of apostasy 
in Deuteronomy. This considerable number of verses form a body of prima 
facie evidence about the type of exigency that was constraining them and which 
was provoking their response. The narrator/authors weave the fear and danger 
associated with apostasy throughout the text of Deuteronomy. It is spread out 
through nineteen chapters and found in every recognized division of the text.181  
From the frequency of its repetition and its context, it is hard not to conclude 
                                                          




that this topic held a special significance for the narrator/authors who saw this 
issue as a danger to Israel’s future existence.182 It is likely that what the 
narrator/authors were trying so hard to thwart was occurring among the 
citizenry of the land of Israel on their watch.183 In Chapter Four, I will show 
how the issue of apostasy is woven into the rhetorical design of Deuteronomy 
as a major premise and will explain its significance for the rhetorical structure 
of the work. 
Louis Stulman has observed that an ethos of encroachment has long been 
recognized in the Deuteronomic traditions and a focal of concern for group survival 
gives the work its distinctive character. Life and death, survival and annihilation 
were constantly before the Israelites on the pages of Deuteronomy. Stulman 
commented: 
In Deuteronomy… contacts with "outsiders" or "foreigners" is perceived 
as, unavoidable yet dangerous. It is unavoidable because Israel lacks the 
power to insulate itself from harmful outsiders. It is dangerous because 
foreigners pose a threat to the integrity of the boundaries and thus to 
security and well-being of the community. In response to this awareness 
of encroachment and danger, Deuteronomy attempts to produce a 
program in which the integrity of Israel's internal boundaries is 
(re)established and clarified in order to protect insiders from the potentially 
harmful outsiders.184 
                                                          
182 Timothy Lenchak also highlights this issue in his study, Moses' Third Discourse Dt. 28:69-30:20. 
Lenchak (1993:108-118). 
183 Niehr (2010: 23-36), Milgrom (1998: 1-3), Crouch (2012: 541-554). Niehr (1995: 45-74). 
 




Stulman is correct in his analysis as far as he goes with it, but there was more 
to Israelite concerns, even though we can affirm that encroachment was indeed a 
part of the rhetorical situation. The narrator/authors present the major threat to 
Israel’s internal and external boundaries as “turning or being lured away” from the 
exclusive worship of Yahweh, and this was the stasis of Deuteronomy, that is, the 
specific question that they are attempting to address.185  The narrator/authors work 
to devise an effective strategy to cope with the “turning away” that, in part, was 
coming from the encroachment to which Stulman refers. The problem of “turning 
away” is the problem of apostasy against which they take a firm stance.186 This 
struggle came to occupy an intriguing place in their argument strategy. We will 
come to see in Chapter Five: The Enduring Legacy of Deuteronomy: Embracing the 
Particular and Reaching for the Universal, that in their struggle against apostasy, 
the narrator/authors reveal that they had other important ideas in their minds to 
advance, other than how to cope with the issues of encroachment and apostasy, as 
important as they were. 
2.3   Categories of Apostasy: Describing the Exigencies and Constraints in 
Deuteronomy 
The narrator/authors of Deuteronomy highlight six distinct categories of 
worship practices or behaviors against which they issued dire life and death 
warnings to Israel. Taken together as a single category (“apostasy”), they loom 
                                                          
185 Dt. 5:29; 7:3-4; 9:16; 11:16, 28; 12:30; 13:3, 7, 14; 29:17, 25; 30:17; 31:18, 29. (15). 
 




substantially larger than the term ‘idol worship’ or ‘idolatry’ conveys. This 
collection of beliefs and practices represents one particular worldview, 187 which 
in this study we will refer to as a “structure of reality.”188 It was in reference to 
that existing structure of reality that the narrator/authors were strenuously trying 
to reject certain aspects of it and while at the same time, offering a different 
vision of a new structure of reality as a replacement. The most significant aspect 
that they rejected was the validity of an opened ended multiplicity of divine 
representation through images. I will have more to say about that subject in my 
final chapter. Their practical method to deal with this issue was to characterize 
apostasy as a crime worthy of a death sentence and serious enough to warrant 
expulsion of the entire Israelite population from the land.  
The narrator/authors mention six categories of behaviors or actions 
considered as apostasy that they pose in the negative: (a) worshiping ‘other’ 
gods, (b) making idols or images of any kind, (c) following the ways of the 
nations, (d) use of objects associated with foreign worship, (e) engaging in 
mantic practices, and (f) engaging in astral worship. A seventh topic (g) is the 
                                                          
187 It is not my purpose here to enter into an extended description of that worldview. However, one of 
the best descriptions I have found of this worldview is that of Michael Fishbane who wrote: "In this 
worldview, the gods are immanent and near, and there is a deep harmony linking man and god and the 
world. This harmony is truly ontological. And how could it be otherwise? Do not man, god, and the 
world share the same substance? Is not mankind created out of the very bodies of Tiamat's cohorts in 
Enuma elish, even as the world is itself carved out of her desiccated hulk? The same energies flow 
throughout all being, indeed, there is a macrocosmic-microcosmic homology: all is linked, and every 
level of being ontologically ‘mirrors’ all others. The cosmic organum is thus redolent with 
‘sympathies’ and correspondences; an intricate and eternal network of correlations links gods, and 
men, gods and nature, men and nature. Within this mythic monism, man could always say ‘I am also 
that.’" Fishbane (1989: 50-51). 
 




host of derisive epithets that expresses their opinion on the nature or value of 
such practices. It is important at this stage that we identify and locate these 
features so that we may appreciate their full significance as one of the main 
driving concerns in the overall composition of the book of Deuteronomy. The 
uncompromising stand taken by the narrator/authors on these issues and the 
breadth of their attack against them, shows that the writers had a thorough 
understanding of the subject of apostasy and a strong opinion about the danger it 
posed.  By the extirpation of  the above practices, their intention was to change 
the mental outlook of the Israelites about such matters and thereby change the 
religious trajectory of their nation in their time and for all time.  
(a) The Prohibition Against Bowing Down or Serving Other Gods.189 There 
are thirty verses of admonitions against idol worship. They are expressed 
as going after, bowing down, being lured away to serve, or serving "other 
gods." These references mention that the Israelites either did not know 
these gods, or that they were humanly made of wood and stone, or that 
they had been given to the “foreign” nations by God when He created the 
heavens. The following verses are typical of this set of admonitions: 
Dt. 8:19: If you forget the Lord your God and follow other gods to serve 
them     or to bow down to them, I warn you this day that you shall 
certainly perish. 
 
                                                          
189  In the following footnotes (189-195), I will document the entire dataset followed by a number in 
parentheses (#) tabulating the total occurrences of a given feature. Dt. 4:28; 5:9; 7:4, 16; 8:19; 11:16, 




Dt. 13:2:  If there appears a prophet or a dream-diviner and he gives you 
a sign or portent, 
Dt. 13:3: saying, “Let us follow and worship another god”– whom you 
have not experienced–even if the sign or portent that he named comes 
true, 
Dt. 13:4a: do not heed the words of that prophet or dream-diviner. 
 
Dt. 28:14: and do not deviate to the right or to the left from any of the 
commandments that I enjoin upon you this day and turn to the worship 
of other gods. 
 
Dt. 28 64: The Lord will scatter you among all the peoples from one end 
of the earth to the other, and there you shall serve other gods, wood and 
stone, who neither you nor your ancestors have experienced. 
 
Dt. 29:17: Perchance there is among you some man or woman, or some 
clan or tribe, whose heart is even now turning away from the Lord our 
God to go and worship other gods. 
 
(b) The Prohibition Against Making Idols or Images of Any Kind.190 There 
are thirteen verses prohibiting the making of idols or divine images of 
any kind, whether they be of a man, woman, beast, insect, fish, winged 
creature, or anything that flies in the sky. Also banned are molten 
images made by hand, sacred posts, anything in the image of the 
heaven including the moon and stars, the entire heavenly host above or 
the waters below.  The following verses are typical of this admonition:                                                                          
Dt. 5:8: You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image, any 
                                                          




likeness of what is in the heavens above, or on the earth below, or in 
the waters below the earth. 
                  
Dt. 16:21: You shall not set up a sacred post – any kind of pole beside the 
altar of the LORD your God that you may make – 
Dt. 16:22: or erect a stone pillar, for such the LORD your God detests. 
 
Dt. 27:15:  Cursed be anyone who makes a sculptured or molten image, 
abhorred by the LORD, a craftsmans’ handiwork, and sets it up in secret––
and all the people responded, Amen. 
 
(c) The Prohibition Against Following the Ways of the Nations.191 There 
are fifteen verses warning the Israelites not to follow the ways of the 
peoples around Israel, that is, the nations. The following verses are 
typical of this admonition:   
Dt. 6:14: Do not follow other gods, any of the gods of the peoples 
about you.  
 
Dt. 7:3: Do not intermarry with them; do not give your daughters to 
their sons or take their daughters for your sons.  
                       
Dt. 18:9: When you enter the land the LORD your god is giving you, 
you shall not learn to do the abominations of the nations.                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
                                                          




(d) The Requirement to Destroy Foreign Religious Symbolism.192 There are 
eleven verses that refer to the banning of foreign religious objects and 
sites of worship. The Israelites are to destroy, smash, burn, and obliterate 
these places of foreign worship and symbolic representation. 
 Dt. 7:5: Instead, this is what you shall do to them: you shall tear down 
their altars, smash their pillars, cut down their sacred posts and consign 
their images to the fire.  
 Dt. 7:25:  You shall consign their images of their gods to the fire; 
you shall not covet the silver or gold on them and keep it for 
yourselves, lest you be ensnared thereby; for that is abhorrent to the 
LORD your God. 
Dt. 12:2:  You must destroy all the sites at which the nations you are to 
dispossess worship their gods whether on lofty mountains and on hills 
or under any luxuriant tree. 
Dt. 12:3: Tear down their altars, smash their pillars, put their sacred 
posts to the fire, cut down the images of their gods, obliterating their 
name from that site. 
 
(e) The Prohibition Against Engaging in Mantic Practices.193 There are ten 
verses that, strictly speaking, may or may not be seen as religious worship, 
as such, but are to be seen as occult practices associated with the 
worldview of other societies in the ancient Near East that are banned in 
Deuteronomy. The following verses are typical of these admonitions: 
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Dt. 18:10:  Let no one be found among you who consigns his son or 
daughter to the fire, or who is an auger, a soothsayer, a diviner, a 
sorcerer, 
Dt. 18:11:  one who cast spells, or one who consults ghosts or familiar 
spirits, or anyone who inquires of the dead.  
Dt. 18:14:  Those nations that you are about to dispossess do indeed 
resort to soothsayers and augers; to you, however, the Lord your God 
has not assigned the like. 
 
(f) The Prohibition Against Astral Worship.194  There are three verses which 
prohibit the worship of the sun, moon and heavenly host. 
Dt. 4:19: and when you look up to the sky and behold the sun and the 
moon and the stars, and the whole heavenly host, you must not be lured 
into bowing down to them or serving them. These the LORD your God 
allotted to other peoples everywhere under heaven;  
 
Dt. 17:3: turning to the worship of other gods and bowing down to them, to 
the sun or the moon or any of the heavenly host, something I never 
commanded. 
 
(g) Derisive Terminology for Foreign Gods and Practices.195 I have taken 
special note of this category by providing the Hebrew, as well as its 
transliteration and lexical references, in order to highlight the opinions of 
the narrator/authors, through their use of strongly derisive vocabulary, on 
the subject matter of categories (a) through (f). Whatever the source or 
                                                          
194 Dt. 4:19; 5:8; 17:3; (3) 
 




context of these practices, the narrator/authors appear to have engineered a 
conceptual break with them. Intellectually, Deuteronomy advocates 
moving on from those widely practiced forms of divination in category (e) 
and the other forms of divine representation, to the promotion of a new 
vision Israel’s spiritual life. It is their overwhelmingly derisive vocabulary 
that signposts a changed way of thinking about what could validly be 
included in their spiritual ‘structure of reality’ in the future.  There are a 
least sixteen verses which use derisive terminology when referring to 
foreign gods, practices and acts of worship. The following verses are 
typical of this characterization: 
Dt. 4:16: not behave corruptly (תשחתּון / tašḥitûn) 195F196 and make for 
yourselves a sculptured image on any likeness whatever: the form of a 
man or woman. 
Dt. 12:31a: You shall not act thus toward the LORD your God, for they 
perform for their gods every abhorrent (תועבה / tôʽēbâ) 197 act that the Lord 
detests (שנא / śānē՚).197 F198 
 
Dt. 7:25b: you shall not covet the silver and gold on them and keep it for 
yourselves, lest you be ensnared (תוקש / tiwwāqēš) 198F199 by it. 
                                                          
196 HALOT: (2001: 1471): to behave corruptly, ruin, destroy oneself, inflict unheard of damage.  
 
197 HALOT (2001: 1765): something repulsive, abhorrent, something despicable. This term is 
extremely important for studying identity formation. See Crouch (2015). 
 
198 HALOT (2001: 1338-40): expresses hate or enmity, something odious, something detested. 
 




Dt. 7:26a: You must not bring an abhorrent thing into your house, or 
you will be proscribed (חרם /ḥērem) 200 like it;  you must really reject 
it as ceremonially unclean and abhorrent ( תתעבנו ותעב תשקתנו שקץ   / 
šaqqēṣ tĕšaqqĕṣennû wĕtaʻēb tĕtaʻăbennû) 200F201 for it is proscribed. 
 
Dt. 29:16: and you have seen their repugnant (שקוציהם/ šiqqûṣȇhem) 
things and the abominable idols (גלליהם / gillulȇhem) 201F202 of wood and 
stone, and silver and gold that they keep. 
 
Dt. 32:16: They incensed Him with alien things (בזרים / bĕzārîm),202 F203 
vexed Him with abominations.  
Dt. 32:17:  They sacrificed to demons (שדים / šēdîm),204 no-gods ( לא
 ĕlōah), gods they had never known, new ones, who cameי יlō / אלה
but lately, who stirred not your father’s fear. 
Dt. 32:21: They incensed Me with no-gods, vexed Me with their 
futilities (הבליחם / habĕlȇhem).204F205 
We have now reviewed a broad sampling of verses that set out the range of 
topics and behaviors that the narrator/authors considered as apostasy. The frequency 
of these ninety-eight verses tell us that these matters were an extremely serious 
                                                          
200 HALOT (2001: 353-4): something put under a ban, forbidden, something to be devoted to destruction. 
 
201 HALOT (2001:1646): repugnant, ritually contaminated, detested as ceremonially unclean, unclean 
and abhorrent, cultic abomination, horror.  
 
202 HALOT (2001: 192): refers to idols, droppings, always used polemically and contemptuously as in 
something that is abominable. 
 
203 HALOT (2001: 279): a strange, or alien thing, prohibited, illicit, unauthorized, peculiar. 
  
204 HALOT (2001:1417-1418): malevolent demons, a spirit of the darkness. 
 




concern for the narrator/authors. They posed them as involving matters of life, 
death and destruction for anyone engaging in those banned practices and 
prohibited forms of worship.206  They represent ten percent of Deuteronomy's 
959 verses. This range of banned and detested practices were the consequential 
results of contact with a host of foreign peoples and influences that had been 
present in the land of Israel––before, during, and after the time of the 
composition of the work. They are the literary reflections of Edwin Black's extra-
linguistic influences and the source of Lloyd Bitzer's exigence and constraints, 
which made up a large component of the rhetorical situation to which the 
narrator/authors felt compelled to respond.  
To reinforce the above ideas statistically, I note Jacob Milgrom’s analysis 
of the general issue of idolatry occurring in Judah during the eighth and seventh 
centuries BCE, mentioned in the Hebrew Bible texts he dates to these two 
centuries.207 Milgrom defines idolatry as the worship of all images, not just other 
gods, but also something thought to be an image of Yahweh. Milgrom lists 
fifteen instances of verses that he believes come from eighth century BCE texts: 
Lev 19:4, 26.1; Amos 5:26; Hosea 5:3b-4, 6:10; Isaiah 2:8, 18, 20, 10:11, 17:8, 
27:9, 30:22, 31:7; Micah 1:7, 5:12-13a.  Milgrom also cites at least one hundred 
sixty-six verses from seventh century BCE texts; thirty-six from Deuteronomy, 
forty-six from Jeremiah, eighty-two from Ezekiel, one each from Habakkuk and 
Zephaniah. By citing these instances, I am making the point that the issue of idol 
                                                          
206 See: Dt. 7:10-11; 8:19; 11:17. 
 
207 Milgrom (1998: 1-13). 
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worship and worship of divine images which constituted apostasy in the eyes of 
our narrator/authors was, broadly speaking, an issue on the minds of a numbers 
of authors of other prophetic books in that era. This lends credence to seeing this 
issue as both an exigence and a constraint on the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy, representing one of the main features that stood in the background 
as part of the rhetorical situation.  
 
2.4   A Further Constraint on the Narrator/Authors: Questions about Israel's Moral 
Character 
There is another important objective circumstance that both touches upon 
the rhetorical situation and that constrained the narrator/authors. This constraint 
was the opinion of the narrator/authors concerning the moral character of the 
Israelites and their willingness and capacity to follow the Mosaic laws set out in 
Deuteronomy. It needs to be asked, what was the moral defect in the Israelite 
character that constrained the narrator/authors? Deuteronomy's concept of 
space/time embodies past, present and future with its emphasis on a future rooted 
in and motivated and shaped by events in the past.  Deuteronomy is at pains to 
remind the Israelite audience that they had a checkered, troubled ‘history’ with 
both God and Moses.208 As such, there are two distinct aspects of the future that 
the narrator/authors address in Deuteronomy. The first is the religious or spiritual 
life of the people and their past relationship with their God Yahweh, and the 
                                                          
208  For example: the Golden Calf incident, the incident at Kadesh-barnea, and the incident at Baal-peor, 
and Moses’ prediction of Israel going astray in Dt. 31:16-19. 
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expected non-relationship with other gods in the future. The second aspect of the 
future that the narrator/authors address is the Israelite's relationship with his 
fellow Israelite within the natural circumstances of living in an organized 
complex society.  When it comes to this second aspect of the narrator/authors' 
opinion, their view is that the Israelites are a normal people–normal in the sense 
that they required legal mediation under specific types of circumstances. This 
was to insure that their cultural predispositions of social justice found adherence 
as much as can be expected. For example, Dt. 22 is composed of a string of 
secular oriented instructions or laws many of which have no stated penalties. Dt. 
22: 1-3 addresses the ethics of stray sheep or oxen and what a citizen must do 
when encountering this circumstance. Dt. 22: 8 addresses construction methods 
required in order to avoid injury or death from a fall to a third party who may be 
on the roof of the home for some reason or other. The owner must build a parapet 
so as not to incur bloodguilt. Dt. 22:15 addresses what a man should do in 
regards to his will in the case when he has two wives that he does not love in 
equal measure. Dt. 23: 13- 21 addresses questions of marriage, divorce and 
virginity. These cases presuppose a set of normal social circumstances with 
imperfect human beings in need of ethical or judicial guidance and periodic legal 
adjudication at some point.  In this context, the secular oriented laws of Deuteronomy 
function as a constraint upon the citizenry acting improperly and imbue them with a 
sense of community responsibility, which they are presumed to already possess. 
However, in the case of the first aspect, that of the religious or spiritual 
life and behavior of the Israelites towards their God, there is a different and 
89 
 
negative opinion being expressed that bears directly upon the rhetorical situation, 
and functions as a constraint upon the narrator/authors and the Israelites as well. 
The historical review in Dt. 1-3 points out the many acts of disobedience and 
disloyalty of the people and the many acts of forbearance that God dispensed to 
the Exodus and pre-conquest generations. This forbearance occurred in spite of 
all the trouble they caused and in spite of the disloyalty they displayed upon 
occasion. For example, Dt. 1:26-28, the incident at Kadesh-barnea, recounts the 
refusal of the Exodus generation to heed the word of God and go up and conquer 
the land after the twelve spies had gone to reconnoiter it and returned with their 
report. None of them except Caleb was willing to do as the Lord required; 
therefore only he would live to enter the land. Later, in Dt.1:41-45, they disobey 
again and attempt a conquest of the land but fail miserably because the Lord 
withdrew His protection of them. These passages are meant to reveal their lack of 
loyalty, which is their unwillingness to follow the Lord’s commands. This act of 
faithlessness and disloyalty, followed by further disobedience, results in an 
extended thirty-eight-year punishment of wandering through the wilderness until 
the unfaithful exodus generation died off. God had concluded that the exodus 
generation was unworthy of the inheritance of the land promised to the fathers. 
Pointedly, the narrator/authors even show Moses not to be immune from this 
inner struggle to obey the Lord, even if Moses’ disobedience was unintentional.  
In Dt. 3:26a, the narrator/authors remind the audience that Moses, God's 
personal representative and the only human to speak with God face to face, was 
also capable of disloyalty in the eyes of God and not immune from severe 
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punishment for his misdeeds. In an example of good story telling, the 
narrator/authors portray Moses in a most human of way as he tried to fob off 
blame for his own misdeeds onto the Israelites. In Dt. 3:26b-27, God sternly 
rejects Moses' plea to enter the land because of Moses' disobedience at the 
Waters of Meribah. 209 God explains to Moses that he refused to affirm His 
sanctity in the sight of the Israelites by striking the rock twice instead of ordering 
it to produce water as God had instructed him. God lets Moses know he will not 
be forgiven for this lapse.  The incident at Meribah also shows the Israelites to be 
faithless and complaining, and Moses capable of wrong doing. Consequently, an 
unrelenting God commands Moses to ascend to the summit of Mt. Pisgah. There, 
God instructs Moses that he should gaze in all directions to see the land that He 
swore never to allow Moses to enter.210  Here we see a duality, common to 
Deuteronomy’s style that prepares the ground for rhetorical argumentation. The 
narrator/authors skillfully lead the audience to think to themselves that if such a 
great man can receive such a harsh punishment for simply striking a rock, how 
much more so God might punish a person of lesser stature for any greater act of 
disobedience or disloyalty.  In this way, the Israelites come to understand that 
even when it came to Moses, God's incomparable prophet and their liberator, 
God does not readily forgive disloyalty. Reward and punishment become a 
paradigmatic form of argumentation in Deuteronomy as I will demonstrate 
below. We will see in Chapter Four of this study how the narrator/authors pose 
                                                          
209 Num. 20:2-13. 
 
210 Dt. 34:1-6. 
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life and death choices and establish value hierarchies of preferred outcomes to 
argue their case to the Israelite audience. 
   As a final note to this section on the rhetorical situation, Deuteronomy 
chapter four is the place where the narrator/authors introduce the topic of 
apostasy and its deadly consequences for the first time. Dt. 4:3 reminds the 
Israelites of the destruction of those who strayed at Baal-peor. In Dt. 4:15-28 
Moses expounds the strict prohibition against images, idol worship and following 
foreign gods and threatens utter destruction if they do not obey. The 
narrator/authors reiterate this theme throughout Deuteronomy wherein its 
overarching narrative equates apostasy with unfaithfulness and disloyalty to God. 
It is a mortal sin with enormously negative consequences.  Within Deuteronomy, 
this effectively and rhetorically makes the point to their audience about what will 
happen to them if they are not steadfast and loyal to the Lord, or do not follow 
His instructions. It also shows that the narrator/authors understood human nature, 
and that their fellow Israelites would need both moral suasion to adapt to 
Deuteronomy’s strictures and the threat of corporal consequences to constrain 
them.  Deuteronomy's rhetorical design contrasts a faithful and unwavering God 
with an unfaithful, unworthy, disloyal, and disobedient Israel. Moses and God 
must wage a life and death struggle to keep on the right path. The 
narrator/authors present a picture of the Israelites as a people who possess a great 
capacity to get things wrong by spiritually going astray. It is this expectation of 
moral turpitude on the part of the Israelites that forms a major constraint on the 
thinking and actions of the narrator/authors. The narrator/authors must find a way 
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to overcome this problem of the inclinations of the people if they wish to lead 
and direct their fellow Israelites successfully.  
In this discussion of rhetorical situation, I have highlighted both the 
exigencies and the constraints faced by the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy. Bitzer’s 
conception provides a workable analytical framework that helps us understand how 
the historical circumstances that form the background to Deuteronomy’s composition 
are able to be directly absorbed in the narrative. We have seen how the exigence of 
apostasy, the constraints of Israel's problematic moral character, and the historical 
background of the rhetorical situation provide the basic materials that the 
narrator/authors must use to begin to fashion rhetorical argumentative discourse. Let 
us now turn our attention to the matter of the various audiences found in 
Deuteronomy. 
2.5 Theoretical Considerations on the Question of Audience: “Addressed” and “Invoked” 
Audience 
Deuteronomy presents an interesting and complex set of literary 
circumstances when it comes to the subject of audience because there is more 
than one audience addressed in the text. The question is how we might best 
understand this important rhetorical element of audience in Deuteronomy’s 
written discourse?  The term audience refers not just to the intended, actual, or 
eventual readers (or hearers) of a discourse, but to all those whose image, ideas, 
or actions influence a writer during the process of composition.211 This definition 
                                                          




complements Bitzer’s and Black’s notions about the rhetorical situation. R. J. 
Willey212 draws attention to a long-standing discussion among modern scholars, 
with its roots in pre-classical Greece, about the dichotomy between audiences that are 
"addressed,” and ones that are “invoked.” 213  The issue is whether writers “address” 
readers external to their texts, or whether they “invoke” an audience within their 
texts, teaching their readers through textual clues how to relate to and read a 
given text. In Deuteronomy, the narrator/authors do both. Willey has traced these 
developments back to the earliest pre-Socratics and Sophists, who dealt with 
audience in a more complex way than first impression might suggest and laid the 
foundation for what modern scholars are discussing as the addressed/invoked 
dichotomy. While the details of these early discussions about audiences are 
indeed fascinating, they need not detain us here.  It is important to note, however, 
that Plato's view that the rhetorician should adapt a speech to the characteristics of 
an audience was based on several assumptions: that the audience was a known entity, 
that the values and needs of the audience can be identified and that the audience is 
separable from the discourse and its social context.214 Plato's influential ideas on 
                                                          
212 Willey (1990) 25-39). 
 
213 An "addressed audience" refers to real-life people. Ede and Lunsford emphasize the concrete reality of 
the writer's audience; they also share the assumption that knowledge of this audience's attitudes, beliefs, 
and expectations is not only possible (via observation and analysis but essential). An "invoked audience" 
refers to the audience called up or imagined by the writer. Those who envision audiences as "invoked" 
stress that the audience of a writer's discourse is a construction of the writer, a created fiction. They do 
not deny the physical reality of readers, but they argue that writers simply cannot know this reality in 
the way speakers can. The central task of the writer, then, is not to analyze an audience and adapt 
discourse to meet its needs. Rather the writer uses the semantic and syntactic resources of language to 
provide cues for the reader, cues which help to define the role, or roles the writer wishes the reader to 
adopt in responding the text. Ede and Lunsford (1984: 160). 
 
214 Geza and Roen (1984: 15). 
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audience became the dominant perspective until modern times. His ideas may 
have applied well to oral communication in Plato’s day where speakers had an 
audience in front of them. However, the idea that audiences are separable from 
the discourse addressed to them and separable from its social context is not 
considered a valid way of approaching the speaker-audience relationship in 
current thinking.215  Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford write: 
The addressed audience, the actual or intended readers of a discourse, exist 
outside of the text. Writers may analyze these reader’s needs, anticipating 
their biases, even defer to their wishes. But, it is only through the text, 
through language, that writers embody or give life to their conception of the 
reader. In doing so, they do not so much create a role for the reader (or 
hearer)––a phrase which implies that the writer somehow creates a mold to 
which the reader adapts––as invokes it. Rather than relying on incantations, 
however, writers conjure their vision––a vision which they hope readers will 
actively come to share as they read the text––by using all the resources of 
language available to them to establish a broad, and ideally coherent, range of 
cues for the reader.216 
 
 Ede and Lunsford suggest that the meaning of audience tends to diverge in 
two general directions: one toward actual people external to the text, the audience 
whom the writer must accommodate; the other toward the text itself and the 
audience implied there: a set of suggested or evoked attitudes, interests, reactions, 
conditions of knowledge which may or may not fit with the qualities of actual 
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readers or listeners.  Therefore, they opine that the most complete understanding of  
audience involves a synthesis of the perspectives  of the addressed audience, with 
its focus on the readers, and the invoked audience, with its focus on the writer.217 
 
2.6   Mutual Fictionalization: How the “Addressed” and “Invoked” Audiences Connect 
with the Rhetor              
In Deuteronomy, the narrator/authors directed Moses’ discourse to an 
“invoked” audience in the text, but it was not strictly speaking a fictional 
audience. As a matter of rhetorical strategy, however, the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy “invoked” an audience of the Exodus and pre-conquest 
generations, which they then presented to the contemporary generation of 
“addressed” audiences as their recognizable and known cultural antecedents. The 
narrator/authors represented that audience as a complex society with elders, 
chieftains, clans, magistrates, a king, rich and poor citizens, high priests, 
prophets, widows and orphans, woodchoppers, water carriers and individuals 
located in every social station and type of circumstance. They presented it as 
organized, and settled in urban, village and agricultural settings. In other words, 
they portray life in such manner that a contemporary reader or hearer in pre-
exilic Judah would easily recognize as a social structure that was familiar to 
them. If this were not the case, it would be hard to see how their program had any 
likelihood of success.  
In the 1970s, Walter Ong wrote that invoked audiences are always a 
                                                          




fiction. He meant that the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or 
vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role, and that the addressed audience 
must correspondingly fictionalize itself to accept the role assigned to it by the 
writer. 218 A reader, Ong says, has to play a role in which the author cast him, 
which seldom coincides with his role in the rest of actual life.219 The creative 
power of the adept writer, Ong says, has the ability both to project and alter an 
audience’s perceptions. Readers must learn or know how to play the game of 
being members of an audience that 'really' does not exist. What emerges from 
Ong's comments is a sense that a writer creates a context wherein the addressed 
audience and the ‘invoked’ audience enter into contact with each other through a 
process he calls mutual fictionalization.  This is one of the major goals of 
persuasive rhetorical argumentation, that is, the creation of a deep bond of 
identification between the writer and audience. In this process, the psychological 
distinction between them and reality becomes blurred. 220  When we apply this 
idea to Deuteronomy, we will see how the narrator/authors used the ‘invoked’ 
audiences of Deuteronomy to facilitate mutual fictionalization and identification 
with the addressed audience of receptors as a way to set a foundation under their 
rhetorical argumentation.   
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219 In Deuteronomy, a late First-Temple or even an exilic “addressed” audience is being 
encouraged to visualize themselves as members of the fictionalized “invoked” audience of the 
Exodus and pre-conquest generations. Clearly, this was not the actual life of the addressed 
audience of contemporary Judeans. 
 




Another view of the rhetor/audience relationship that applies directly to 
Deuteronomy is provided by Robert Polzin. 221  Polzin addresses two types of 
narrator utterances which serve the purpose of creating a gap between the 
“addressed” contemporaneous audience of readers or hears and the “invoked” 
fictionalized audience of the text. In order to better understand this process we 
can examine the relationship between "reporting"222 and "reported"223  speech in 
Deuteronomy. Polzin identified fifty-six verses of what he calls "reporting 
speech" 224 in Deuteronomy with the rest of the corpus being "reported speech." 
Importantly, the narrator/authors appeal to social memory for knowledge about 
Moses and all their cultural traditions. These two voices create a separation that 
also makes it clear to the addressed audience that the narrator/authors are as 
important a source of knowledge and information to them today about the 
Teachings as Moses was to the invoked audience in his day. This is the case 
because it was only through the narrator/author's narrative report that the 
addressed audience could gain access to the Mosaic Teachings.  For example, Dt 
1:1-5 and 4:44-49 are two sets of verses of “reported” speech that provide a 
frame for Moses' speech which Polzin says, does not distract the readers/hearers 
from its rhetorical power or the emotional content of Moses' words. A second 
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222 In Deuteronomy, "reporting speech" is the speech or voice of the narrator. 
 
223 In Deuteronomy, "reported speech" is the direct discourse mostly of Moses but also God. 
 
224 Reporting speech in Deuteronomy: Dt. 1:1-5; 2:10-12, 20-23; 3:9, 11, 13b-14; 4:41-5:1a; 10:6-7, 





type of narrator “reported” utterance, he points out, "break-frame" by inserting 
some addition parenthetical information that breaks the flow of the discourse.225  
Polzin believes that these devices serve to create a distance and distinction between 
the “invoked” and “addressed” audiences that get the “addressed” audience more 
involved in the storyline by shifting back and forth from the narrated past to the 
narrator's present: 
We are suggesting here that the Deuteronomic narrator is pictured here as subtly 
reinforcing the difference between Moses' audience and his own audience so that 
the latter, while attending focally to Moses' powerful authority and message, is 
subsidiarily and intermittently kept aware of the two audiences. These "frame-
breaks" force the Deuteronomic audience to shift from subsidiary awareness that 
they are descendants of these earlier Israelites, and therefore distant hearers of 
Moses' teaching, to a momentary focal awareness of this situation, and then back 
again to the continuing focal awareness of the earlier context of the story.226 
 Here we get a sense of how the narrator/authors made clear to the addressed 
audience the gap between a distinct and distant invoked audience of the Exodus and 
pre-conquest generations, and those contemporary pre-exilic Judeans who were 
also being directly addressed, and who were now hearing the narrator/authors 
authorative report of what happened. The narrator/author created this distinction 
for the rhetorical purpose of fostering in the contemporary audience of Judeans a 
bond with the Exodus and pre-conquest that helped them create a sense of shared 
                                                          
225 See: Dt. 2:10-12; 2:20-23; 3:9; 11:13b-14. 
 
225 Dt. 1:1-5; 2:10-12, 20-23; 3:9, 11, 13b-14; 4:41-5:1a; 10:6-7, 9; 27:1a, 9a, 11; 28:69; 29:1a; 
31:1, 7a, 9-10a, 14a, 14c-16a, 22:23a, 24-25, 30; 32:44-45, 48; 33:1; 34:1-4a, 5-12. 
 




identity and mutual fictionalization. The creation of a shared identity was a 
prerequisite for them to be successful in their rhetorical argumentation.227 In the 
process of creating a psychological connection between the “invoked” and 
“addressed” audiences, the “addressed” audience could begin to understand the 
intentions of the narrator/authors and the role they had assigned to them going 
forward.  
 From the above discussion, we can understand that there are a number of 
angles from which the dynamics of the rhetor/audience relationship at work in 
the rhetorical situation can be discussed. The premise upon which the notion of the 
rhetorical situation operates is that of a shared understanding of the circumstantial 
situation. From this perspective, a meeting of the minds preexists the discourse 
which allows argumentation   to proceed that is both dispositional and action 
producing. We saw that, when it comes to question of audience in Deuteronomy 
there is a distinction to be made between the ‘addressed’ and ‘invoked’ 
audiences.  The writer ‘invokes’ an audience to an another audience which is 
being ‘addressed’ in order to create identification and mutual fictionalization. 
This in turn is meant to foster identification with the aims and purpose of the 
writer or rhetor. From these ideas, we can understand that the rhetor/audience 
relationship is more fluid than it might initially appear. The direction of 
influence between the rhetor and the audience is not unidimensional going from 
writer to readers but is multi-dimensional and interactive. Mutual-
                                                          




fictionalization, then, was an important rhetorical technique that the 
narrator/authors of Deuteronomy seem to have made use of intuitively in order to 
create a psychological bond upon which arguments could be made. Polzin’s 
comments regarding the two types of utterances, that of “reported” and 
“reporting” speech, add a third technique used by the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy to foster the acceptance by the addressed audience of the role 
authoritative role of narrator/authors. All of these rhetorical techniques can help 
us understand the dynamic complexities of the rhetorical situation and the range 
of techniques available to the narrator/authors to impact the perceived exigencies 
and constraints and harness the energies of the Israelites to move in new 
directions. 
2.7   The Rhetorical Audience of Deuteronomy  
Lloyd Bitzer, who introduced the concept of the rhetorical situation that we 
just discussed, was of the belief that while rhetoric always requires an audience, a 
rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable of being 
influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.228 This is an important 
insight.  Martin Medhurst, who views are similar to Walter Ong, has written about 
the rhetorical audience: 
The rhetorical audience is that audience that enters into the drama of reading 
and completes that drama not only by completing the story as told in the text, 
but also by becoming part of the story by extending the community whose 
story it is. It is not only their story, it is also our story if we identify with the 
                                                          




religious values and commitments of the storytellers.229 
 
Medhurst’s views on the rhetorical audience address the psychological and 
rhetorical advantages gained when an identification of values and commitments 
between rhetor and audience can be said to exist. What he describes is a deeper way 
of understanding mutual fictionalization that may apply to “mediators of change” 
particularly and the other audiences more generally. Bitzer’s views on the rhetorical 
audience emphasize a dispositional outcome of the rhetorical situation. A 
dispositional outcome means that the narrator/authors successfully created or found a 
willingness or disposition on the part of certain fellow Israelites to carry forward or 
mediate their program to a wider audience. Bitzer’s views thus penetrate into the 
sociological and motivational aspect of the rhetor/audience relationship. Medhurst 
and Bitzer offer two useful views of the dynamics and outcomes of this relationship. 
They open a door that reveals what rhetoric is able to accomplish. 
2.7.1   The “Mediators of Change” are the “Addressed” Audience of the First Order  
  Bitzer defined the rhetorical audience as being comprised of only those 
who could be “mediators of change.” This is a useful and incisive idea that raises 
some questions. Who were the "mediators of change" that the narrator/authors 
sought to influence by their arguments and motivate as agents of change? In 
other words, who was Deuteronomy’s rhetorical audience of the first order?  
Whoever the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy may have been, they no doubt 
would have been writing, initially, for a literate audience of contemporary 
                                                          




Judeans.230 In late First Temple times, the literate class would have included 
members of the Levites, priests, scribes, the royal administration, prophetic 
circles, members of the military leadership and officer corps, and magistrates of 
the court system both local and national who were all socially present in eighth 
through early sixth century Judea.231 We may add to this group contemporary 
Israelites also from the upper classes of Judean society who might have been 
literate enough to read and write. These individuals were likely engaged in the 
normal activities of life and commerce while living in a complex society that was 
part of a large empire.232   
Dt. 17:18 names the Levitical priests233 as being in the position to produce 
a copy of the Teaching for the King that it may remain with him so he may read 
                                                          
230 Literate, in this historical context, meant being able to both read and write per Christopher Rollston's 
definition. "Literacy is the possession of a substantial facility in a writing system, that is, the ability to write 
and read, using and understanding a standard script, a standard orthography, a standard numeric system, 
conventional formatting and terminology, and with minimal errors of composition or comprehension." 
Rollston (2010:127). 
 
231 Ian Young has pointed out that scribes, administrators and priests formed a special class of people who 
both possessed and used skills in reading and writing. Young (1998: 412). In exilic or even post-exilic 
times, the constituents of this first audience would have been somewhat different, but would still have been 
members of the literate classes. 
 
232 Ian Young has written that the ability to read was a matter of social standing among the upper class 
who prided themselves on being part of the literate elite in the late First-Temple period. Young (1998: 
411). 
 
233 In Deuteronomy, there are two classes of Levites mentioned. One is "the Levite living in your 
gates" meaning the towns of Israel/Judah mentioned in Dt. 12:12; 12:12-18-19; 14:27-29; 16:11; 
16:13-14; 18:6-7; 26:12. The context of these references is that the Israelites shall rejoice with the 
Levite providing food for him because he has no portion or inheritance with his brothers from the 
other tribes. The other is "Levitical priests" found in Dt. 17:8-10; 17:18; 18:1-2; 19:17; 24:8; 21:9. 
In these contexts, they render legal decisions (Dt. 17:8-9; 21:5; and 24:8; 27:9) and they are in charge 
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it all his life. In Dt. 31:9-12, Moses places the tôrâ in the hands of the priests, 
sons of Levi and all the elders. This would mean that two groups were in 
possession of the ‘official’ copy of the tôrâ and would therefore be responsible 
for its preservation as well as its accuracy. Thus, it was individuals from these elite 
groups, through a formal educational process whatever it was, that would have 
possessed the recognition, competency and had the opportunity to be involved in 
composing, collating, taking charge of, protecting and/or promulgating the text of 
Deuteronomy. As such, they performed the role of being the mediators of change 
of the first order.234 This category of literate elites were writing for other literate 
elites.235 In other words, the narrator/authors who most likely originated from the 
priestly, scribal, and Levitical priestly families in Jerusalem would have been the 
ones to have been writing for those high status individuals closest to them at the 
upper levels of Judean society. In principle, then, these groups would have been 
the rhetorical audience of Deuteronomy. These, then, were the "mediators of 
change" from which the narrator/authors of the Deuteronomic program would 
have required co-operation and adherence in the era of its creation. One can 
postulate that a critical level of buy-in occurred on the part of these elites in order 
for the program imagined in Deuteronomy to gain enough critical social 
                                                          
of the Torah (Dt. 17:18) Rehm (1992: 302-305). See also Dt. 33:8-11 in Moses’ Farewell Blessing 
where Levi is assigned to be the one to teach Israel. 
 
234 I am not addressing the question of formal education in late First Temple times or afterward but am 
assuming that the needs of an administrative state required trained literate individuals to assume a 
variety of official roles in order for a royal administration or a temple administration to function both 
internally and in an international arena. 
 




momentum to go forward. We may chance to call them a religious-political 
oligarchy or ruling-class who would have been highly motivated to work for their 
own preservation and had become sufficiently identified with the values and 
commitments of the narrator/authors to work for its success.  
2.7.2   Plausible Pathways of Dissemination 
If we take the above analysis one-step further, we can hypothetically 
reconstruct a mechanism that might have been in place during pre-exilic times 
for the dissemination of a text and program such as Deuteronomy beyond the 
confines of Jerusalem. 236  It is important to recall that there was a dramatic 
development and expansion of an administrative state in Judea in the eighth and 
seventh centuries that resulted from the fall of Samaria.237 The known sites of 
this administrative network where writing has been found from that period 
include: Lachish, Arad, Mesad Hashavyahu, Gideon, Tel Beit Mirsim, En-gedi 
and Ramat Rachel.238  From these facts, it can be argued that, a small but not 
insignificant group of literate elites from all classes of the literate elites would 
have been disbursed throughout the cities, towns and countryside of Judea for the 
purpose of running the country. Among the literate elites in this administrative 
role were the Levities and Levitical priests whose role in the Deuteronomic 
                                                          
236 After the Babylonian conquests of 597 BCE and 587 BCE in the exilic or even post-exilic environment, 
the constituents of these ‘mediators of change’ of the first order would have been somewhat different, but 
they would have still been members of same literate classes to the extent they survived. 
  
237 Finkelstein (2006: 259-285); Jameson-Drake (1991: 147-149). 
 




reconfiguration of the judiciary was to assist in administrating and interpreting 
the law as Dt. 17:9 clearly states.239  
       Deuteronomy identifies the Levites as a literate class with interchangeable 
roles at the national and local levels. In support of such an interpretation, we can 
cite Dt. 18:6-8, which envisions Levites from any settlement free to travel to 
Jerusalem to serve in the Temple like any fellow Levite in attendance before the 
Lord.  A further piece of internal evidence comes in the verses Dt. 31:9-13: 
Dt. 31:9: Moses wrote down the Teachings and gave them to the priests, 
the sons of Levi, who carried the Ark of the Lord’s Covenant, and to all 
the elders of Israel. 
 
Dt. 31:10: And Moses instructed them as follows:  Every seventh year, the 
year set for remission, at the Feast of Booths, 
  
Dt. 31:11: when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the 
place that He will choose, you shall read this Teaching aloud in the 
presence of all Israel.    
 
Dt. 31:12: Gather the people––men, women, children, and the strangers in 
your communities––that they may hear and so learn to revere the Lord 
your God and to observe every word of this Teaching. 
 
Dt. 31:13:  There children, too, who have not had the experience, shall 
hear and learn to revere the Lord your God as long as they live in the land 
that you are about to cross the Jordan to possess. 
This scenario, as powerful an experience as it might have been for any 
                                                          
239 Dt. 14:27; 16:18; 17:8-13;  
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individual, must have been especially so for any child who would have been 
able to experience the tôrâ “instructions” being read to them in Jerusalem 
perhaps once or twice while growing up (Dt. 6:7), seems inadequate to the task 
at hand.  It hardly seems to be in accord with the intentions of the 
narrator/authors that all Israel, and especially that the children, should hear the 
teachings so infrequently. That there are at least forty-two verses, which 
demand strict observance and adherence to the laws and teachings, stated in one 
form or another throughout the text, demonstrates the sense of urgency that the 
narrator/authors attached to the topic of the general populace hearing, learning, 
and observing the teachings.240 What actually seems implausible, then, would 
be the notion that gathering all the people every seven years to hear the tôrâ 
“instructions”  read to them (Dt. 31:9-13) would be sufficient to thoroughly 
educate an entire population in the complexities of the teachings. It would be 
inadequate unless there existed another more regular manner of disseminating 
the teachings. Taking this analysis a step further, what we see from the texts of 
Deuteronomy that have we reviewed, that the Levites played a central role in 
teaching, administrating, and preserving the laws of Moses. This is evidence 
internal to Deuteronomy that argues for a multi-layered mechanism having been 
in place to accomplish the education of both the elite and general populations in 
the Mosaic teachings.  
The above reconstruction paints a picture of literate countryside Levites, 
                                                          
240 Dt. 5:1, 29-30; 6:2-9, 17; 8:1, 6, 11; 10:12-13; 11:8, 18-21; 12:1, 28; 13:1; 19:9a; 26:16; 




capable of functioning in both the Jerusalem Temple like any other Levite and 
therefore being capable of reading and teaching Torah in the local communities 
so that the common non-literate citizens could regularly hear and learn about it 
and fulfill its requirements.241 Deuteronomy's prescription of study, observance, 
and constant inter-generational communication about the teachings, 
presupposes that some level of literacy and social organization in the population 
would be a constant.242  This was the programmatic vision of the narrators who 
apparently believed that the only way their  vision could outlive their generation 
was through proactive mediation to the next generation. 
2.8   The   Second "Invoked" Audience: The People of the Land Mentioned in 
Deuteronomy 
The above hypothetical reconstruction of a dissemination mechanism has 
pertinence to the question of the second “addressed” audience in Deuteronomy, 
which would have been the populace at large. This wide audience was 
numerically the largest class of Judeans, made up of those who were not literate 
and would have needed to rely on the members of the literate elites, presumably 
the Levitical priests, for their knowledge of the tôrâ “instructions.” These 
individuals would have had the text read, taught and interpreted to them.243 In 
                                                          
241 Leuchter (2007: 417-436). 
 
242 See note # 240 above. 
 
243 Nehemiah 8:1-12 envisions just such a scenario as does Dt. 31:10-13. This set of verses 
envisions a public reading of the Teachings to the entire assembly of Israel every seven years 




Deuteronomy, the voice of the narrator/authors speaks directly to these two 
addressed audiences of Judeans that we have identified. Most of the population, 
presumably would have heard the text of Deuteronomy read to them in a public 
setting,244 and hypothetically some literate individuals might have had an opportunity 
to read and learn the text at some point in time contemporaneously with its creation 
or afterward. It would have been important for the success of the program that the 
second “addressed” audience and their real life circumstances found a reflection of 
themselves in the narrative.  
The stakeholders are all those members of the community of Israelite society 
whose concerns or potential concerns are articulated in the various laws, statutes, and 
ordinances of the Deuteronomic program. The interests of the citizen stakeholders 
and those of the narrator/authors were in alignment over the issues of social justice 
generally and the impartial administration of justice in the courts of law in 
particular.245 I am making the deduction that multiple copies of the text existed given 
the administrative structure of the Judean state that existed.  This means that 
potentially many Judean citizens up and down the social structure had the 
opportunity to become familiar with the Deuteronomic program at some stage 
through local, public readings and teaching, as well as in legal contexts both at the 
local level and in Jerusalem.  
 
 
                                                          
244 On the tradition of public reading in the Pentateuch see: Watts (1995:540-557). 
 
245 Vogt (2008: 35-44), Weinfeld (1960: 241-247). 
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2.8.1   A Closer Look at the Second “Invoked” Audience 
Deuteronomy is notable for the fact that it goes to great length to name in 
considerable detail its second “invoked” audience, as will be detailed below. 
These specifically named types of individuals are to be understood as the second 
order stakeholders of Deuteronomy with direct counterparts in contemporary 
Judean society. As Deuteronomy’s legal corpus will directly affect the lives of 
these second order constituents, they become a presence in the text as addressees 
of Moses' discourses and, as a matter of rhetorical strategy, the narrator/authors must 
motivate them to find reasons “buy-in” to what is proposed. 
2.8.2   Constituent Stakeholders: Israel as the Collective 
The most frequently mentioned constituent of the second “invoked” 
audience in Deuteronomy is the collective audience of Israel itself. There are a total 
of one hundred collective references of this type coming in many forms. 
Throughout the text, the narrator/authors refer to the general audience of Israelites 




(a) all lsrael,246 (b) the assembly of Israel,247 (c) lsrael,248 (d) sons of lsrael,249 (e) 
thirty-two instances of the term “brothers who constitute fellow Israelites, kinsmen and 
also Levites,250 (f) two references to Israelites as “the people,”251 (g) one reference to 
“children of the Lord,”252 (h) one occurrence of “the people of Yahweh.”253 As we 
can see, the narrator/authors used a number of different terms to address Israel as 
a collectivity and, most likely chose to apply different terms for the sake of literary 
style. 
2.8.3   The General Constituent Stakeholders of Deuteronomy: Dt. 1-4 
The recitation of the citizen stakeholders in Deuteronomy’s second 
invoked audience below, demonstrates that the narrator/authors included the 
                                                          
246 Fourteen occurrences of 'all Israel': Dt. 1.1; 5:1;11:6; 13:12; 18:6; 21:21; 27:9; 29:1; 
31:1,7,11[2x]; 32:45; 34:12. 
 
247 One occurrence of the 'entire assembly of Israel: Dt. 31:30. One occurrence of 'your congregation': 
Dt. 5: 19. 
 
248 Thirty-three occurrences of 'Israel': Dt. 1:38; 4:1; 5:1; 6:3.4; 9:1;10:12; 17:4,12,20: 
18:1;19:13; 20:3; 21:8; 22:19, 21, 22; 25:6, 7, 10; 26:15; 27:1, 9, 14; 29:9, 21; 31:9; 33:5, 10, 21, 
28, 29; 34:10. 
 
249 Sixteen occurrences of 'sons of Israel': Dt. 1:3; 3:18; 4:44, 45, 46; 10:6; 23:18; 24:7; 28:69; 31:19; 
32:49, 51, 52; 33:1; 34:8.9. 
250 Thirty-two occurrences referring to 'aḥ, brother, fellow kinsmen: Dt. 1:16(2x), 28; 3:18, 20; 15:2, 
3, 7 (2x), 9, 11, 12; 17:15 (2x), 20; 18:15, 18; 19:18, 19; 20:8; 22:1 (2x), 2 (2x), 3, 4; 23:20, 21; 
24:7, 14; 25:3, 11. Three occurrences referring to fellow Levites: Dt. 10:9; 18; 2, 7. (Lenchak 1994: 
85). 
251 Two occurrences of 'the people': Dt. 4:10; 27:11. 
 
252 One occurrence of 'children of the Lord’: Dt.14:1. 
 




broadest possible range of people and real-life circumstances and interests when 
they crafted the legal and ethical provisions of the corpus. I am not addressing 
the question of the sufficiency of Mosaic laws to function as an actual law code, 
or how in fact it was used. Of paramount interest was an abiding concern with 
rendering impartial justice, passing on the teaching to the next generation, loving 
the Lord with all one’s heart and soul, and particularly not engaging in apostasy. 
Of striking interest is the extent to which Deuteronomy’s civil laws protect the 
interests of the common citizens. Be it in all matters (of war, farming, family 
matters, rape, incest, levirate marriage, courts, livestock, commerce, construction, 
false prophecy, the needy and destitute, strangers, widows, the fatherless), the 
interests of the common person were included and protected. This would indicate 
that the laws and rules of Deuteronomy were most likely ones that were 
recognizable and familiar to the addressed audience of contemporary pre-exilic 
Judeans.254 Further, a rhetorical situation such as existed in the land, 
characterized by anxiety and foreboding about the future, would be the wrong 
time to introduce alien and unfamiliar legal concepts. The second invoked 
audience that was being addressed by inclusion in the legal vision of the corpus, 
were all those citizens who might have recourse to the magistrates in the future, 
or were simply living their lives with an expectation of ethical treatment in all 
their undertakings. As one reviews the collection of laws, rules and ordinances, it 
is easy to recognize from the breadth of topics and social concerns touched upon 
that their intention was to engage a wide, mostly lay audience. Rhetorically, this 
                                                          




wide inclusion of “invoked” audience stakeholders, paints a picture of a nation 
settled in its land. The vision promoted identification with the values and 
commitments of the narrator/authors on the part of the ‘addressed’ audience of 
contemporary Judean/Israelites who were alive in the era of its creation. 
Dt. 1:1-16 Leadership: These include tribal leaders, chiefs of thousands, 
chiefs of hundreds, chiefs of fifties, chiefs of hundreds, chiefs of ten, 
officials, magistrates, Levitical priests and elders.   
Dt. 1:36 Calebites:  Caleb, son of Jephunneh, and his descendants who were 
the Calebites, a non-Israelite group that gained acceptance within Israelite 
society.255 
Dt. 3:18-19 Military shock troops:  These are the troops who led the conquest. 
This represents the presence of a military organization and a capacity to equip 
soldiers for fighting wars. 
2.8.4 Stakeholders from the Second Discourse: Dt. 5-11 
Dt. 5:14 Sons, daughters, male and female slaves and strangers: These 
passages apply the Sabbath laws to the entire population and enforce rest 
on the Sabbath. They are linked to the command to remember their own 
                                                          
255 There is an interesting pun occurring in the text at this point around the story of Caleb that could be 
a rhetorical device used to make a point to the audience about being faithful to God. Faithfulness to 
God is a theme that redounds throughout Deuteronomy. The root klb is generally taken in Near 
Eastern languages as meaning a “dog.” In Hebrew it is used to express the meaning a faithful servant 
of a high person (HALOT: 476) and can also mean dog. In Numbers 13:6 Caleb, representing the tribe 
of Judah, is one of the twelve spies sent out to reconnoiter the land. In Num. 13:30 he is the only one 
to advise Moses that they should proceed with the conquest. Because of his loyalty to God, in Num. 
14:24 God lets Caleb live to enter the land and receive his inheritance. The other eleven spies are 
condemned to die in the wilderness as is the entire Exodus generation because of their faithlessness. 
The pun, which leaves one to draw one’s own conclusion, might be that a man with the name that can 
also mean 'dog' had more value to God for his 'faithfulness' and loyalty than the other men of his 





slavery in Egypt, they create a moral obligation to show compassion 
particularly to enslaved members of the community.256 
Dt. 5:2 Tribal heads and elders: This passage mentions the tribal heads and 
elders who heard God's voice at Horeb. 
Dt. 7:3-4 Foreign women: These passages forbid intermarriage with women 
from foreign nations.  
Dt. 10:8 Special status for the tribe of Levi: This passage establishes that 
the God set apart the tribe of Levi to carry the Ark of the Lord, to stand in 
attendance upon the Lord and bless his name.257 
Dt. 11: 18-2: The children:  These passages create a duty to impress the 
words of the Lord upon the children that they may long endure in the land.  
2.8.5  Stakeholders from the Law Code: Dt. 12-26    
Dt. 13:2-6 False prophets and dream-diviners:  These passages set the rules 
for dealing with false prophets and dream-diviners that might lead the people 
astray by urging them to go after, and worship other Gods and thus be disloyal 
to the Lord. This was a capital crime. 
 
Dt. 13:7-12 Close family members who engage in apostasy:  These passages 
also put on notice of death, sons, daughter, wives, and closest of friends for 
enticing other Israelites to worship other gods which they did not know and 
that they had not experienced. 
 
Dt. 13:13-17 Scoundrels who entice to apostasy: These passages also put 
on notice of death scoundrels from the populace that subvert other 
inhabitants to go worship other gods. 
 
                                                          
256 Other laws that touch on the treatment of slaves are Dt. 12:15-18; 24:7. 
 
257 See footnote #233 above. 
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Dt. 14:28-29 Tithing to support the poor and Levites:  Here is established 
the provision of the full tithe, every third year, to provide for the Levite, 
the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow in the communities that they 
may eat. 
 
Dt. 15:1-5 Debtors:  These verses address the remission of debt every seven 
years whereby a debtor may get out from under his burden of money owed. 
The creditor is forbidden to dun a fellow Israelite debtor, but this rule does not 
apply to foreigners 
 
Dt. 15:7-11 The needy and poor people:  These passages address the 
obligation to care and provide for the needy who will always be a part of 
the population. 
 
Dt. 15:12-18 Freeing of slaves, voluntary slavery: Here Deuteronomy 
treats the question of Hebrew slaves and the obligation to free them every 
seven years. It also clarifies how to provide for the slave once he/she 
released and allows for the continuation of that slavery under voluntary 
circumstances. 
Dt. 16:18-20 Magistrates: These passages provide for the appointment of 
magistrates and officials for the tribes and settlements. They are to render 
impartial justice, and not take bribes as bribes subvert justice. Justice must 
be pursued, in order for society to thrive.  
Dt. 17:2-6 Apostate behavior as a capital crime: These passages again put 
on notice of death anyone who transgress the covenant by turning to 
worship and bowing down foreign gods. Legal procedure is enumerated on 
how to deal with this eventuality which, insures that the accused gets a fair 
trial  
Dt. 17: 8-13 Procedures for plaintiffs and defendants for difficult court cases: 
Here is described procedures for referring difficult court cases from a local 
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lower court to a higher court in Jerusalem, and for a hearing before the 
Levitical priests or magistrates in charge at the  
Dt. 17:14-20 Kingship: These passages provides for laws for the selection 
of kings. He must be a kinsman and never a foreigner. The constitutional 
principle of every person, including the king, being subject to the written 
law appears in Dt. 17:18-19.  
Dt. 18:1-8 Levites: These passages recite and expand the rules concerning 
the Levites. 
Dt. 18:20-22 False prophets:  These verses discuss how to recognize a 
prophet who is falsely speaking in the name of the Lord  and how to recognize 
one that does speak in the Lord’s name. 
Dt. 19:1-21 Manslayers and cities of refuge:  This law establishes cities of 
refuge and the rules and conditions under which a manslayer may gain 
protection from the blood-avenger and thus avoid shedding the blood of the 
innocent. 
Dt. 20: 1-9 The rights of individuals mustered for war: These passages discuss 
the procedure of mustering for war which is managed first by priests and then 
officials.  It provides for an authorized absence from battle for certain classes 
of men. These include: one who has built a new house and not lived in it; 
one who planted a vineyard but never harvested it; one who paid the bride-
price for a wife but not yet married her; one who is afraid or disheartened. 
Dt. 21:1-9 Finding a body in the open country: Here the law is concerned 
with community responsibilities at the rural township level. The elders of a 
town nearest to where a slain person is discovered must assist in determining 
who is responsible. There is strong sanction against incurring bloodguilt and 
this law provides procedures for absolution in what otherwise would be 
ambiguous circumstances. 
Dt. 21:10-1: Rights of the conquered: This law establishes the rules of 




Dt. 21:22-23 The body of an executed person:  This law discusses the 
procedure for dealing with the corpse of a man put to death for a capital 
offense. 
Dt. 22:1-4 Care of livestock:  This law provides an obligation for citizens to 
protect stray livestock on behalf of the fellow whose beast had gone missing 
and for raising a beast who has fallen and cannot get up. 
Dt. 22:5 Crossdressers: This law prohibit cross-dressing and homosexuality. 
Women must not wear men's apparel nor men wear women's clothing. These 
acts are abhorrent to the Lord. 
Dt. 22:8 Concerning building practices:  This law requires the 
construction of a parapet on the roof when building a house so as to avoid 
blood-guilt if someone were to fall from it. 
Dt. 22:9-21 Family law:  These laws deal with family matters and offer 
protection and procedures for a woman falsely accused of not being a 
virgin and for determining the truth of the case. The girl's father and 
mother, and the elders, become involved in determining guilt or 
innocence. This issue becomes an important matter for the honor of the 
family name and in not allowing injustice to prevail in family relations or 
in the community at large. 
Dt. 22:22 Adultery: This law provides that lying with another man's wife is 
a capital offense. 
 
Dt. 22:23-28 Rape: This provision discusses the accusation of rape of a virgin 
who is engaged to another man and how to determine guilt in this case. It also 






Dt. 23:1-25 General legal matters affecting various stakeholders: These 
passages deal with a series of issues which include: prohibition against 
marrying a father's former wife, one who had his testes crushed, bastards 
not being admitted to the congregation, prohibitions against Ammonites 
and Moabites from entering the congregation, nocturnal emissions which 
occur when a soldier is in the war camp, prohibitions against male and 
female cult prostitution, not charging interest on loans to Israelites, the 
importance of fulfilling vows to the Lord, and the protection of a 
neighbor's vineyard or field from overgrazing. 
 
Dt. 24:1-20 General legal matters affecting various stakeholders: These 
verses include: procedures in divorce cases, exemptions from going to war 
during the first year of marriage, prohibition against taking an upper 
millstone in pawn, sanction of death against kidnapping and selling an 
fellow Israelite, skin afflictions, rules for making loans, return of a pledge 
of a needy man, prohibition against abuse of a needy or destitute laborer 
who must be paid on the day of his work,  parents not incurring capital 
offense on behalf of a child's crime and vis versa, prohibition against 
subverting the rights of the stranger or the fatherless, leaving some crops 
unharvested so that the needy may eat, not over gathering olives that have 
fallen to the ground after beating the trees so the poor may glean and find 
some food to fill his/her stomach. 
 
Dt. 25:1-16 General legal matters: This is another series of short laws 
that, deal with a variety of topics including: prohibition against over 
flogging a guilty man lest he become degraded, laws of levirate marriage, 






2.8.6   Constituents from the Blessings and Curses in Dt. 27-28  
Dt. 27:16-25 Moral and ethical offenses affecting various stakeholders: 
These verses mention the following offenses: one who insults his father or 
mother, one who moves his fellows countryman’s landmark, one who 
misdirects a blind person on his way, one who subverts the rights of a 
stranger, the fatherless and the widow, one who lies with his father’s wife, 
one who lies with any beast, one who lies with his sister whether daughter 
of his father or daughter of his mother, one who lies with his mother-in-
law, one who strikes down his fellow countryman in secret, one who 
accepts a bribe in the case of the murder of an innocent person. 
 
2.8.7 Constituents from the Third Discourse and Supplement: Dt. 29-34 
Dt. 29: 9-11: General constituent stakeholders: These verses mention: 
tribal heads, elders, officials, all the men of Israel, children, wives, even 
the stranger within the camp, from woodchopper to water drawer. 
 
2.9   The Third “Invoked” Audience: The “Foreign” Presence in the Land                                                                                      
         There exists a third “addressed” audience in Deuteronomy, which is quite 
important for the rhetorical strategy of the book. This third invoked audience was 
the “foreign” presence existing in the land. It was their cultural norms, and their 
religious practices that the narrator/authors present as the overriding fear and 
concern against which they took a stand.  This third invoked audience was, 
rhetorically speaking, placed in opposition to the other two invoked audiences of 
the text that we have identified. In the Deuteronomic traditions, the foreign 
"nations" of the land are named three times: Dt.7:1; Jos. 3:10; 24:11. They were 
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the: Hittites, Girgashites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites. 
Some of these nations are identifiable while others, like the Perizzites and 
Girgashites are more obscure.258 Whether or not all these distinct nations were 
present in the Land at the time of the composition of Deuteronomy is open to 
question. However, when it comes to this third “invoked” audience and the 
extensive polemic directed against it, the narrator/authors are indirectly 
addressing these foreign populations in order to make the Judeans understand the 
their presence is officially unwelcome and in order to warn of the danger they 
pose. The presence of this third “invoked” audience was meant to resonate in the 
contemporaneous Judeans as a symbolic "stand-in" for the actual foreign 
presence in the land. Symbolically, they took on the rhetorical role of foil of the 
"other" for the purposes of argumentation. The mention of these traditional 
"nations" may then be an example of a coded literary reference which was 
politically circumspect given their precarious historical circumstances as a weak 
vassal of the Neo-Assyrians, or later in exilic times as captives of the 
Babylonians 
2.10 Summary 
In this chapter, I began by discussing the meaning of the rhetorical situation 
and supplemented that discussion by mentioning a number of concepts that have 
deepened our understanding of the dynamics of the rhetor/audience relationships and 
which also function rhetorically as prerequisites for argumentative discourse.  I have 
explained that Bitzer’s concept of the rhetorical situation conforms to the expectation of 
                                                          
258 Christensen (1992: 1038 #3). 
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modern rhetorical theory in seeing the audience as inseparable from the discourse 
addressed to them. An organic bond exists between the rhetor and audience because they 
lived in a shared world in which both parties understand and the same situational reality. 
This underlying bond is fostered in a text like Deuteronomy when the narrator/authors 
can evoke a sense of mutual fictionalization and identification between the “invoked” 
and “addressed” audiences who find alignment with the ideas and goals of the rhetor. We 
have also seen that the how the narrator/authors address the Mosaic teachings to a wide 
audience of constituent stakeholders in order to achieve maximum “buy-in” from their 
fellow Israelites. Let us now turn to an introduction to the ideas of Chaim Perelman and 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca through whose creation of The New Rhetoric we are able to gain 
many useful tools for conducting a rhetorical critical analysis on a text like Deuteronomy. 
The New Rhetoric will help us unravel the rhetorical structure of Deuteronomy and 















         Chapter Three: 
 
                           Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric:  
             How their Revival and Redefinition of Rhetoric Helps Us Understand 
                    Argumentation in Deuteronomy 
Abstract 
 In this chapter, we will discuss the background, origins and details of The New 
Rhetoric in order to reveal its premises, scope and potential. I will explain the problems 
that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were trying to address in their work as seen from the 
perspective of the post WWII period. The major concepts of The New Rhetoric will be 
discussed and why they provide an appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing 
Deuteronomy. In order to accomplish this objective we will also discuss the differences 
between the premises of the “old” classical rhetoric of Greco-Roman times and that of the 
“new” rhetoric of the modern era, in order to make clear what “kind” of rhetoric is 
appropriate to analyze Deuteronomy. We will consider the significance of David A. 
Frank’s proposal that The New Rhetoric represents a Jewish counter-model to the 
classical tradition. Further, we will discuss the details of the Argument Schemes, which 
are the core of The New Rhetoric’s argumentation model in order to preview the parts of 
the model that may be applied in my rhetorical critical analysis of Deuteronomy.  
3.1 Preliminary Comments on the Nature of The New Rhetoric 
In the discussion below, I will review the foundational concepts of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of practical argumentation introduced in 1958 as Traite de 
l’argumenation: la nouvelle rhetorique.259  As I explain the basic features of their theory, 
                                                          




we will gather a set of concepts and tools that will prove useful in deciphering the main 
premises and techniques of argumentation used by the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy. 
Naturally, not every aspect of Perelman’s theory of practical argumentation may be 
applied to what we find Deuteronomy, but much of it can be. The New Rhetoric’s 
perceptive insights will allow us an opportunity to describe Deuteronomy as a rhetorical 
and synchronic whole.260  The utility of Perelman’s theory of practical argumentation for 
analyzing Deuteronomy should become apparent in the course of the discussion. We 
might feel compelled to ask after our review whether the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy were not themselves intuitively proto-Perelmanian in their approach.  
Deuteronomy is a rhetorical text whose premises reflect a concern with questions 
of history, cultural memory, community, social justice, and choices about value 
hierarchies. The narrator/authors present its rhetorical situation in a temporal setting and 
what it proposed exemplifies a sense of the contingent. The narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy reason informally with their audiences about the past, present and future in 
order to arrive at a plan of action. They do not employ reasoning in order to arrive at a 
notion of some pre-existing knowledge or  eternal truth. Rather, knowledge based upon 
experience is the kind of knowledge the narrator/authors try to apprehend.  This 
characterization of Deuteronomy makes it clear why applying a strictly neo-Aristotelian 
model, while not impossible, would not provide the tools to perform a critical analysis 
that meets the needs of  modern rhetorical criticism.   
                                                          
260 There have been previous studies that have briefly used the concepts in The New Rhetoric in analyzing 
Deuteronomy. See in particular Katz (1986) who analyzes ancient argumentation using The New Rhetoric 
and devotes one chapter to Deuteronomy, and Lenchak (1993) whose dissertation uses to some extent the 
insights of  The New Rhetoric to discuss Moses’ Third Discourse in Dt. 28:69-30:20. 
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By contrast, The New Rhetoric responds to the demands of a modern rhetoric that 
places choices about values, the human community, the contingent temporal nature of 
truth and the individual at the heart of rhetorical argumentation.  Deuteronomy takes 
place in real time, in temps plein, and demands a commitment from the entire audience, 
collectively and individually, to make correct choices, engage in a vita activa, in the land 
promised that they are going to possess. The Perelman-Olbrechts-Tyteca model––in as 
much as it seeks to understand how people reason about values and make choices about 
what is preferable, reasonable and justifiable within the context of their own particular 
situation–– is a good fit for analyzing argumentation in Deuteronomy. At the foundation 
of the Perelman-Olbrechts-Tyteca model is the premise that all informal argumentation is 
of a contingent nature. This means that the validity of such arguments are not subject to 
formal proof, but are valid only if the audience that hears them considers them sufficient 
to gain adherence and become disposed to act upon what was given presence in their 
minds. The disposition to act is based on the premise that both rhetor and audience live in 
a “shared world” where such arguments conform to premises that resonate to their own 
sense of situation in all its temporality and to their sense of what is real and preferable.  
3.2   The Background and Origins of The New Rhetoric 
 Chaim Perelman (1912-1984) was a Belgian philosopher and a professor of logic, 
ethics, and metaphysics at the University of Brussels.  When the Nazis occupied Belgium 
in 1940, Perelman was removed from his academic post. During the war, Perelman 
became an important resistance leader in Belgium and returned to his post after the 
liberation in 1944. In the wake of the destruction of Europe during the war and the 
Holocaust, Perelman and other European thinkers began to grapple with the issue of the 
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failure of reason in the face of totalitarian thought. During this period, Perelman co-
chaired a UNESCO committee that sought to establish the philosophical basis of the 
United Nation’s position on human rights. What he and other philosophers concluded in 
the aftermath of the Second World War was that reason had been misused by 
totalitarians.261  Perelman, who had been trained in the tradition of logical positivism,262 
came to believe that this intellectual framework could not provide insight into questions 
of values and justice. In Perelman’s view, logical positivism and existentialism,263 the 
two prevailing philosophical movements in the post-war setting were not equipped to 
prevent the misuse of reason as had occurred during World War II.  
It was in the post-war year of 1947 that Perelman began his eleven year 
collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. There has been much discussion about the 
nature of Olbrechts-Tyteca’s role in the development of The New Rhetoric and of her 
collaboration with Perelman. It is said that Perelman brought to the collaboration an 
expertise in philosophy and logic and Olbrechts-Tyteca contributed her command of 
literature, literary criticism and the comic.264  
                                                          
261 Frank (2003: 165-167, Frank (2014: 81-85). 
 
262 Logical positivism and logical empiricism, which together formed neo-positivism, was a movement of 
Western philosophy that embraced verification, an approach that sought to legitimize philosophical 
discourse on the basis shared with the best examples of the empirical sciences. In this theory of knowledge, 
only statements verifiable either logically or empirically would be cognitively meaningful. The movement 
flourished in the 1920’s and 1930’s in several European centers. 
 
263 Existentialism was a chiefly 20th century philosophical movement embracing diverse doctrines but 
centering on analysis if individual existence in an unfathomable universe and the plight of the individual 
who must assume ultimate responsibility for acts of free will without any certain knowledge of what is right 
or wrong or good or bad. 
 




During the war years 1940-1944, Perelman had written De la justice which was a 
study of six standpoints on the subject of justice. He was, however, not satisfied with the 
conclusions he had reached as he was not able to discern how justice could be 
justified!265 Perelman studied justice from the point of view of logical empiricism and 
succeeded to show in his study that formal justice is a principle of action, according to 
which beings of one category must be treated in the same way. This became known as the 
“rule of justice.” When he tried to apply his rule of justice to actual situations, he 
understood that this required making distinctions and creating categories that are relevant 
as to how people should be treated, and that these decisions involved judgments of value. 
He concluded that if justice consists in the systematic implementation of certain value 
judgments, it does not rest on any rational foundation.266 His study of justice led him to 
conclude that the values that come under discussion are subject to varying opinions 
pronounced by members of society. This realization in turn led him to believe that those 
values did not of themselves, belong to the “world of Ideas.” This line of thinking led 
Perelman to take a position contrary to Platonic theory, that justice cannot be related to an 
ontological question, as he had determined that justice has no separate existence beyond 
the circumstances in which it is applied or beyond the people who appraise it through 
confronting each other by means of thesis and antithesis. Whether matters are just or 
unjust, he concluded, depended on the decision of the audience which, in the process of 
deliberation, pronounce on them and determine whether they are just or unjust.267 This 
                                                          
265 Dearin (1984: 155-185). 
 
266 Perelman (1979: 9). 
267 Torsedillas (1990: 111). 
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position conformed to the opinion of Protagoras (490-420 BCE), the first and most 
famous of the Sophists who declared that “any sort of thing which seems just and 
admirable to any city is necessarily just and admirable for it, as long as that city agreed to 
it.”268  
As a consequence of his research, Perelman became interested in judgments of 
value, which for positivists like himself would generally have no meaning. In his search 
for the grounds of justice, he sought for an expression of reason that could join the vita 
contemplativa with the vita activa.269  He saw that reason had been restricted to the 
former in the classical tradition because of Plato and he came to believe that the resultant 
denouncement of reason in the practical domains of morals, law and politics had in 
contemporary society become increasingly problematic for reasons previously 
mentioned. In the search for an answer to what he perceived as a crisis of reason, 
Perelman’s research eventually led him to rediscover Cicero’s rhetoric.270 What caught 
                                                          
268 Torsedillas (1990: 110). 
 
269 In Greco-Roman times the terms vita contemplativa and vita activa represented the opposition between 
two ideal forms of life: the active life and the contemplative life. The ideal of the contemplative life was 
essentially concerned with the pursuit, the comprehension, and the contemplation of the truth concerning 
the subject of himself, the order and nature of things, or divinity. Starting from such comprehension, the 
wise man was supposed to be able to work out the rules of action, both public and private, as based on 
philosophical knowledge. Prudence and reasonable action flowed directly from knowledge, on which they 
were based, and to which they are subordinated. The rhetor, on the other hand, educated his disciples for 
active life in the city; he was concerned to train serious-minded, politically oriented men, capable of 
effectively taking part in courtroom proceedings as well as in political deliberations; able if necessary, to 
exalt those ideals and aspirations that ought to inspire and orient people of action. Perelman (1979: 43).  
 
270 For a fuller discussion of the trajectory of Perelman’s transition from logical positivist to rhetorician, see 
Robert D. Clark’s introduction to the translation of Perelman’s “First Philosophies and Regressive 
Philosophies.” David A. Frank identifies this particular article, first published in French in 1949 and not 
translated into English until 2003, as the culmination and turning point in Perelman’s thinking about 
rhetoric and argumentation in the post-war years. In it, he presents the main themes that he later 
127 
 
Perelman’s attention about Cicero was his emphasis on rhetoric’s role in ensuring justice. 
Cicero, Perelman discovered, thought that “the most important science relative to 
governing the city was rhetoric, that is to say, the science of speaking, for if there were 
not speech, there would be no city, nor would there be any establishment of justice or of 
human company.”271 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca had found in Cicero a historical 
warrant to connect justice to rhetoric.  
Perelman, in fact was struggling with a number of different and interrelated 
problems. First was his conclusion that justice and value judgments were arbitrary. 
Second, was the limitation of philosophical reasoning to contemplation. Third, was the 
failure of many to act responsibly before and during World War II. His trajectory from 
logical positivism to rhetoric was a result of an evolving view that many philosophers had 
a severely limited and truncated vision of reason.272  In 1964, Perelman wrote about the 
nature of their research in its formative period by writing that he and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
began an investigation into the manner in which people reason when they deliberate, 
decide, and choose. It was necessary, they thought, so that one’s actions not be arbitrary, 
that the decisions and the choices made were preferable for one reason or another. Hence, 
they sought after a logic of value judgments that they believed indispensable to a 
philosophy of action. Their search proved to be both in vain and fruitful––for instead of 
delivering a specific logic of value judgments, their analyses led to a general theory of 
                                                          
developed more fully in his Treatise on Argumentation: The New Rhetoric. See Frank, Bolduc and Clark 
(2003: 177-206). 
 
271 Frank (2003: 555). 
 




argumentation. Later, they connected their theory of practical argumentation with 
dialectical reasoning, such as what Aristotle had presented in his Rhetoric and Topics.273 
They felt it was necessary to draw up, for the sake of logicians, a philosophical defense in 
favor of an enlarged conception of proof and reasoning, which does not limit itself to 
demonstrative reasoning––those of formal logic274––but completes them by recourse to 
all the forms of argumentation used to convince and to persuade. Perelman wrote that 
reason is able to lead us through correct deductions, from true premises to true 
conclusions, but it also plays an essential role when it is a question of showing that our 
decisions are just, our choices reasonable, and our actions justifiable.275 The outcome of 
this research made it possible for rationality to be introduced once again, into practical 




                                                          
273 Dialectic was the guided attempt to move to a higher understanding by engaged method of question and 
answer in which the soul and opinions of a single interlocutor are probed. Where rhetoric acknowledges the 
authority of public opinion, dialectic begins in opinion with the intent of transcending the realm of 
empirical experience and arriving at truths more securely grounded because they have been purified by the 
operation of reason. Dialectic is a form of reason based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-
arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses). The outcomes of such 
dialectic might be a refutation or a relevant proposition, or a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing 
assertions, or a qualitative improvement in the dialogue. Kastely (2001:221-225). 
 
274 Formal reasoning is reasoning where the force of the argument depends upon the logical pattern alone. 
Van Noorden (1978:178). 
 
275 Perelman (1984: 188-189). 
 




3.3 Perelman’s Regressive Philosophy 
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rejected the premises of “first philosophies”277 as 
being inadequate to the task of coping with values and making value judgments, but did 
not reject “first philosophies” themselves.  Their main criticism of the classical tradition 
was that it was not open to truths that were fluid, partial or in contradiction. From the 
classical tradition they traced a direct relationship to logical positivism, concluding that it 
was not well suited to grapple with the problems of making value judgments in the 
uncertainty of the modern age. Perelman sought a foothold for a new and expanded sense 
of reason in values and sources shared by an author and the audience by invoking 
Aristotle as a source of authority for valorizing rhetoric. If Aristotle, the ‘father’ of 
apodictic logic, inflated reason to include the probable and rhetoric, then Perelman’s 
attempt to do the same thing must be justified.278 Van Noorden writes that Aristotle dealt 
with arguments which pass from the general to the particular, which he called arguments 
from probability. He defined probability as “a reputable proposition about what people 
know to happen generally.” Arguments from probabilities and signs are the arguments 
used in rhetoric. Aristotle regarded such arguments as defective syllogisms and 
considered them an approximation to valid, demonstrable inference. Nonetheless, they 
were still considered sound because they were inductive arguments based on the weight 
of evidence.279  
                                                          
277 First philosophies refer to any metaphysics that purport to determine first principles such as the 
fundamentals of being (ontology), of knowledge (epistemology), or of action (axiology). 
 
278 Frank and Bolduc (2003:184), Lawson-Tancred (2004: 74-790. 
 




Perelman developed what he called “regressive philosophy” which created an 
antimony with “first philosophies.” 280 To conceptualize an alternative to first 
philosophies, Perelman drew on the work of Ferdinand Gonseth281 and from the axiology 
and sociology of his mentor, Eugene Dupreel.282 Perelman felt that his rhetoric needed 
philosophical grounding, which Gonseth’s notion of an “open philosophy” provided. 
Gonseth had advanced an alternative to “first philosophy” that emphasized experience in 
time rather than eternal knowledge as central to the philosophical enterprise. Gonseth 
held that theory and experience are intertwined and that reason should yield to the lessons 
of experience. Experience, according to Gonseth, could only be understood and theorized 
with dialectic, which consists of four principles (wholeness, duality, openness to revision 
and responsibility), which Perelman discusses in his article “First Philosophies and 
Regressive Philosophy.”283 In this connection Frank and Bolduc wrote: 
(Regressive philosophy) provides a metaphysical foundation for rhetoric, a 
grounding that is not absolute but firm enough to base contingent truths. In doing 
so, it identifies and avoids the performance contradiction that plagues post-
Enlightenment thought.284 It establishes a third way between the absolutes of first 
                                                          
280 Frank and Bolduc (2003: 177-203). 
 
281 Gondseth (1947). 
 
282 Dupreel (1948). 
 
283 Frank, Bolduc and Clark (2003: 185-186). This article was not translated into English until 2003. 
 
284 The phrase ‘the performance contradiction that plagues post-Enlightenment thought’ refers to a belief 
that radical skepticism was the only alternative to Enlightenment rationality.  Perelman joined other post-
war theorists in resisting the reign of disembodied Enlightenment rationality. It was Perelman’s belief that 
radical skeptics failed to see that they had been held hostage by Enlightenment blackmail in accepting the 
Enlightenment’s criterion for truth. Regressive philosophy provided the human community with a mode of 
philosophical reasoning located between the extremes of Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism. 
In this space between extremes, Perelman’s identified contingent truths and values dependent on a 
rhetorical mode of reasoning, which made moral judgments possible. Frank, Bolduc and Clark (2003: 178). 
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philosophies and radical skepticism. It does so by identifying contingent truths, 
those strong enough to warrant temporally restricted knowledge, but open to 
further modification and change. Knowledge need not be timeless and eternal, nor 
is understanding impossible. With regressive philosophy and rhetoric, it is 
possible to move beyond the demands of certainty and the pitfalls of aporia285 to 
arrive at contingent but reasonable judgments. Once liberated from the 
performance contradiction of post-Enlightenment thought, questions of values, 
justice and action could be judged in the light of regressive philosophy, one that 
sought progress, learned from mistakes and errors and improved in time.286 
 There was an important distinction to be drawn between “first philosophies” and 
Perelman’s “regressive philosophy” for the repurposing rhetoric in the modern age. ‘First 
philosophies’ focus on eternal principles, thereby make one moment in time—generally 
from the past––as original, and the source of present-day principles. ‘Regressive 
philosophy’ does not privilege any one particular moment but aspires to problem solving 
through constant deliberation and human interaction, carried out by a society of free 
minds interacting with each other in the context of lived experience. The nexus of this 
interaction allows for those free minds to take responsibility for judgments in the field of 
action. 287 
3.4   Perspectives on The New Rhetoric 
In the post war years, the interrelated crises of justice, the limitations of 
philosophical reasoning, and the question of responsibility were Perelman’s 
                                                          
 
285 Aporia is an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction in a text, argument or theory. 
 
286 Frank, Bolduc and Clark (2003: 186). 
 




intellectual exigencies. With those issues in mind, Perelman began his collaboration 
with Olbrechts-Tyteca.  Over the next three decades, Perelman continued to develop 
his ideas in frequent publications which appeared in the period 1949-1984.288  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s original treatise and the body of work which came 
afterward came to be known by scholars in the field as The New Rhetoric Project 
(NRP).289  The New Rhetoric has been described as the most significant rhetorical 
theory of the twentieth century by David A. Frank who has devoted his entire career 
to studying Perelman.290 Other scholars have been equally effusive about the 
importance of The New Rhetoric. 291  It seems appropriate to raise several questions 
at this point. First, what was it about The New Rhetoric that made it so influential in 
the late twentieth century?  Second, how does one distinguish the “new rhetoric” 
from the “old rhetoric.” In other words, how do their underlying premises and 
objectives differ? Third, how do Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ideas help us 
understand rhetorical argumentation in Deuteronomy.  I will try to provide answers 
to these important questions in the following discussion of the topics associated 
with the theory. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were in fact highly critical of the classical 
tradition that started with Plato and Aristotle, and continued with St. Augustine, 
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289 See: Frank (1997, 2003); van Eemeren (1996); Karon (1976); Crosswhite (2010). 
 
290 Frank (2003: 163). 
 




Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza in the form of empiricism and logical 
positivism. Descartes292 who had “taken as false everything which was only 
plausible” had been a major influence on Western philosophy for the past three 
centuries.293  But, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also understood that the 
European philosophers who were their audience shared a commitment to classical 
thought and, as such, Aristotle, the father of modern logic, served as the locus294 
and starting point for their critique of classical rhetoric. While Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca reaffirmed the connection that classical theories of argumentation 
had with dialectic and rhetoric they nonetheless, sought to foster a break with that 
same classical tradition which had excluded these forms of thought from the realm 
of reason and rationality in antiquity.  David Frank has noted that Perelman and 
                                                          
292 Rene Descartes’ (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) continues to be a standard 
text in most university philosophy departments. Descartes laid the foundation of 17th-century continental 
rationalism, later advocated by Spinoza and Leibniz, and opposed by the empiricist school of thought 
consisting of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. For Perelman on Descartes, see Perelman (1982: 149-
152). 
 
293 Perelman (1969: 1), Franks (2003: 170). 
 
294In rhetorical discourse, loci are the preferences of a particular audience which are of an extremely 
general nature and can, without difficulty, serve as justification for statements made in argumentation 
addressed to that audience. According to Perelman’s New Rhetoric, loci express preference for one 
abstraction verses another. Thus it may be a locus for a particular audience that the enduring is preferable to 
the transitory as in “A bird in the hand is worth one in the bush.” This locus would then be the basis for a 
value hierarchy in which some sure thing is preferable to some unsure thing because surety has greater 
value to the audience. Loci constitute an extensive store to be drawn upon as a rich basis for values and 




Olbrechts-Tyteca shared the view that predicative logic295 which had ruled 
Aristotelian and Western reason were unduly restrictive.296 They wrote: 
Since the time of Aristotle, logic has confined its study to deduction and inductive 
reasoning as though any argument differing from these was due to the variety of 
its content and not to its form. As a result, an argument that cannot be reduced to 
canonical form is regarded as logically valueless.  What then about reasoning 
from analogy? What about the a fortorio297 argument? Must we, in using such 
arguments, always be able to introduce a fictive unexpressed major premise, so as 
to make them conform to the syllogism?298 
What Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca did was to reorient Aristotle’s dialectic and 
shift the premises of situated reasoning 299 from the propositional 300 to the 
                                                          
295 First order logic––also known as first order predicate calculus and predicate logic—is a collection of 
formal systems used in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science. First-order logic uses 
quantified variables over non-logical objects and allows the use of sentences that contain variables so that 
rather than propositions such as “ Socrates is a man” one can have expressions in the form “there exists X 
such that X is Socrates and X is a man” where “there exists” is a quantifier and “X” is a variable. This 
distinguishes it from propositional logic which does not use quantifiers or relations.  
 
296 Franks (2003: 173). 
 
297 The term ‘a fortorio’ expresses a conclusion for which there is stronger evidence than a previously 
accepted one. It has the meaning: with greater force or more convincing force—used in drawing a 
conclusion that is inferred to be even more certain than another. 
 
298 Perelman (1979: 26-27). A syllogism is an instance of a form of reasoning in which a conclusion is 
drawn (whether validly or not) from two given or assumed propositions (premises), each of which shares a 
term with the conclusion and shares a common or middle term not present in the conclusion (e.g., all dogs 
are animals; all animals have four legs; therefore, all dogs have four legs). 
 
299 Situated reasoning refers to reasoning specific to a particular situation. 
 
300 Propositional reasoning refers to conclusions drawn from premises with logical connectives 




axiological.301 This shift was done for two reasons: the first was that they did not want to 
be bound by any metaphysical system which acceptance of Aristotle’s dialectical 
premises would imply, and second, they wished to exploit the topoi of dialectical 
reasoning by focusing on values and the value hierarchies of the audience rather on the 
relationships between subjects and predicates.302 
James Crosswhite identified two critical features to which he points, as radical 
rhetorical moves that justify calling Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca’s argument model 
The New Rhetoric.303 The first was that they retrieved the rhetorical topoi,304 those 
                                                          
301 Axiological reasoning is the philosophical study of value. It is either a collective term for ethics and 
aesthetics—philosophical fields that depend crucially on notions of worth—or the foundations for these 
fields, and thus similar to value theory and meta-ethics. This expression was first used by Paul Lapie in 
1902. 
 
302 Frank (2003: 173). 
 
303 Crosswhite (2008: 169). 
 
304 Aristotle distinguished between two types of topics (topoi): common and special. He defines topics as 
lines of reasoning useful across three rhetorical situations: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. He listed 
twenty-eight common types of arguments, including opposites, correlatives, consequences, definition, 
parts, and cause and effect. He also describes two types of special topics. The first were categories 
governing specific material appropriate as evidence in each of the types of discourse. For example, his 
deliberative topics included: ways and means, peace and war, national defense, and food supply; forensic 
topics included motives, states of mind, kinds of wronged persons, and just and unjust actions; epideictic 
topics pointed to virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom. These special topics did not 
supply information but rather prompted the rhetor to find it. Aristotle noted that such topics approached the 
fields of ethics and politics in which the content could be found. Another type of special topics were the 
appeals for ethos and pathos. For ethos, Aristotle proposed showing good sense, good moral character, and 
good will. For pathos, he offered a list of possible emotions, identifying them, discussing their causes, and 
indicating how they might be excited. Aristotle’s conception of the purpose of the topics has been a matter 
of debate among historians of rhetoric. One position holds that the topics were aids to memory, a checklist 
or inventory of forms or argument or available premises for enthymemes to help a rhetor convince an 
audience of a judgment already held. In this view, the topics were warrants linking premises to already held 
conclusions, finding rather that creating judgments. Another view on topics holds that Aristotle’s topics had 
an epistemic function, guiding the rhetor to new knowledge or new probable  judgments, and thus giving an 




general forms of reasoning that had been neglected in modernity, but which they 
reinterpreted and reorganized into a system of argumentative techniques that provided the 
shared rhetorical logic of argumentation. These techniques were not necessarily truth 
preserving, like the formal proofs of logical systems, but were supposed to preserve 
adherence as the argument moved from the starting point to the claim.305  The second was 
the valorization of the audience, of receptivity as a kind of rational agency–– that is, a 
reception theory of rationality. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put it: “all 
argumentation takes shape and develops out of a relation to an audience, and the quality 
of an argument is a function of the quality of the esprits306 that would assent to it.”307  
Their model outlined the various forms of receptivity to arguments and their most famous 
of these sources of receptivity was their universal audience.308  This is an audience or 
form of receptivity of the highest quality, a paragon receptivity that possesses all the 
capabilities and knowledge necessary for making the most reasonable judgments about 
the strength of an argument. Crosswhite wrote that these two moves (toward redefining 
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306 Esprits is defined as vivacious cleverness or wit. Perelman’s usage of this term makes sense if it is 
rendered as mind or an intellectual capacity to engage. 
 
307 Perelman (1969: 5). 
 
308 Crosswhite (1989: 158). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca thought that there were several different types 
of audience an author may construct, and they may be more or less coincident with the actual social group 
with which an author is faced. The most important distinction they draw between kinds of audience is the 
distinction between kinds of audience is the distinction between a particular audience and a universal 
audience. This distinction is made in order to distinguish between argumentation which appeals only to  
particular groups with particular characteristics in particular places at particular times and argumentation 




the topoi and toward a reception theory of rationality) not only structure a new 
philosophy of rhetoric they also define The New Rhetoric as the rhetoric of philosophy.  
In their theory practical reasoning, Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca revived, 
redefined and repurposed Aristotle’s techniques of classical argumentation.309 They 
recognized a need for a new way to think about dialectical and rhetorical arguments that 
could embrace situated opinions about values and value judgments in the modern era.  In 
fact, it was their intention to develop a philosophical system that would promote a 
rapproachment between dialectic (reason and logic) and rhetoric (the art of adapting 
arguments to audiences). 310 In the Introduction to Perelman’s, The Realm of Rhetoric, 
Carroll Arnold wrote that Perelman, in effect, abandoned the traditional distinction 
between rhetoric and dialectic.311 In antiquity, dialectical reasoning312 was considered as 
running parallel with analytical reasoning but treating that which is probable instead of 
dealing with propositions that are necessary. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca felt that the 
ancients had not exploited the potential of dialectics and non-formal reasoning. Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca observed that how “opinionable” ideas get argued will be 
substantially the same in either circumstance because the arguer is always seeking the 
adherence of some other person or persons to an undemonstrable thesis.313 The revival of 
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dialectical methods in the service of practical reasoning led Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca to a theory of rhetoric that places the action of the individual at the center of the 
rhetorical process.  This process concerns choices that people make when they establish 
hierarchies of values that lead to social action. 
3.5 On Temporality in The New Rhetoric 
In the above discussion, I have provided a short introduction to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work and thinking. However, there are some additional elements of 
their thinking that require elaboration for the sake of completeness. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s belief that argumentation is by nature something temporal further 
brought into focus the distinction between the demonstration of classical reasoning and 
purposes of argumentation–– not by way of the self-evident, but by way of differences in 
their temporality.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca thought that demonstrative 
argumentation is always executed in “empty time” (temps vide),314 while (rhetorical) 
argumentation always takes place in “full time” (temps plein).315 Adherence, as the object 
of argumentation is itself thoroughly temporal, and (rhetorical) argumentation is both 
within time and is also internally temporal. 316 Another scholar who has taken note of this 
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conditioning of the audience that has occurred alters the meaning of arguments. But this alteration is not an 
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point, Robert Tindale wrote that by the reworking of principles from both philosophy and 
rhetoric The New Rhetoric necessitated a fusion that produced something quite new. Part 
of this reworking involved acknowledging the temporal and historical dimensions of 
reason and argumentation. Adherence can be understood not only in terms of intellectual 
assent, but also in terms of formation and dispositions. The strength of arguments can be 
understood only in terms of the time in which adherence waxes and wanes.317 
 Before we go any further in describing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
approach to rhetoric and argumentation, let us review some of their main ideas mentioned 
thus far: 
(a.) The purpose of rhetorical argumentation is not, as understood in the classical 
sense, to persuade, but rather is a matter of gaining adherence to premises 
that are already accepted by an audience.  
(b.) The New Rhetoric was interested in how people reason and argue about 
values and make choices when they do not employ the methods of classical 
logic. This process concerns contingent circumstances where choices about 
hierarchies of value that lead to social action. 
(c.) They argued that there was no real difference between rhetoric and dialectic 
as they both are interested in getting a person or persons to accept theses that 
are not able to be demonstrated by formal logic. 
(d.) They argued that the individual and the audience and not the rhetorician are 
at the center of the rhetorical process. 
(e.) They sought an enlarged conception of proof and reasoning, which did not 
limit itself to demonstrative reasoning—that is formal logic—but availed 
itself of all the forms of argumentation used to convince and persuade. 
(f.) They asserted that argumentation is temporal and takes place in “full time,” 
meaning it is historically situated. 
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(g.) They argued that adherence as the object of argumentation is itself 
thoroughly temporal and argumentation is both within time and also 
internally temporal. 
(h.) They argued that adherence can be understood not only in terms of 
intellectual assent, but also in terms of the formation of disposition. 
(i.) They were interested in the type of reasoning people use in conditions of 
uncertainty, and when the issues concern the motives from which they act, 
the goals that they seek, and the constraints, attractions, practices and 
outlooks that hold them together as a community. 
(j.) They sought the justification of the possibility of human community in the 
sphere of action when this justification cannot be grounded in a reality or and 
objective truth. 
(k.) They reoriented Aristotle’s dialectic by shifting the premises of situated 
reasoning from the propositional to the axiological. 
 
3.6   The New Rhetoric: A Jewish Counter Model––Toward a Jewish Metaphysics 
 It is fascinating that Perelman was explicit in acknowledging that he had been 
working at creating a fusion between classical and Talmudic methods of reasoning.318 In 
a speech at Hebrew University in 1980, Perelman traced his intellectual trajectory from 
logical positivism to rhetoric and declared that: 
A robust view of logic ought to be completed by a theory of 
argumentation that draws from the dialectical reasoning and the rhetoric 
from Greco-Roman antiquity, but also with Talmudic methods of 
reasoning. It is to the study of this theory, and its extensions in all 
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domains that I have dedicated, for more than twenty years, the majority 
of my works.319  
A tendency to make explicit reference to Judaic thought had been latent in 
Perelman’s writing until the 1970s.  A close reading of The New Rhetoric reveals that 
Perelman’s interpretation of Jewish reasoning and argumentation was at this 
foundation.320 It was from Judaism that Perelman drew the values of pluralism, tolerance, 
community, and the importance of argument, though he was not in possession of a deep 
understanding of the Talmud. He was, therefore, selective in his choice and deployment 
of Jewish thought in his writings.321 The defining logic of The New Rhetoric was 
comparative or reasoning from analogy, which is prominent in Jewish thought and it was 
in that sense that Perelman’s work may be seen as a Jewish counter-model to classical 
reasoning and argumentation.  It was Perelman’s thought, he wrote, that the idea of 
unicity of truth had disqualified rhetoric in the Western philosophical tradition from 
being useful in argumentation that is concerned with values. Perelman advocated that 
things were different in a tradition that follows a juridical322 rather than a mathematical 
model. In the tradition of the Talmud, for example, it is accepted that opposed positions 
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can be equally reasonable; one of them does not have to be right.323 Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca brought this into relief by citing the famous clash between two schools 
of biblical thought, Hillel and Shammai, which, he thought, encapsulated the distinction 
to be made between classical and biblical thought. The arguments of both schools were 
viewed to be just, even as they seemed to be incompatible. The dispute between Hillel 
and Shammai reflects the existence of a metaphysics, epistemology, axiology and a set of 
assumptions about argument quite different from those of the Western philosophical 
tradition.324 I have already mentioned that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca believed that 
classical or first order philosophies used the vita contemplativa to achieve immutable and 
eternal truths, which were thought to be a perfect eternal reflection of reality. Jewish 
metaphysics, on the other hand, could host multiple and contrasting truths. Perelman 
considered that, as the Hebrew Bible was the primary source for Jewish philosophical 
reflection and metaphysics, it had set forth a vision of first principles unlike any he had 
detected in the great poems of Parmenides.325  Further, the Hebrew Bible outlines a 
metaphysics that celebrates freedom, seeks justice, defies clarity, resists deductive logic 
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325 Perelman traced the impulses of the classical traditions and Western metaphysics to Parmenides. 
Parmenides argued for an eternal and uniform reality conforming to the demands of reason. Perelman 
characterized Parmenides’ philosophy as an ontological monism, which had the effect of setting philosophy 
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Aristotle and other Greek thinkers. It was that metaphysics that privileged the vita contemplativa over the 
vita activa. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyeca saw their work as taking a ‘break’ from that way of thinking. 




and declarative propositions, and embraces contradiction. It uses a paratactic326 pattern 
of expression which places the elements of argumentation in association rather than in 
direct hierarchy as opposed to hypotactic structures which subordinate one value to 
another.327  These touchstones, Frank observes, meant that Judaism reversed the order 
given to the vita contemplativa. Frank’s understanding of Perelman on this issue held that 
the human world, like the world of God, was one of action. Jewish metaphysics and 
Perelman’s The New Rhetoric was intended for the vita activa, a life lived in human time 
or in lived time.328  While The New Rhetoric has been called a Jewish counter-model of 
philosophical reasoning that stands in contra-distinction to that of classical philosophical 
thought, it also sought to create a fusion of the two.  Perelman drew from Jewish and 
Talmudic thought a view of truth, reason and logic that was meant to co-exist with 
demonstrative reasoning, expanding dialectic with forms of reasoning not bound to 
propositional logic and the syllogism. An expanded dialectic would allow for and 
promote plurality, dissent and “double-voicedness.”329 Perelman found in Jewish thought 
an embodied dialectic that developed and exploited Aristotle’s notion of dialectical 
reasoning.330 It is important that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca fused philosophy and 
rhetoric with classical and Talmudic reasoning to create a model of practical reason that 
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was concerned with how people reason about values in the real world of human 
communities where certitude and ultimate truths are unavailable. 
3.7   Three Key Concepts in The New Rhetoric 
 There are three more key concepts in the New Rhetoric that are necessary to 
discuss: the prerequisites of argumentation, the audience, and the creation of presence. 
Each of these topics  occupies an important place in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
vision of how argumentation  proceeds and becomes effective. 
 3.7.1   The Prerequisites of Argumentation  
In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory, there are certain conditions which 
must be assumed to be present in order for argumentation to proceed. Let us recall 
Bitzer’s ideas about the underlying circumstances of the rhetorical situation meant that 
both rhetors and audiences experience exigencies and constraints and a common 
‘situational’ frame of reference. This mutually held sense of what their reality is creates 
the potential for argumentation to emerge if a rhetor feels so compelled to begin a 
discourse.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe this relationship as an instance of 
‘shared worlds’ in terms of which an esprits exists which they both carry into 
argumentation and without which argumentation is not possible. What this means is that a 
great deal of agreement is assumed to already exists between the rhetor and the audience. 
Perelman thought that in adapting to an audience a speaker can choose as his points of 
departure only theses or premises already held by those he addresses.331 On this point, 
                                                          




Perelman was more insightful than Bitzer.  In the view of The New Rhetoric, the rhetor 
and audience share as the starting points of argumentation such matters as: facts 
organized by theories and other systems of beliefs that are generally held in accord; 
values ordered in hierarchies that are held in accord only by particular groups; 
presumptions that are generally held in accord but not in all cases; and general forms of 
argument acknowledged to carry varying degrees of weight in different times and 
circumstances. This overall accord varies relative to special audiences and 
circumstances.332  However, in The New Rhetoric argumentation requires certain minimal 
conditions to occur: 
The first condition is that there must be a meeting of the minds (contact de 
esprits) and in fact, all argumentation is a continuous and specific kind of contact 
de esprits. The meeting of the minds is made possible, and sustained, by having: a 
common language, a reason to argue, and so a goal that has a plausible chance of 
being achieved by argument; a situation or conflict about which the parties are 
willing to change their minds—that is, conditions in which people are receptive to 
arguments; rules that govern the beginning, the conduct, and the endings of 
arguments, including rules for turn-taking, the length of the arguments allowed, 
and so on; interlocutors who are willing and able to argue with one another, who 
respect each other enough to change their minds because of what the other says; 
interlocutors with knowledge of the other party sufficient and accurate enough to 
permit appeals to what is held in common and the use of appropriate argument 
forms. Further, there must be no violence or bribery or any other form of 
coercion. The reasons for being convinced must be discursive.333 
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 It was Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s belief that when rhetorical exigencies 
press, invention happens. However, invention is not simply a deliberate act. Situations 
invent arguments. These worlds are not inert systems. They are active and historical.  
They exist in time and they change. They are not isolated from the situations through 
which they act and change. Invention happens when worlds move into new situations. 
Much of what rhetorical invention is about is watching what is happening in the 
particular situation—which constituents of the world are coming into question and being 
put to action at this time and in this place. Invention happens without any practice or 
teaching or theory of invention. It happens “by nature” as people used to say. Part of 
invention therefore requires being attuned to what is already happening, the forces 
already at play that are producing arguments.334 It is important to reflect on the above 
requirements when considering argumentation in Deuteronomy. If we chose to look at it 
from this set of perspectives, we can theorize the deep connection that must have existed 
between the narrator/authors and the audiences that can explain the importance of the 
work to the Israelite community that received, preserved, and forwarded it on to the next 
generations even down to the present. 
3.7.2   The Audiences: Particular and Universal 
 The New Rhetoric differentiates between two types of audience: a particular 
audience consisting of a particular group or person and a universal audience which 
consists of all human beings that are considered to be reasonable. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca thought of the audience as an ensemble of those whom the speaker 
                                                          




wishes to influence by his argumentation. However, the picture that the rhetor has in 
mind about the audience is a mental construct of the rhetor’s own making.335 In order for 
the argumentation to be effective, the picture that the rhetor has of the audience must 
accord as much as possible with reality. Persuasive argumentation lays claim to approval 
from a particular audience. A particular audience is the only audience that may be 
prompted or persuaded into action and its approval manifested in practical terms. This 
would mean that the rhetor is in possession of the necessary knowledge concerning 
whom he/she wishes to influence by his/her argumentation. Richard Long has written: 
In a phenomenological sense, argumentation achieves meaning only when the 
audience registers in the speaker’s consciousness and vice versa. Rather than 
merely analyze the audience, the rhetor becomes the audience. The two merge 
and become one, and the union results in action. In this respect, Perelman’s 
The New Rhetoric transcends audience analysis.336  
The second type of audience in The New Rhetoric, the universal audience, 
represents a norm transcending all particular parties.  Argumentation that lays claim to 
approval from universal audience is argumentation that deemed to be convincing. 
Sometimes a particular audience can stand for “rationality,” thus fulfilling the functions 
of a universal.337 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca thought that whenever a philosopher or 
rhetor makes an appeal to reason they actually address a universal audience.  
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Perelman objected to the way in which classical philosophers conceived of this 
type of audience. In the classical view, reaching the level of universality resulted from the 
existence of a reality or objective truth, an established fact, or the necessity and the 
plainness of certain theses, which every reasonable being is obliged to accept. The 
traditional conception therefore, rejects all rhetoric not based upon knowledge of a [pre-
existing] truth.338   
The New Rhetoric defends the thesis that every philosopher addresses himself to 
the universal audience as he conceives it even in the absence of an objectivity, which 
imposes itself on everyone.339 Nevertheless, there was considerable confusion about what 
The New Rhetoric meant when it spoke of a universal audience. A statement issued by the 
Committee on the Nature of Rhetorical Invention which Perelman approvingly cites in 
his last published article, contains a statement that he felt had properly understood the 
role of the universal audience: 
Perelman’s concept of a universal audience is obviously important in the search 
for rapport or at least operational agreement of diverse groups. However, efforts 
directed at finding this audience or to describing it fail to take account of the 
pervasive importance of invention. Rather, (a) audiences are made not given; (b) 
there is no a priori reason that, there may not be many universal audiences, 
although not in a single situation; and (c) most important, the task is not, as often 
assumed, to address either a particular audience or a universal audience, but in the 
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process of persuasion to adjust to and then to transform the particularities of an 
audience into universal dimensions.340 
As this relates to Deuteronomy, we can observe that the majority of the corpus is 
an appeal to the particular audience of Israelites at a moment in time. Nonetheless, the 
topic of the universal audience will come up again in Chapter Four-Application of The 
New Rhetoric to Deuteronomy when we see that the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy 
make a very direct and significant appeal to a universal audience. 341  
3.7.3   The Creation of Presence:  
For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, presence had a role of paramount importance 
in the conduct of argument. A disposition on the part of the audience to listen occurs 
when the rhetor creates presence. Perelman conceived presence as the product of style, 
delivery, and disposition and as a function of those persuasive strategies, which made 
someone perceive, conceive, discriminate and remember the objects ideas or lines of 
argument set forth by the rhetor.342  Presence refers to not only the rhetor’s linguistic 
projections of important elements into the audience’s mind, but its intent is to make those 
elements occupy the foreground of the hearer’s consciousness. Effective presentation is 
essential in all argumentation aiming at immediate action. Its object is to inspire the mind 
and give it a certain orientation, and to make certain schemes of interpretation prevail. 
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The rhetor creates presence by selecting certain elements from the audience’s opinions, 
convictions, and commitments and by stylistically amplifying those elements, giving 
them a significance and conferring upon them a hierarchy of value or rank of importance.  
As such, presence is a significant psychological element in effective rhetoric. The 
New Rhetoric’s concept of presence is that it preserves continuity of time, invests the 
content of discourse with a sense of immediacy and importance and therefore plays a part 
in the qualification or classification of hierarchies of admitted values. 343  It is a mode of 
securing links between the elements of discourse, which can alter the premises 
significantly. Presence is a means by which reality is constructed and consequently may 
be a vehicle for transposing a phenomenon from the realm of the contingent to the realm 
of the absolute; it frees values from their equivocal status.344  Presence in The New 
Rhetoric has five effects or characteristics: 
First, it is a felt quality in the auditor’s consciousness. This quality, created by the 
rhetor’s “verbal magic,” enables him to impress upon the consciousness of his 
audience whatever he deems important. Second, presence fixes the audience’s 
attention while altering its perceptions and perspectives. Third, its strongest agent 
is the imagination. Fourth, its purpose is to initiate action or to dispose the 
audience toward an action or a judgment. Fifth, it is created, chiefly, through 
techniques studied under the headings of style, delivery, and disposition.345 
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 In the above discussion of The New Rhetoric, I have presented many of the main 
concepts of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s model of practical argumentation. We have 
just reviewed their ideas on the prerequisites for argumentation, audience and presence. 
Explication of these concepts is intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding 
of the terms we will be using when we apply The New Rhetoric to argumentation in 
Deuteronomy. Let us move on to the presentation of a summary of another key feature 
and the core of its model, Argument Schemes. 
3.8   The Basics of Argument Schemes in The New Rhetoric  
The Argument Schemes346 lie at the core of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
theory in as much as they devoted nearly two-thirds of The New Rhetoric discussing 
them. 347  Their importance lies in the fact that they allow the rhetorical critic to 
categorize systematically and evaluate arguments that do not occur according the 
demonstrative classical model, that is, for arguments that proceed along the lines which 
employ informal reasoning. Their role is to increase or decrease the presence of certain 
elements of reality in the mind of the audience. Further, while the schemes themselves 
must have a certain presence for the anticipated audience, they depend upon symbols, 
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beliefs, and values specific to a particular culture. A key point in Perelman and Olbrecht-
Tyteca’s theory about the Argument Schemes was their thinking that a theory of 
argumentation must examine the use discursive techniques that induce the mind’s 
adherence to theses or premises presented for assent.  The success of such argumentation 
depends upon the idea that the premises used are ones that are already accepted by the 
audience and that these premises are the foundation of argument.  
Arguments derive persuasive force, therefore, from recognized premises and the 
way rhetors connect opinions to these premises. Argument schemes pass acceptance from 
the premises to the conclusion. Argument schemes can create such links either through 
processes of association,348 in which premises are brought together and unified in 
particular ways, or through processes of dissociation349 where previously unified 
premises can also be disengaged from each other.350 Significantly, these premises form 
both the foundation and the starting point of argumentation. Argument schemes are used 
to construct arguments from liaisons of various types: coexistence, causal, and symbolic, 
as well as value hierarchies and loci recognized and accepted by particular audiences, or 
considered to be compeling in relation to a universal audience. 351  Importantly, the NRP 
rejected any model of proof that was ahistorical or acultural, viewing argumentation as a 
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culturally constituted activity.352  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca  erected a theory of 
knowledge upon an account of how belief is generated through the strength of adherence 
and by the apprehension of consensus.353 
 3.8.1   The Details of the Argument Schemes 
 Below are the main components of Perelman-Obrechts-Tyteca’s Argument 
Schemes.354 However, in order to provide further context and clarity about the matter of 
Argument Schemes, it is important to note that there are three separate dimensions of the 
schemes that work together: (a) the starting point for argument, (b) the conventions 
governing argument practices, and (c) the mechanisms or schemes for making inferences. 
These three dimensions tie a conception of what the arguer believes to what the audience 
will accept. 355 
The starting points of argument according to the Argument Schemes are facts, 
truths, presumptions, value hierarchies, and the loci of the preferable. They are derived 
from premises that the rhetor anticipates the audience presumably subscribes. The 
conventions for conducting arguments also grow out of practices and norms mutually 
accepted by interlocutors who participate together in a common culture. Likewise, the 
inferential schemes that move that audience to accept the arguer’s claims are generated 
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through commonplaces, and structures recognized by a particular audience that shares 
that common culture like for example, Western society.356 The specific organization of 
the argument schemes presented below is that of Warnick and Kline, and it covers the 
main categories and features Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss in The New 
Rhetoric.357 
3.8.2   The Premises of Argumentation:  
In order for argumentation to be effective, a rhetor must adapt to his audience. The 
speaker or writer can choose as his points of departure only those theses accepted by 
those he addresses. The aim of argumentation, Perelman wrote, is not like demonstration, 
to prove the truth of the conclusion from the premises, but the transfer to the conclusions 
the adherence accorded the premises. To be unconcerned with the audience’s adherence 
to the premises of the discourse is to commit the gravest error: petitio principia 358 or 
begging the question.359 Premises come in two types: 
a.  Premises that focus on the real and consist of facts, truths and presumptions: 
Presumptions are not as certain as facts and truths, nevertheless, they can furnish 
a sufficient basis upon which to rest a reasonable conviction. We associate 
presumptions with what normally happens and what can be reasonably counted 
upon. Presumptions that are tied to common experience and to common sense 
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permit one to function reasonably, but they can be contradicted by the facts 
because the unexpected can never be avoided.360 
b. Premises that focus on the preferable and consist of values, hierarchies, and loci 
about the preferable: Arguments derive support from values, as well as from 
hierarchies, which can be either concrete or abstract, homogeneous or 
heterogeneous. Many arguments begin with the assumption that humans are 
superior to the animals and gods to humans. Values are hierarchical, and therefore 
values related to humans are superior to those that belong to things. Along with 
concrete hierarchical values are others that are concerned with abstract values, 
such as the superiority of the just over the useful. An abstract principle, such as 
the superiority of cause over effect, can establish a hierarchy among a great 
number of concrete realities. Heterogeneous hierarchies relate qualitatively 
different values; homogeneous hierarchies are based on quantity.  Preference is 
given to the greatest quantity of a positive value and, symmetrically, to the 
smallest quantity of a negative value.361 
3.8.3   Arguments by Association 
 
Through association the rhetor unites separate elements so that the audience may 
perceive a unity among them. Association schemes are divided into the quasi-logical and 
the real. Quasi-logical schemes bring together elements so that they appear to follow a 
process of formal logic, whereas real schemes bring together elements so that they seem 
to correspond to the nature of the very thing they represent. The real can be further 
divided into particulars and analogies.362  In The New Rhetoric, there are three sorts of 
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associative relations capable of being made in argumentation: quasi-logical arguments; 
arguments that are based on the structure of reality; and arguments that establish the 
structure of reality.363  
Quasi-logical Arguments:364 This type of argument is so named because it has the 
appearance of formal logic (and not because it is to be regarded as somehow “less 
than logical”). In using quasi-logical schemes, arguers draw upon the recognized 
structures of formal logic to construct non-formal arguments.365 Items (a) through 
(h) below are forms of quasi-logical argumentation: 
a. Contradiction and Incompatibility: The assertion, within a formal system, 
of a position and of its negation—that is, of a contradiction—makes the 
system incoherent and hence unusable. These types of arguments depend 
on the commonly held assumption that asserting “x” and “not x” 
simultaneously is absurd. It is necessary, then, to choose one or the other 
affirmation. In argumentation, one may also be faced with 
incompatibilities, where the affirmation of a rule, assertion of a thesis, or 
adoption of an attitude involves a conflict with either a previously 
affirmed thesis or rule, or with a generally accepted thesis to which, as a 
member of a group, one is expected to adhere. An incompatibility forces a 
person to choose, to indicate in a conflict which rule will be followed and 
which will be relinquished, but not abandoned.366  
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364 Quasi-logical arguments are those types of arguments, which are best understood by way of comparison 
to logical, mathematical, and formal thinking. A quasi-logical argument differs from formal deduction in 
that it always presupposes adherence to non-formal theses, which alone allow the application of argument. 
Perelman (1982: 50). 
 
365 Warnick and Kline (1992: 2-3). 
 




b. Identity: A purely formal identity is self-evident, or is posited by 
convention, and this escapes argumentation. Identifications that arise in 
ordinary discourse aim sometimes for a complete identity and other times 
for a partial identity of the elements involved. The identification of two 
expressions can result from definition or analysis.367 
c. Definition: In the process of defining a term, the claim to identity of the 
defining expression with the term to be defined constitutes an 
argumentative quasi-logical use of identity. There are four kinds of 
definitions in ordinary discourse: (1) normative definition, which 
prescribes the usage of a term; (2) descriptive definitions, which indicates 
normal usage; (3) condensed definition, which shows the essential 
elements of the descriptive definition; and (4) complex definition, which 
combines, in varying ways, elements of the preceding definitions.368 
d. Reciprocity: Reciprocity arguments are based on a simple, conditional 
relationship between two terms. They rely upon a perceived symmetry that 
has a certain appeal.369 
e. The Rule of Justice: A type of argument based on the idea that things in 
the same essential category should be treated the same way. These 
arguments are successful because audiences value precedent.370 
f. Transitivity: Transitivity is the formal property of a relationship which 
allows the affirmation that if a certain relation exists between the first term 
and a second, between the second and a third, then the same relation exists 
between the first and the third. This property characterizes relations such 
as “equal to,” “included in,” and “greater than.” These arguments are 
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based on the categorical syllogism and aim to cause audiences to accept 
theses by way of transference through a middle term.371 
g. Division: These arguments proceed by making the point by enumerating 
the parts or features of something, and rely upon spatialized conceptions 
of reality and excludes overlapping, interactions and fluidity.372 
h. Weights Measures and Probabilities: These are arguments of comparison. 
Comparison constitutes a quasi-logical argument when it does not give 
rise to real weighing and measuring that use a system of weights and 
measures. The persuasive effect of such comparisons derives from the 
underlying idea that the person making the comparison can, if necessary, 
support his judgment through a process of verification.373 
 
3.8.4 Arguments Based on the Structure of Reality.374  These arguments employ liaisons 
and relations that the arguer can assume are already recognized, and accepted by 
audiences. This category includes the (i) through (n) below: 
i. Liaisons of Succession: This category includes all forms of causal 
arguments 375 wherein phenomena of the same level are connected in an 
explanatory relationship.376 
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374 Arguments based on the structure of reality are those arguments that depend on liaisons which exist 
among elements of reality. Belief in the existence of such objective structures, can be conveyed to varied 
realities, relations of causality, or essences of which certain phenomena are only the manifestation. What is 
important is the existence of agreements which are not questioned and, which the speaker uses to develop 
his argument. Perelman (1982: 81-105) 
 
375 Causal arguments are one grounded in culturally held beliefs and presumptions about reality, not the 
least of which is that events generally must have a cause rather than being the result of random chance. 
Effective causal argument depends upon agreement among interlocutors about the motives and precedence 
of action. 
 
376 Perelman (1982: 81). 
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j. Liaisons of Co-existence: In this type of argument one connects terms that 
belong to unequal levels of reality such as the connection of an 
unobservable essence to its observable manifestations.377 
k. Symbolic Liaisons: In this type of argument recognized symbols reshape 
an audience’s perception. These are characterized by a relationship of 
participation between a symbol and what the symbol evokes.378 Symbolic 
liasons often function as recognized metonymies.379 
l. Double Hierarchies: Audiences regularly use undisputed hierarchies to 
weigh or grade values and to resolve conflicts between values. This type 
of argument employs accepted value hierarchies to get other hierarchies 
accepted. The use of loci of quantity (indicating that the existence of 
certain unquestioned hierarchies are present) is what makes double 
hierarchy arguments possible.380 
m. Differences of Degree: One asserts the general loci of quality and quantity 
(or degree) when one asserts that what is good for the greatest number is 
preferable to what profits only a few; that the durable is preferable to the 
fragile, or that something useful in varied situations is preferable to 
something that is of use in highly specific ones.381 
n. Differences of Order:  The general loci of order affirms the superiority of 
the anterior over the posterior, of cause over consequence, and the existent 
over the non-existent. It affirms the superiority of what is simply possible 
over what is not possible; of essence, which accords superiority to 
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379 Metonymy is the substitution of the name of an attribute or adjunct for that of the thing meant, for 
example, suit for business executive, or the track for horseracing. 
 
380 Perelman (1982: 102). 
 




individuals who best represent the essence of genius; and of the person, 
implying the superiority of what is tied to the dignity and autonomy of the 
person.382  
 
3.8.5 Arguments which Establish the Structure of Reality:383 This type of argument 
seeks to call upon existing audience predisposition to create new audience 
perceptions. These arguments generally employ a concrete instance, relationship 
or linguistic form to establish a more abstract or general principle. The category 
includes items (o) throught (r) below: 
o. Example: An example seeks to establish a new principle by resort to the 
particular case. Use of example implies disagreement over a principle 
while assuming that generalization is possible. To make way for the 
principle, the example must be factual and striking.384 
p. Illustration: These arguments resemble examples in form but their 
function is different. Instead of establishing a principle, they increase 
presence by clarifying it or showing its import. Since the principle is 
already established, the illustrations may be fictive––so long as they 
engage the imagination, for vivacity is the source of its appeal.385 
q. Model and Anti-Model: This type of argument presents a person or group 
as a model to be imitated or avoided. Attraction for the model (antipathy 
for the anti-model) is converted into favorable or orientation toward the 
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383 Arguments which establish the structure of reality are those kinds of arguments which, starting from a 
known specific case, allow the establishment of a precedent, model, or general rule, and enable reasoning 
by model or example. In this category are arguments by analogy and arguments by the use of metaphor. 
(Perelman (1982: 51). 
 
384 Perelman (1982: 106). 
 




model’s behavior. The argument’s aim is to encourage imitation or to 
incite to an action inspired by a particular behavior.386 
r.  Analogy and Metaphor: These bring together two structures—a better 
known structure (the phoros) and one that is lessor known (the theme). 
Analogical arguments succeed to the extent that the arguer can focus 
audience attention on those features of the theme that are considered most 
important. Analogies facilitate the development and extension of thought; 
they make it possible to give the theme a structure and a conceptual 
setting. Metaphoric arguments consecrate the relation between theme and 
phoros. The two are no longer separate but are fused.387 
3.8.6   Arguments by the Dissociation of Ideas  
Perelman believed that association and dissociation of ideas characterize all 
argumentation schemes. 388 Dissociation modifies a notion’s conceptual structure by 
disengaging incompatible notions that had originally been unified. Dissociation begins by 
assuming the original unity of elements comprised within a single conception, but then 
sets a criterion by using the valued term of a hierarchized pair to produce a value 
reorientation. Through dissociation, a rhetor separates a whole into individual elements 
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387 Perelman (1982: 114-126). 
 
388 An argument of dissociation aims to separate elements which language or recognized tradition have 
previously tied together. In an argument that seeks to resolve a difficulty raised by common thought, it is 
required to dissociate the elements of reality from each other and bring about a new organization. By 
dissociating among elements described in the same way, the real from the apparent, movement is made in 
the direction of elaborating a philosophical reality which is opposed to the reality of common sense. 




so that the thought of the audience concerning it can be modified. Dissociation, therefore, 
aims at re-formulation of notions held by an audience.389  
We have now finished our review of the main features of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric. Let us move on to the application of the Argument 
Schemes and see how we may apply a number of their ideas to Deuteronomy to unravel 
its premises, rhetorical structure and style of argumentation. 
  
                                                          




       Application of The New Rhetoric to Deuteronomy 
Abstract:  
In preparation for the application of The New Rhetoric to the text of 
Deuteronomy, we will first orient ourselves by a review the basic classifications of 
rhetoric that are found in the corpus. We will identify Deuteronomy’s numerous direct 
and indirect voices, its narrative style, and how the narrator/authors created the authority 
for themselves to carry out their existential rescue operation for the Israelite people. After 
we discuss these points, we will begin to apply the appropriate concepts from The New 
Rhetoric’s Argument Schemes in order to identify the three main premises that comprise 
the rhetorical structure for the entire text. The three rhetorical premises of Deuteronomy 
use an existing structure of reality and by clever exploitation of an intersection between 
situation and cultural memory establish a new structure of reality that the Israelites must 
embrace and to which they must choose to adhere. Among the features of The New 
Rhetoric that we will examine are how the narrator/authors created presence through the 
use of visual imagery, argued by example, illustration and by the use of models and anti-
models. The chapter will demonstrate how The New Rhetoric may usefully describe the 
entire rhetorical structure of the work as well as its methods of persuasion. 
4.1 The Basic Classifications of Rhetoric Found in Deuteronomy: Primary and 
Secondary Rhetoric  
As we begin the task of applying aspects of The New Rhetoric’s model to the text 
of Deuteronomy, let us first take a moment to define and classify the types of rhetoric we 
find in the corpus. The idea of primary rhetoric comes from classical Greece. 390  It 
derives from the idea of rhetoric as the art of persuasion, and as being primarily an oral 
                                                          




transaction that involved an utterance on a specific occasion in some civic context. It 
subsequently became associated with texts as well.  The text of Deuteronomy is a series 
of discourses combined with law giving which takes place on a specific occasion and 
place. Those characteristics define it as an example of primary rhetoric. By contrast, in 
secondary rhetoric, the speech act is not of central importance. That role is taken over by 
the (voice of the) text.  Secondary rhetoric contributes to accomplishing the purposes of 
the speaker or writer, indirectly and at a secondary level. It provides ways of emphasizing 
ideas or making them vivid. An example of secondary rhetoric in the parlance of 
Perelman’s model would be the creation of presence.391  Examples of secondary rhetoric 
in written works are commonplaces392 and figures of speech.393 A few other examples of 
techniques of secondary rhetoric in Deuteronomy are: identification, value hierarchies, 
and models. In Deuteronomy, both primary and secondary rhetoric combine for the 
rhetorical purpose of crafting arguments based upon premises already accepted and 
familiar to the various audiences we have described. 
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392 From the time of Aristotle, commonplaces (topoi or loci communes) had been bound to the construction 
of cogent argument and the gathering of material to develop composition. They comprised the most 
effective ways of arguing from beliefs or judgments that an audience generally accepted as true. 
Commonplace formulas included arguments drawn from definition, genus, species, enumeration of parts, 
etymology, conjugates, similarity, difference, contraries, adjusts, contradictions, cause, effect and 
comparison.  Moss (2001: 119-124). 
 
393 Figures of speech are the smallest structural units of rhetorical stylistics. Common forms of figures of 
speech are metaphor, metonymy, irony, hyperbole, chiasmus, assonance, euphemism, antithesis, and 




4.2 The Presence of Classical Typologies 
For rhetorical typology, we can refer to the categories of rhetorical discourse 
developed in classical times. Aristotle defined three types of rhetoric: deliberative, 
epideictic and judicial. 394  These categories, while admittedly providing limited 
information about the content, strategy or internal structure the rhetorical discourse they 
describe, are still useful in their own way. We can easily apply at least two of them to the 
rhetoric found in Deuteronomy: deliberative and epideictic rhetoric.  
Deliberative Rhetoric: Deliberative rhetoric was a device, sometimes called 
legislative oratory, that juxtaposes potential future outcomes to communicate support or 
opposition for a given policy or action or policy. 395  The clearly stated premise and 
purpose of Deuteronomy is to persuade the Israelites to agree to adhere to Moses’ laws 
when they enter the promise land.  Deuteronomy’s call for action in the future involves 
their immediate self-interests, and collective well-being.  Deuteronomy engages in 
deliberative rhetoric throughout the corpus when the narrator/authors have Moses 
addressing all Israel about taking actions in the future. For example, in Dt. 4:9 Moses 
tells the Israelites to “ take utmost care and watch themselves scrupulously, so that they 
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395 A rhetoric is deliberative when a rhetor seeks to persuade the audience to take some action in the future. 
In deliberative rhetoric, the argument is about the question of self-interest and future benefits, often in the 
very immediate future. In deliberative rhetoric, there is often a preponderance of inductive argument based 
on past example, along with the explication of the advantages obtained from some course of action. (An 
inductive argument is one in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for the truth of 
the conclusion. The truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is probable, and based upon the 
evidence given). In deliberative rhetoric, the audience is often directly involved in the matter, so the rhetor 
needs to do less to interest them than he might do to secure a favorable judgment for himself or some other 




do not forget the things they saw with their own eyes and so that they do not fade from 
their mind as long as they live and the make all those things known to their children and 
to their children’s children.” This is deliberative discourse or reasoning from example. 
The events that Moses is asking them to remember serve as examples of what God did for 
them and as reasons for taking certain actions in the future.  In another example in Dt. 
4:15-20, the narrator/authors have Moses adjure the Israelites: “for their own sake, to be 
most careful not to make any sculptured images of any kind since they saw no shape 
when God spoke to them at Horeb.” The narrator/authors identify making sculptured 
images with being disloyalty to the lord. The Israelite audience already has witnessed 
examples of how God punishes disloyalty and this predisposes their action (or inaction) 
in the future. This is also arguing by example. 
Epideictic Rhetoric:396  Deuteronomy engages in epideictic rhetoric when, for 
example, the narrator/authors places Moses and in the role of speech maker delivering a 
historical review to the assembled Israelites in Deuteronomy Chapters 1-3. In those 
chapters the audience is rhetorically situated in present time, while Moses reviews what 
had happened up until that moment. Then, in Dt. 4:1-8 Moses asks the Israelites to give 
heed to and observe the laws, rules and instructions so that they may live to enter the 
promise land. This call is for an action in present time. In Dt. 5:1, Moses exhorts the 
Israelites to study and observe the laws and rules faithfully that he proclaimed to them 
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good or matters of faith and belief. Epideictic rhetoric includes: speeches, eulogies, descriptions, 




“this day.”  Perelman thought that epideictic genre was the heart of rhetoric as he 
conceived of it because upon it depends all argumentation over values.397 He further 
wrote: 
In effect, the goal of the orator in the epideictic discourse is to contribute the 
enhancement of values. This holds true whether they are abstract, such as liberty 
or justice, or concrete values such as Athens, or soldiers fallen in combat.  When 
one is pronouncing such a discourse, let us say by being an educator of his 
community, one must already possess a certain quality, exercise a function, 
possess a prestige, which allows the orator to speak in solemn circumstances and 
to support what he is praising (or teaching) by the authority, which he enjoys.  
Whereas, it is self-evident that the parties in judiciary debates, whoever they are, 
can always make themselves understood. It is normal in deliberation that, every 
point of view be expressed. In the case of epideictic discourse, which exalt the 
commonly held values of the audience, the quality of he who will be, so to speak, 
the porte-parole of the community is essential. His role will be to exalt publicly 
the values around which the community is formed and through which it 
communes. Without common devotion to such values, there is no political or 
religious community.398  
 Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s concept of epideictic rhetoric differed from that 
of Aristotle who saw it as a genre designed to celebrate and entertain but not to provoke 
action.  In their reconceptualization, epideictic discourse became the grounding for 
discourse in a pluralistic culture.399 As they came to understand it, they saw it as a 
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category of rhetoric that drew on preexisting community values and commitments to 
inspire the audience to do something.400 
Judicial Rhetoric: 401 In Deuteronomy generally, and surprisingly in 
Deuteronomy’s Law Code in Dt. 12-26 in particular, we do not find judicial rhetoric.  
Judicial rhetoric, as a category, concerns forensics and courtroom argumentation where 
an orator is trying to persuade an audience about a matter in the past that involves truth or 
justice.  Deuteronomy does not engage in this type of argumentation. For example, Dt. 
17:2-13 is replete with rules of judicial procedure which include: the requirement to 
gather evidence to assess guilt, the number of witness needed for conviction in a capital 
case, the authority of the courts to decide and the requirement to obey the legal rulings of 
a magistrate or Levitical priest.  There are other examples in Deuteronomy of a similar 
nature.402 On the surface there seems to be a contradiction in that The New Rhetoric’s 
model follows a juridical model and one might suppose that these two terms, that is, 
juridical deliberation and judicial rhetoric are terms that are somehow related.403 This not 
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401 Judicial (forensic) discourse is a type of discourse occurs when a rhetor seeks to persuade an audience 
about events which occurred in the past, and where the basic argument involves the question of truth or 
justice. Morrow (2001:314-321) 
 
402 Dt. 16:18-20 calls for the appointment of magistrates and officials who will govern with due justice and 
who are required to judge fairly and impartially and not to take bribes. The Israelites are adjured to pursue 
justice that they may thrive and occupy the land. First mentioned in Dt. 4:41, Dt. 19:1-10 reiterates the 
establishment of three cities of refuge in the case of involuntary manslaughter, so as to avoid blood guilt 
which would obtain from the shedding of innocent blood. Dt. 19:11-12 differentiates the case of a 
premediated murderer who may not avail himself of a city of refuge and must be handed over to the blood 
avenger. Dt. 19:15-21 reiterates the requirement for more than one and at least two witnesses to convict a 
person and establishes the principle of how to disallow false testimony and the jeopardy that the false 
accuser faces. 
 




the case, even though the meta-subject matter is similar.  Perelman’s juridical model 
refers to the obligation that a judge is under to give reasons for his decision that are 
consistent with the provisions of law. These reasons cannot be determined by formal 
logic alone but must be based on some form of informal reasoning.404 
4.3   Narrative in Deuteronomy   
Another important rhetorical feature of Deuteronomy is its prophetic narrative 
form. Prophetic narrative, as conveyed by the narrator/authors, provides the overall 
literary, structural and framing context of Deuteronomy. It is a core feature of the corpus 
and is most salient in accounting for its rhetorical impact. Narrators can come in many 
forms in the Hebrew Bible. They can be omniscient taking the stance of knowing 
everything, they can be intrusive by adding comments and explanations, they can operate 
from a remote perspective, they can watch from above and hover over the characters, or 
they can be neutral, objective observers. The narrator’s point of view provides a unity 
beyond questions of events, places and time.405  In Deuteronomy, the narrator/authors 
function in a role somewhere between being omniscient and a being intrusive.  Their 
presence is felt at key moments in the storyline as an organizing force and as storyteller.  
For example, in Dt. 1:1-5, the narrator/authors set the stage for the entire narrative and in 
Dt. 34:1-12 they bring the story to its end, thereby providing framing elements for the 
whole corpus. In other cases, we have seen that they move the narrative back and forth 
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between the present and the past for the sake of engaging the audience and creating 
mutual fictionalization.406   
David Gunn and Danna Nolan Fewell have written that there are two types of 
narrative texts found in the Hebrew Bible. The first type is the dialogic form of narration. 
Ruth and Jonah are good examples of this first type. This type of narration may entertain 
several ideological points of view and contain different “voices” that are often in tension. 
It is characterized by restraint on the part of the narrator, who lets the character’s actions 
and dialogue ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’ the story. The second form of narrative is 
monologic. This form has more in common with the rhetoric of public persuasion such as 
political speech or sermon. It is represented by Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah. It tends 
to elicit a narrower range of responses from the reader, minimizes tension and ideological 
plurality and is characterized by a premium on “telling” through extend monologues from 
both narrator and characters.407 By the above criteria, Deuteronomy contains 
characteristics of both dialogic and monologic narrative. Deuteronomy’s narrative form, 
therefore, is not entirely a clear-cut matter. We can say it is not clear-cut for reasons that 
have to do with extent and types of dialogue that appear in the text. 
4.3.1 Matters of Style: Utterances within Utterances 
Utterances quoting utterances within utterances typify Deuteronomy’s narrative 
discourse. Robert Polzin wrote about this unique aspect of Deuteronomy’s style: 
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The book is more than just utterances within the narrator’s utterances: Moses 
utterances continually quote, with direct discourse, other utterances, as for 
example throughout chapters 2 and 3, which are, mostly quotations within a 
quote. Here, Moses is quoted by the narrator as quoting a number of others. Each 
of these cases can be described as, an utterance (of the person quoted by Moses) 
with an utterance (of Moses) within an utterance (of the narrator).408  
The narrator/authors waste no time in establishing their method of discourse. It 
opens with the voice of the narrator/authors speaking to the Israelites. Moses’ First 
Discourse, Dt. 1:1-4:43, is a good example of the above description of its narrative style. 
In the introductory passages, Dt. 1:1-5, the narrator/authors speaks to the invoked 
audience of Israelites. They set the stage in time and space for the utterances of Moses, 
which are to follow. Then in Dt. 1-6a, Moses directly addresses the Israelites but 
immediately switches in Dt. 1:6b-8 to quoting what God said to the Israelites at Horeb. 
Then in Dt. 1:9-13, Moses again quotes himself speaking to the Israelites. In Dt. 1:14, 
Moses quotes the Israelite’s brief response to him and then begins to quote himself again 
through Dt. 1:22a.  In Dt. 1:22b, Moses quotes the Israelites addressing him but in Dt. 
1:23-27a, Moses again begins to quote himself. In Dt. 1:27b-28, Moses again quotes the 
Israelites addressing him.  In Dt. 1:29-34 Moses quotes himself. But in Dt. 1:35-36 
Moses quotes God.  Dt. 1:37a quotes Moses speaking to the Israelites and Dt. 1:37b-40 
Moses quotes God speaking to Moses. Dt. 1: 41a has Moses quoting the Israelites 
addressing him in Dt. 1:41b. In Dt. 1:42 Moses quotes God who asks Moses to warn the 
Israelites.  Following God’s request, Moses quotes himself addressing the Israelites in Dt. 
1:43-45 which closes the chapter.   
                                                          




In these passages, the narrator/authors introduce the main voices that appear 
throughout the text.  We have the narrator addressing the audience, Moses addressing the 
Israelites, the Israelites addressing Moses, Moses addressing God, and God addressing 
Moses. However, they are mostly quotations of utterances, with little direct dialogue with 
each other except as already noted. In most cases, Moses speaks alone and does not 
engage in dialogue. With a few exceptions, there is minimal amount of direct dialogue in 
Deuteronomy that does not involve both Moses and God.409 This pattern, with an 
emphasis on Moses’ historical recitation, continues in the next two chapters. Thereafter, 
Moses’ direct speech and admonitions to follow the laws, rules, ordinances and teachings 
dominate the narrative throughout the corpus. 
4.3.2 Direct and Indirect Voices  
In Deuteronomy, there are four voices: three direct 410 and one indirect. 411 The 
two main direct voices are God and Moses with the voice of Moses being the 
predominant speech actor. The voice of God engaging in direct dialogue with Moses 
occurs in only forty-one verses.412 Mostly, however, the dialogue between God and 
Moses is God addressing Moses. Moses and God engage in dialogue with each other in 
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410 Direct speech repeats or quotes the exact words spoken.  Direct speech reports what is said in the present 
or what was said in the past. For further analysis, see S. Meier (1992). 
 
411 Indirect speech is reported speech and is commonly used to talk about the past. Reporting verbs like to 
say, to tell or to ask are used. 
 





thirteen verses.413 The indirect voice, and arguably the most important one, is that of the 
narrator/authors who are in monologue with the audience, speaking directly to them in 
fifty-six verses.414 The fourth voice, a minor direct one is that of the Israelites of various 
descriptions who are in infrequent dialogue with Moses in twenty-two verses.415 This 
direct two-way dialogue between Moses and the Israelites is important, but does not serve 
to dominate the narrative. Moses’ dialogue with the Israelites is mostly a monologue of 
instruction.  
 The main clusters of narrator/author utterances appear at the beginning of the 
corpus and at its conclusion thereby providing a framework for Deuteronomy’s program, 
and an explanation that identifies the source of the Levitical priestly authority to mediate 
it.  If we take a closer look at what the narrator/authors’ indirect voice actually reports, 
we can see that their speech conforms to two types of utterances: reports of what Moses 
said and geographical references of  where he said what he said.  These utterances appear 
in two primary clusters in the text.416 In the first cluster are the narrator/authors’ 
utterances that either report what Moses said and provide clear geographic orientation as 
to the location, or add historical recollection about the importance of those locations in 
the past.417 In the case of Dt. 10: 6-9, the narrator/authors provide information on the 
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414 Polzin (1980: 29);  Dt.1:1-5; 2:10-12, 20-23; 3:9, 11, 13b-14; 4:41-49; 5:1a; 10:6-7, 9; 27:1a, 9a, 11; 
28:69; 29:1a; 31:1, 7a, 9-10a, 14a, 14c, 15, 16a, 22-23a, 24-25, 30; 32:44-45, 48; 33:1; 34:1-4a, 5-12. (56) 
 
415 Dt. 1:9-14, 16-17, 19b-21, 22, 25b, 27-33, 41; 5:21-22; 27:9-10; 31:7-8. (22) 
 
416 In chapters Dt. 1-5 and 10 and in chapters 27-34.  
 




location of Aaron’s death, and parenthetically, how the tribe of Levi was set apart at that 
time to stand in attendance before the Lord for all time. This important principle is 
particularly significant in that it is reported before the delivery of the law code in chapters 
12-16, and offers an anchor for their authority to play the role of mediator of 
Deuteronomy’s message. The framing utterances of time, place and recollection provide 
important reference points.  In the second cluster of indirect speech, in most instances the 
narrator/authors report what Moses said or did and/or what Moses and other leaders said 
together. These leaders were either the elders, Levitical priests or Joshua. 418  
The largest concentration of this type of reported speech appears in Chapter 
thirty-one.419 Chapter thirty-one, however, is the critical set of narrator/authors utterances 
which further reinforce how it is that they are in the position to play the important role 
that they do in the current story. Chapter thirty-one completes the circle by explaining the 
source of their authority. For example, in Dt. 31: 7-8, Moses begins to transfer his 
political authority to Joshua to lead the conquest. In Dt. 31: 9-13, by contrast, Moses 
transfers his religious authority to the priests, the sons of Levi and to all the elders along 
with instructions on how to proceed in the future. In Dt. 31: 24-25, Moses, having 
finished writing down the words of the Teachings to the very end, charges the priests, 
sons of Levi to take possession of his book of Teaching and place it beside the Ark for 
safekeeping––with a warning that he knows the Israelites will stray once he is dead.  
Moses does this so that his teachings may stand as a witness against the Israelites when 
they act wickedly and engage in apostasy in the future. Thus, no one in the future would 
                                                          
418 Dt. 27:1a, 9a, 11; 29:1a.   
 
419 Dt. 31:1, 7a, 9-10a, 14a, 14c, 15, 16a, 22-23a, 24-25, 30. 
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be able to claim that the Israelites had not been clearly warned.  Dt. 31:29, in fact, 
anticipates that Moses fully expected that they would stray. Structurally then, Dt. 31 
explains how the narrator/authors received the authority in the present day to convey the 
authoritative words of Moses and God.   
4.3.3 Establishing Authority: The Rhetorical Impact of the Indirect Voice  
What then is the rhetorical import of the indirect voice in narrative structure for 
understanding argumentation in Deuteronomy? What messages are the narrator/authors 
conveying to the “addressed” audience when they finally recall to them that their 
authority had been passed down through the Levites and elders in an unbroken chain of 
possession from Moses at the time of the conquest?  The narrator/authors having 
established that they were the gatekeepers, conveying to the “addressed” audience of 
contemporary Israelites that it was only through their mediation that they can gain access 
to the words of God. This raises the question as to where the ultimate semantic authority 
lays in Deuteronomy.  Does it lay in the word of Moses and God, or the word of the 
narrator/authors who were mostly likely Levitical priests?  By this question, we are 
addressing a prerequisite of the rhetor/audience relationship, which precedes matters of 
mutual fictionalization as a rhetorical priority. The narrator/authors having claimed the 
authority to convey the words of God and Moses based upon an unbroken chain of 
possession actually control what words of Moses and God the audience will hear. Thus 
while the words of God and Moses are intended as the ultimate sematic authority in 
Deuteronomy, the report of these words by the narrator/authors must be taken by the 
audience as both definitive and authoritative as well. 
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4.4   Points of Departure for Argumentation: “Shared Worlds” at the Intersection of 
Situation and Cultural Memory 
Deuteronomy was composed by an authorial group or succession of groups under 
the exigencies and constraints of a rhetorical situation particular to the time and place of 
its creation. In our previous discussion, we established how the narrator/authors received 
their authority to be mediators of Moses’ and God’s words.420 With that authority 
established in the mind of their audiences, the question became: upon what type of 
premises can they proceed to make their arguments? The New Rhetoric’s Argument 
Schemes allows for two main types of premises in argumentation: (a) premises that focus 
on the real and consists of facts, truths and presumptions and (b) premises that consist of 
values, hierarchies and loci about the preferable.421 A distinction needs to be made, 
however, between a prerequisite structural premise such as we have just reviewed above, 
which relies on a transference of an existing prophetic authority to a third party, and a 
rhetorical premise which becomes the starting point of argumentation.  Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s research led them to believe that the basis of premise (a) above was 
the presumption by narrator/authors and audience that they were in substantial agreement 
about a host of important matters, particularly the exigencies and constraints and reality 
of the rhetorical situation. 422  Put another way, there existed a common bond of 
understanding between them and a meeting of the minds that was the substance of their 
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existing structure of reality or shared world.423 These shared cultural “truths,” cultural 
memory, agreement about the rhetorical situation, and their meeting of the minds is what 
Perelman means by “facts” upon which conviction and argument can reasonably be 
based.  Thus, according to The New Rhetoric, arguments that start from such premises are 
arguments for the purpose of affecting the will of the individual to adhere to certain ideas. 
The rhetor gives presence to such ideas with the intent of prompting a willingness to act.  
This means that the narrator/authors were at liberty to recreate, reshape and reform an 
existing “shared world” of cultural concepts, concerns and memories into a course of 
action that was previously unanticipated by the audience.  
We can observe that the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy intuitively seem to 
grasp an approach analogous to The New Rhetoric’s premises of argumentation we 
discussed above after asserting their authority. Taking an existing structure of reality as a 
starting point, the conditions already existed under which they could argue what they 
wanted to argue to the “addressed” audience.  They relied upon a host of cultural 
traditions and collective memory which placed them in a position to address the 
exigencies and constraints of their rhetorical situation in the way that they did and for the 
purposes they had in mind.  
4.4.1   Narrator/Authors’ Presumptions: Reliance on Collective Memory  
 As we further examine the role of the narrator/authors and relate it to The New 
Rhetoric’s first type of premise above, we can make a few observations. Initially, the 
presumptions of the narrator/authors remain unstated, but they become readily apparent 
                                                          
423 See 3.8.3 Footnote # 373. 
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in the flow of the narrative. For example, among their main presumptions is the idea that 
their “addressed” audience is fully familiar with the entire range of Moses stories, their 
own long history, and their history with God. Further, they hold those memories in high 
esteem and personally identify with them.  The strength of their arguments may be said to 
rest upon appeal to cultural or collective memory. Jan Assmann has written that it is the 
task of collective memory, above all, to transmit collective identity.  He writes:  
Society inscribes itself in this [collective] memory with all its norms and values 
and creates in the individual the authority that Freud called the superego and that 
has traditionally, been called “conscience.” [Collective memories] are not built up 
gradually, as with communicative memory, and they do not disappear again with 
the cycle of three generations. Sometimes they vanish after twelve years, 
sometimes they endure for thousands of years. It is a projection on the part of the 
collective, that wishes to remember and of the individual who remembers in order 
to belong. Both the collective and the individual turn to the archive of cultural 
traditions, the arsenal of symbolic forms, the “imaginary” of myths and images of 
“great stories,” sagas and legends, scenes and constellations that live, or can be 
reactivated in the treasure store of a people.424  
What Assmann calls collective memory, The New Rhetoric refers to as shared 
worlds.  Assmann makes the further point that cultural memory and tradition are closely 
intertwined. Tradition, he wrote, is not exchanged reciprocally and horizontally, but is 
transmitted vertically through generations. Its temporal structure forms a diachronic axis 
through which societies reach far back into the past.425 Thus, for the narrator/author to 
draw upon cultural memory, as Assmann has conceptualized it, tends to create 
                                                          
424 Assmann (2006: 7-8). Assmann writes as an Egyptologist. For a treatment by a Biblicist, see Mark S. 
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identification with their commitments.  It is identification lodged in Assmann’s 
diachronic axis of collective memory that creates the disposition in the audience to “hear” 
the words of these authorities as they share the same mental world and historical status.  
It is upon conditions such as these that an audience becomes willing to act.   The 
establishment of narrative/authorial authority based upon cultural memory creates a shift 
in the temporal perceptions of the “addressed” audience. This shift opens up a new 
mental space in which the narrator/authors are free to argue about what is to come. We 
have seen above how the narrator/authors have to employ an argument that relied on an 
existing structure of reality to accomplish their initial purpose of tying together authorial 
authority with cultural memory. It was upon the acceptance by the audience of these 
ideas that argumentation is able proceed in Deuteronomy.  
4.4.2   A Possible Historical Warrant for Israel’s Collective Memory 
On this matter of collective memory and the Exodus tradition upon which so 
much of Deuteronomy depends, Ronald Hendel has attempted to put this question into 
historical perspective.  Hendel has made the plausible case that the centrality of the 
Exodus in biblical tradition has roots in the experience of slavery that the residents of 
Canaan experienced when they were a province of the Egyptian Empire in Asia. This was 
the case, particularly in the period from Thutmose III (1479-1425 BCE) through the reign 
Ramesses IV (1154-1148 BCE). In that period Egypt had effective administrative control 
of the trade routes through Canaan and appropriated resources through tribute and 
taxation, which included: wood, precious metals and copper, gemstones, glass, 
foodstuffs, and also people. Slaves were demanded as tribute from the rulers of Canaanite 
city-states who presumably rounded them up, Hendel thinks, from the local population or 
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from captured towns. Slaves were also acquired as prisoners of war during Egypt’s 
military campaigns during this era. The Egyptian term for such a foreign captive was 
“bound for life.” Canaanites were taken into slavery in Egypt by means of vassal tribute, 
military conquest, mass-deportations and sold for purely financial reasons. The Egyptian 
temple of Amun owned 56 towns in Canaan and the temple of Re owned 103 towns. All 
of the above known historical referents help Hendel to argue that, over a long period-of-
time, the residents of Canaan experienced oppression and slavery at the hands of the 
Egyptians.  Perhaps, he suggests, it is for this reason that Pharaohs themselves remain 
unnamed in the Pentateuch.  The Pharaoh’s identity in the Pentateuch, Hendel says, may 
function as a strategic feature of the tradition, providing a moveable boundary of 
inclusion for those who shared this memory. 426 
In The New Rhetoric’s conception, it is from a set of such facts, truths and 
presumptions based in a shared cultural/historical memory that a particular structure of 
reality obtains which creates the mutual identification that foregrounds effective 
argumentation which leads to adherence and action.  This short digression is by way of 
making the point that the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy did not just make up a story of 
Israel’s origins when they sat down to write Deuteronomy or any other part of the 
Pentateuch. There were actual cultural memories about such matters that the 
narrator/authors appealed to and which the audience ascribed to as a kind of ‘truth’ about 
their self-identity.  Add to the forgoing a conscious awareness of their current rhetorical 
situation, that is also a shared mental aspect of reality, and we have an intersection of 
memory and situation that provided fertile ground for a meeting of the minds.  Absent 
                                                          
426 Hendel (2001: 604-608). See also Smith (2002: 631-651), Blenkinsopp (1997: 76-82). 
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this shared cultural knowledge of facts and truths and presumptions, meeting of the 
minds, and arguments which became based on them would have lacked any semblance of 
comprehensibility or context, and would therefore not have been able achieve their 
intended purpose of adherence.  
4.5 Deuteronomy Chapter Four as the Heart of Deuteronomy’s Rhetorical Vision: Three 
Premises Hiding in Plain Sight  
In reviewing the first three chapters of Deuteronomy, we see that Moses recalls 
events of Israel’s history, both good and bad, to the “invoked” audience who are in the 
final stages of their forty years of wilderness wanderings and beginning the conquest of 
the land at the behest of God.  His words encompass, both explicitly and referentially, the 
entire sweep of Israel’s history with God and the many important events in Israel’s life as 
a people. The emphasis is, however, on the present moment and what is to come.  The 
narrator/authors, in their introductory framing dialogue, appeal to both cultural memory 
and geographical referencing.427 By these appeals to space, time and memory, they 
establish themselves as the mediators of all that is reported about God and Moses and sets 
the stage for all that is to be required in the future.428  Deuteronomy Chapter Four, 
however, is the pivotal moment in the narrative that presents Deuteronomy’s three main 
rhetorical premises. The narrator/authors begin to reveal the rhetorical design of the work 
by reconfiguring the historical and cultural references found in the first three chapters 
into main premises of argumentation. In doing so, they set up the structure for entire 
                                                          
427 Dt. 1:1-7, 19-20; 2:1-3, 8, 13, 18, 24, 26, 32, 36; 3:1, 4-5, 8-10, 12-18. 
 




corpus and make known what is at stake in the corpus. I have identified what I believe are 
Deuteronomy’s three main rhetorical premises which are stated below. The New 
Rhetoric’s model of practical argumentation can readily be used to describe these 
premises, and the entire corpus is able to be encompassed by them. They are: 
(1) Israel’s has a unique and univocal relationship with Yahweh in which He has 
shown    steadfast loyalty to Israel and now demands loyalty and faithfulness in 
return.  
(2) The unconditional promise of the land given to the fathers is now made 
conditional.  Continued possession of the land is contingent upon faithfully 
following God’s and Moses’ laws, rules, ordinances and teachings and not 
engaging in any form of disloyalty or apostasy, as these are now made matters of 
life and death. 
(3) The statutes, judgments and, teachings that God revealed to Moses and that 
Moses revealed to Israel are just. It is, therefore, a display of the utmost of 
wisdom and discernment to follow them and many blessings will accrue for doing 
so.  
These three main rhetorical premises become the starting points of 
argumentations, and are repeated, reinforced and reiterated, throughout the text. The 
arguments in Deuteronomy flow directly from them.  It seems ironic, though, in seeking 
to discover the rhetorical design of Deuteronomy that one should need to look any further 
than certain passages that the narrator/authors pose as rhetorical questions!429 In a way, it 
                                                          
429 A rhetorical question implies that the audience itself knows the answer. In fact, a rhetorical question is a 
way of implying that the audience will be fully cognizant of its implications. A speaker or writer may 
identify this with the audience by implying that the audience will obviously agree. Rhetorical questions 
have the form of a question but are not designed to elicit information. The intent, therefore, is not to ask for 
a response but to make an emphatic declaration. A rhetorical question can be a persuasive device because 
the speaker implies more than the words as such and expect no response. The hearer is impressed by the 
thought processes that would logically lead to the kind of answer the speaker intends the hearer to reach. 
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seem as though these premises have been hiding in plain sight all along. What has been 
missing is a way to understand these premises as the starting points of argumentation. It 
is a matter of literary interest that the narrator/authors pose premises one and three using 
rhetorical questions while premise two is, in a manner, a derivative of the first rhetorical 
premise but is distinctly a main premise. Notwithstanding, these three premises, which 
are also conclusions stemming from the narrative review, are also the foundation upon 
which the narrator/authors will craft arguments that seek to create a new structure of 
reality for Israelite life going forward. These ideas need unpacking and clarification.  Let 
us now examine the first rhetorical premise.   
4.5.1 The First Rhetorical Premise 
1) Israel has a unique and univocal relationship with Yahweh in which He has 
shown steadfast loyalty to Israel and now demands loyalty and faithfulness in 
return.   
Drawing upon The New Rhetoric’s Argument Schemes,430 we can see that that 
there are two types of arguments by association431 that apply here and form the basis of 
the first rhetorical premise.  The first type is the argument based on the structure of 
reality. This type of argument is based on a premise that focuses on the real and consists 
of facts, truths and presumptions tied to common experience and common sense that the 
arguer can assume are already recognized and accepted by the audience. The second 
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430 See 3.8 above. 
 




type of argument technique which applies here is the liaison of succession.432 In this type 
of argument, the rhetor unites separate elements so that the audience may perceive a 
unity among them. The liaison of succession is a form of causal argument wherein 
phenomena of the same level which are collected in an explanatory relationship. 
Deuteronomy contains eight, distinct elements of the liaison of succession that that are 
based upon the structure of reality which demonstrate Israel’s univocal relationship with 
Yahweh. They are:  
(a) Israel as God’s Chosen People 433  
(b) The Covenant with Abraham and the Promise of the Land 434  
(c) The Sojourn in Egypt 435  
(d) The Exodus from Egypt 436  
(e) The Theophany at Horeb and the Giving of the Ten Commandments 
437  
                                                          
432 See 3.8(i). 
 
433 Israel as God’s Chosen People: Dt. 1:9-11; 4:20; 7:6-8a; 9:26-29; 10:15; 14:1a, 2; 26:18-19b; 27:9b; 
28:9b; 29:12a; 32:1-14 (29).  
 
434 Covenant with Abraham-The Promise of the Land is first made in numerous Genesis passages: 12:1-3, 
7; 13:14-17; 15:1-21; 17:1-21; 22:15-18; 26:2-5; 28: 13-15.  Deuteronomy mentions the subject in the 
following passages:  Dt. 1:8b, 20-21, 34; 2:31; 4:1, 14, 21-22, 37-38; 6:10-11, 18b, 23b; 7:8b, 12b; 8:1b, 7-
10, 18b; 9:5b, 23, 27-29; 17: 2a; 19:8, 14, 21a; 26:9, 15; 27:2-4; 29:12; 30:5, 20b; 31:7b-8, 20-21, 23b; 
32:52. (40) 
 
435 The Sojourn in Egypt: Dt. 1:30; 8:2-6, 15; 10:19, 22; 11:2-7, 10; 15:15a; 16:12; 23:8b; 24:18, 22; 26:5-
7; 28:60; 29:12b, 15a.(25) 
 
436 The Exodus from Egypt: Dt. 1:27, 29; 4:37, 45-46; 5:6; 6:12, 21b-23a; 7:8c, 18b-19a; 8:14; 11:2-7; 
13:11b; 16:1; 20:1; 25:17-19; 26:5b-9; 29:1b-3, 15, 24.(30) 
 
437 The Theophany at Horeb and the Giving of the Ten Commandments: Dt. 1:6; 4:10-15; 5:2-5, 19-28; 9:8-




(f) The Wilderness Wanderings 438  
(g) The Beginnings of the Conquest 439 
(h) Moses’ Expounding God’s Laws, Rules, Ordinances and Teachings for 
Life in the Land 440  
This sequence of eight elements which establish the univocal principle are based 
on Israel’s historical, cultural and spiritual structure of reality, and are presented as a 
liaison of succession.441 I have identified three hundred and twenty-three verses 
associated with this premise which are detailed in footnotes 432-440. They establish the 
univocal principle in Deuteronomy because all eight elements are phenomena on the 
same existential level of reality as components of Israel’s self-awareness or identity.  God 
has directed the storyline and movement of events and they are thus linked in a 
relationship of association with each other and then sequentially by succession.  
Moreover, these eight elements of Israel’s history with God form the deeply rooted 
intertextual basis of the entire narrative flow of the Pentateuch. They are a liaison of 
succession because without (a) there would be no reason for (b), without the events in 
                                                          
438 The Wilderness Wanderings: Dt. 1:19-28, 31-33, 35-45; 2:1-9, 13-19; 6:16; 8:2-5, 15-16, 22-24; 9:7, 
22-24; 19:1; 24:9; 29:4-5, 15b.(60) 
 
439 The Beginnings of the Conquest: Dt. 1:7-8a; 1:29-30; 2:24-37; 3:1-8, 15-22, 23-29; 4:41-43; 6:19; 7:1- 
2a, 17-24; 9:1-6; 11:8b-12, 29-31; 12:29; 20:15-17; 26:1; 27:2-8, 11-14; 29:6-7; 31:2-6, 7b, 23.[(91) (323)]. 
 
440 Expounding the laws, rules, ordinances and teachings: See note #464-466 below.  
 
441 Warnick and Kline (1992:8). In The New Rhetoric, liaisons of succession are one of the arguments based 
on the structure of reality. They include all forms of casual argument wherein phenomena of the same level 
are connected in an explanatory relationship. They are so-named because they employ liaisons and relations 
the arguer can assume are already recognized as accepted by an audience. This category includes liaisons of 
succession, liaisons of co-existence, and symbolic liaisons. 
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(b), there would be no cause for (c), without (c), there would be no reason (d), without 
(d), there is no context for (e), without (e) there is no warrant for (f), without (f) there is 
no precedent for (g) without (g), (h) would lack context and authority.  Each element is 
essential and uniquely important to the story and taken together they contribute to the 
conclusion drawn by the first rhetorical premise, that Israel has a unique and univocal 
relationship with Yahweh.  For the narrator/authors, they become starting point of an 
argument which valorizes Israel’s unique relationship with Yahweh.  A sense of future 
obligation toward Yahweh is given presence in the mind of the audience through constant 
repetition, whether it is to the “invoked” or “addressed” audience. God had done 
something unique in showing his steadfast loyalty to Israel in elements (a) throught (g) 
and now God asks for the same loyalty and steadfastness in return. A critical insight of 
this analysis is the observation that seven of the eight thematic elements which form the 
basis of the first rhetorical premise are referential. Being referential means that the seven 
of the eight themes do not originate in Deuteronomy.442 Moreover, in reviewing the 
instances of these seven literary elements of Israel’s univocal relationship with Yahweh 
highlighted above, it becomes apparent that, by the frequency of their repetition, and by 
their distribution throughout the corpus, that they are thoroughly integrated rhetorically 
and thematically into the narrative of Deuteronomy. What we have in Deuteronomy 
represents a deeply embedded stream of tradition that the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy could draw upon, highlight and reinforce for rhetorical purposes because 
they were well-known traditions that the audience accepted. This suggests that, rather 
                                                          




than seeing Deuteronomy as primarily organized by its three discourses, its law code and 
its supplements,443 one may also correctly view it as being organized thematically, in as 
much as the eight elements of this first rhetorical premise run across all internal 
boundaries in the corpus as footnotes # 432-440 demonstrate. Therefore, we can observe 
that in addition to Deuteronomy’s more well-recognized literary arrangement, it has a 
thematically driven internal rhetorical structure which underpins the arguments that are 
advanced. Their frequent repetition by the narrators/authors are a rhetorical devise 
designed to achieve a top of mind presence that is intended to create a mental disposition 
to take action based upon what will be presented in the remainder of the text.  The 
elements of this univocal relationship reflect the spiritual structure of reality by which the 
Israelite nation assembled its unique identity, its sense of self-knowing and its historical 
orientation.   
A series of four rhetorical questions and three declarative statements from chapter 
four combine to establish the first rhetorical premise:  
4:7a:  For what great nation is there that has a god so close at hand as is the Lord 
our God whenever we call upon Him? 
4:20: but you the Lord took and brought out of Egypt, that iron blast furnace, to 
be His very own people, as is now the case. 
4:32: You have but to inquire about bygone ages that came before you, ever since 
God created man on earth, from one end of heaven to the other: has anything as 
grand as this ever happened, or has its like ever been known? 
                                                          
443 See: Note #2, Introduction 
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4:33: Has any people heard the voice of a god speaking out of a fire, as you have, 
and survived? 
4:34: Or has any god ventured to go and take for himself one nation from the 
midst of another by prodigious acts, by signs and portents, by war, by a mighty 
and an outstretched are and awesome power, as the Lord your God did for you in 
Egypt before your very eyes? 
4:35: It has been clearly demonstrated to you that the Lord alone is God; there is 
none beside Him. 
4:36: From the heavens He let you hear His voice to discipline you; on earth He 
let you see His great fire and from amidst of the fire you heard His voice. 
4.5.2   On Being Rhetorically Incontrovertible 
These questions and statements come at the conclusion of Moses’ recitation of all 
the historical events reviewed in Deuteronomy’s first three chapters.  The answers to the 
four rhetorical questions are contextually self-evident: only us, no, no, and, no.444 The 
answers to the declarative statements are: You did, it has, and, You did!  Clearly, the 
narrator/authors are describing and recalling this unique relationship as the questions and 
statements themselves  embody all that God had done for Israel from the beginning. The 
questions and statements are put by the narrator/authors in a manner that make them 
rhetorically incontrovertible based on the storyline. The questions are posed in a manner 
and at a juncture in the text where we may say that Israel’s spiritual structure of reality 
and cultural identity are bound up in them. For those in the narrative who are now 
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listening to Moses, the four rhetorical questions and the three declarative statements––
which are in effect conclusions as well––appear to be so self-evidently based on what has 
occurred and with which the audience is intimately familiar that they become rhetorically 
undeniable. The premise that Israel has a univocal relationship with Yahweh, is the only 
conclusion that a reasonable member of the audience could reach because it is a shared 
“fact and a truth.”   
As a way of reinforcing the validity of this premise, Deuteronomy has thirteen 
verses that point out that members of the “invoked” audience were indeed eyewitnesses 
to the events surrounding the Exodus, the theophany at Horeb and, the wilderness 
wanderings.445 There is no better witness than an eyewitness and the frequent repetition 
of this idea adds a heightened sense of presence and credibility. This then conveys the 
impression that these historical recollections are “true” as they rhetorically 
incontrovertible. Therefore, it was both the acceptance of the elements of the first 
premise by the audience, as common knowledge, together with the eyewitnesses that 
were available and present that allows the narrator/authors to take the next rhetorical step. 
The next step, after reminding the Israelites about all that Yahweh had done for them, 
was to keep reminding them and then up the ante. Rhetorically, the intention was to 
imbue a sense of obligation to commit themselves to reciprocate God’s steadfast loyalty 
because of all that God had done for them. The next step comes later in the second 
rhetorical premise.  
 
                                                          




4.5.3   The Special Role of Element (h) of the First Rhetorical Premise:  
In 4.5.1 above, we discussed the eight unique elements which work to establish 
the univocal principle in Deuteronomy. We highlighted elements (a) through (g) and 
hinted that element (h) has a special role to play. While element (h) of the first rhetorical 
premise (Moses expounding God’s laws, rules, ordinances and teachings for life in the 
promised land) may be comfortably placed with in the argument by association and 
liaison of succession which establish the univocal principle, it actually serves a triple 
purpose. First, element (h) is part of what is unique about Israel’s relationship with God, 
as only they received the revelation upon which Moses expounds. The act of Moses 
expounding on the law thus creates a temporal shift in the story line, which looks to the 
future and prepares the argumentative foreground. 446 The second role that element (h) 
plays is to form a rhetorical bridge over which the Israelites can carry the burden of 
reciprocity established in the first rhetorical premise. We will see, in examining the 
rhetorical effect of the second rhetorical premise, that we may add the burden of 
existential uncertainty that the modification of the unconditional possession of the land 
element (b) creates to the baggage the Israelites must carry into the future. In this light, 
element (h) may be seen as the vehicle the Israelites must mount in order to be 





                                                          




4.5.4 The Second Rhetorical Premise 
 
A shift begins in the second rhetorical premise based in part on the sense of 
obligation created in mind of the audience by the first rhetorical premise. This sense of 
obligation now stands squarely as a presence in the discursive proceedings. The second 
rhetorical premise makes the continued possession of the land a conditional matter, and 
especially highlights the issue of apostasy in all its forms as the most deadly of sins, 
which would negate God’s promise. Thus, the terms of the relationship become more 
well-defined. In The New Rhetoric’s model, this works to create a new structure of reality 
for the Israelite audience and the narrator/authors now shift to a different argumentative 
premise which is a premise based upon the preferable, and consisting of values and 
hierarchies and loci about what is preferable.447 The narrator/authors having anchored 
their authority to mediate the words of God and Moses in the stream of tradition going 
back to Moses, and having established the univocal principle in the first rhetorical 
premise, now effectively puts the question in the second rhetorical premise as: Do you 
want to continue to enjoy God’s protection?  A simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer would have 
been anticipated. The Israelites are given little incentive to resist, though they might wish 
to, and according to Dt. 31 they are in fact predicted to resist and go astray by committing 
apostasy even after all the warnings against such behavior as Dt. 31:16-21 indicates. Let 
us now review the second rhetorical premise in more detail. 
 (2) The unconditional promise of the land to the fathers is now conditional. 
Continued possession of the Land is contingent upon faithfully following Moses’ 
                                                          




laws, rules, ordinances and Teachings and not engaging in any form of disloyalty 
to God especially apostasy, as it is a matter of life and death. 
The status of the unconditional promise of the land made by the Abrahamic 
covenant Gen. 12:1-7 undergoes in major revision by the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy. We have seen in chapter two, how potent the issues connected to apostasy 
had become in the contemporary rhetorical situation of the narrator/authors. The 
evidence for this is their detailed description of all its many iterations, aspects and 
forms.448  If this were not the case, they would not have wasted so much time going into 
such explicit detail.  As a topic, this change is one that was a relatively new to the 
audience of Deuteronomy in the importance given to it by the narrator/authors. This shift 
is central to Deuteronomy’s argument and has a history of its own.449 In light of what 
Zulink has written about this line of argumentation, it is very significant that it was taken 
up by the narrator/authors, beginning in the critical Chapter four, and made a central 
pivot of the corpus. Previously, we can find the only other set of passages in the 
Pentateuch that link following the law with possession of the land in Leviticus.450 
                                                          
448 See 2.3 Categories of Apostasy. 
 
449 Margaret D. Zulink (1992:192) has identified the source of this obligation of loyalty as stemming from 
the different responses to the events in Samaria and Judah at the end of the eighth century BCE. She writes 
that there were two, contradictory lines of argumentation that co-existed in post-Samaritan Judah of the 7th-
6th centuries BCE. Judahite theology stressed the tradition of the divine guarantee to David, the 
invulnerability of Zion and the inviolability of YHWH’s temple in Jerusalem. The reprieve against the 
Assyrians armies was the triumphant proof of this theology. The first recensions of Amos and Hosea, 
salvaged from the ruined North, on the other hand, interpreted Samaria’s destruction as a sign of YHWH’s 
wrath and as a warning to Judah. Alongside the belief in the divinely insured security of Jerusalem, there 
flourished a polemic that regarded Israel’s covenant with YHWH as contingent upon a certain standard of 
loyalty. In as much as the doctrine of the inviolability of Jerusalem and the promise to David is nowhere 
found in Deuteronomy, and the equating of loyalty to YHWH with continued possession of the land being 
of central importance in Deuteronomy, we can conclude that the narrator/authors were of this latter belief.  
 
450 Lev 20:22-26 specifically links faithfully observing all the laws of the land with expulsion and makes a 
direct connection in Lev. 20: 3 between following the laws and not following the ways of the nations which 
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Scholars have noted a parallel between Leviticus 26:3-45 and Deuteronomy 28 because 
of its similarity to the blessing and curses in that chapter of Deuteronomy.451  Leviticus 
20:22-26 creates the link between losing possession of the land for not following the laws 
and for engaging in the practices of the nations, meaning engaging in apostasy. Thus, 
while the topic comes up in Leviticus, the threat of expulsion for apostasy is thematically 
not a major topic in the Pentateuch prior to Deuteronomy. The narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy, however, take the matter much farther than do the authors of Leviticus and 
go out of their way to connect the loss of possession of the land with the broad topic of 
apostasy.  Whether or not the narrator/authors knew of the Levitical passages which for 
the first time equivocated on the matter of the promise of the land, is a matter of debate. 
My suspicion is that they were aware of them but I will not argue the point.  What 
becomes unequivocal in Deuteronomy, however, is that engaging in apostasy and 
expulsion from the land becomes inextricably linked.  We may conclude from the above 
that, while not following the laws, rules and teachings was a first order offense against 
God worthy of punishment, curses, starvation, and expulsion, engaging in apostasy was 
considered a one-way ticket to national destruction and exile.   
                                                          
the Lord abhors; Lev. 26:33 mentions being scattered among the nations for being disobedient and hostile 
to the Lord. These verses come in the middle of a series of blessing and curses. 
 
451 Milgrom (2000: 2272-2365). The theme of Lev. 26 is keeping the Sabbaths and the commandments and 
failing to do so will lead to exile. Lev. 26:1 specifically mentions not making idols and carved images or 
pillars and thus the chapter includes apostasy referentially. The other passages in Leviticus that touch on 
this subject of exile are Lev 20:22-23 which states that the consequences for not following the laws and 
rules are that the land will “spit you out,” Lev 25:18-19 which connects living securely in the land with 
faithfully following the laws and rules, and Lev. 26:27-33 which states that disobedience will lead to 
desolation and exile.   
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In light of the comments above, the emphasis on this issue represents a new 
element in the religious life of Israel and is a critical rhetorical turning point. It added an 
extra layer of contingency and uncertainty to an already ambiguous and tentative 
rhetorical situation. In creating a heightened sense of presence around the issues of 
disloyalty and apostasy, the narrator/authors sought to alter the audience’s perception of 
the changed nature of their relationship with God by emphasizing and requiring personal 
responsibility and commitment to behave in a particular and proscribed manner. These 
verses work to create a new structure of reality which began and ended in the heart (lēb) 
of the individual Israelite and that would redefine the religious practices they may safely 
embrace in the future. According to Deuteronomy, since what God has done for Israel has 
come from God’s heart, He appeals to the heart of the individual Israelite for this 
recognition and commitment. The necessity for this change reflects the compelling 
exigency behind the rhetorical situation which now demanded heart centered action.   
I pointed out in chapter one 1.8 above, and from the passages that we have 
reviewed here, that the narrator/authors engage many parts of the human being in the 
persuasive act, including sight, hearing and particularly the heart (lēb). It bears repeating 
that in Deuteronomy, matters of the heart are particularly important. In Dt. 7:7 Moses 
reminds the Israelites that the Lord “set his heart upon you and chose you.” In Dt. 8:2 
Moses reminds the Israelites that the Lord made them travel in the wilderness for forty 
years “to learn what was in your hearts.”  In Dt. 4:29 Moses advises the Israelites that in 
times of future troubles they need only “seek the Him with all your heart and all your 
being.” In what is probably the single most foundational and repeated set of verses from 
Deuteronomy, the Shema, Dt. 6:4-6 Moses tells the Israelites:   
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Dt. 6:4: Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God, the Lord is one. 
Dt. 6:5: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and all your being 
and all your might.  
Dt. 6:6: Take to heart these instructions with which I charge you this day.    
The narrator/authors mention matters of the heart eighteen times. 452 The Lord had 
reached out from his heart when He chose the Israelites, and thus asks the Israelites to 
open their hearts to the Lord and to love Him wholeheartedly. The narrator/authors 
understood that in their language and culture that the heart was the place where the 
persuasive act occurred and where the commitment to action was made.  In Hebrew, the 
word for “heart” (lēb) is the seat of one’s inner-self, inclinations, disposition, will, 
intention, reason, and the conscience.453 After working to create presence around the 
issues they wished to highlight through sight, sound and appeal to cultural memory, in the 
end, after compelling and reasoned arguments for keeping the Mosaic laws, they 
appealed to the heart to close the deal. 
In developing the second rhetorical premise, the narrator/authors treat the topic of 
possession of the land as it relates to apostasy in three different ways. The first way is to 
specify all the various behaviors that they identify as apostasy and their negative opinions 
about them. The narrator/authors mention this in ninety-eight verses. 454 The second way 
                                                          
452 Dt. 4:29; 6:5-6; 7:7; 8:2, 14; 10:12, 16; 11:13, 18; 18:13; 26:16; 29:18; 30:1-2, 6, 10, 14; 32:46. (18) 
 
453 HALOT (514). 
 
454  These citations are taken from chapter two, footnotes #189-195, (a) Dt. 4:28; 5:9; 7:4, 16b; 8:19; 11:16, 
28b; 13:2-3, 7a, 8, 14a; 17:2-4; 18:20; 28:14, 64; 29:16-17a; 30:17; 31:18, 20, 29; 32:17, 21a, 37-38. (b)  
Dt. 4:16-19, 23, 25b, 28; 5:8; 9:12b, 16b; 27:15; 29:24-25. (c) Dt. 6:14; 7:3-4a; 8:20; 12:29-31a; 13:7-8; 
18:9; 20:15-18; 29:15. (d) Dt. 7:5, 16, 25a; 12:2-4a; 16:21-22; 20:15-17. (e) Dt. 12:31b; 13:2-4a, 6; 14:1b; 




the narrator/authors treat this subject is to make explicit threat of expulsion for engaging 
in apostasy. The narrator/authors mention this result in seventeen verses.455 The third way 
is to attach a long list of negative consequences that follow if the Israelites are unfaithful 
to the Lord and stray from the path by turning to other gods and are disloyal to the lord. 
There are one hundred twelve verses which mention dire consequences for 
unfaithfulness.456 Thus, there are two hundred twenty verses, footnotes 453-455, that are 
associated with the second rhetorical premise.  
There are four groups of passages in Deuteronomy chapter four that bring up the 
subject of apostasy, linking it to death and expulsion from the land in three of the four 
groups. Collectively, these become the modifiers of the unconditional promise of the 
land, which define the second rhetorical premise.457 Let us examine them.  
Group One: 
4:3: You saw with your own eyes what the Lord did in the matter of Baal-peor, 
that the Lord your God wiped out from among you every person who followed 
Baal-peor; 
4:4: while you, who held fast to the Lord your God, are all alive today. 
Group Two: 
4:15: For your own sake, therefore, be most careful––since you saw no shape 
when the Lord your God spoke to you out of the fire–– 
                                                          
455 Dt. 4:24a, 26-27; 6:15; 7:4b, 10, 26; 8:19b-20; 9:13-14; 13:15b-18a; 17:4-5; 28:15; 29:26-27; 30:18, 
31:21.(17) 
 
456 Dt. 11:17, 28a; 13:6, 9b-11a, 12; 17:4-5; 18:20; 27:16-26; 28:16-68; 29:17b-24; 30:18-19; 31:16-18a, 
27-29; 32:18-20, 21b-43. (112) 
 
457 Dt. 4:3-5, 15-19, 23-24, 25b-28. 
197 
 
4:16: not to act wickedly and make for yourselves a sculptured image in any 
likeness whatever, the form of man or woman, 
4:17: the form of any beast on earth, the form of any winged bird that flies in the 
sky, 
4:18:  the form of anything that creeps on the ground, the form of any fish that is 
in the waters below the earth. 
4:19: And when you look up at the sky and behold the sun and the moon and the 
stars, and the whole heavenly host, you must not be lured into bowing down to 
them. These the Lord allotted to other peoples everywhere under heaven. 
Group Three: 
4:23: Take care, then, not to forget the covenant that the Lord your God 
concluded with you, and not to make for yourselves a sculptured image in any 
likeness, against which the Lord has enjoined you. 
4:24: For the Lord your God is a consuming fire and impassioned God.458 
Group Four: 
4:25 When you have begotten children and children’s children are long 
established in the land, should you act wickedly and make for yourselves a 
sculptured image in any likeness causing the Lord your God displeasure and 
vexation, 
                                                          
458 Dt. 6:14-15 covers the same ground as Group Three but refers to an “impassioned God’s anger that will 
blaze forth and will wipe Israel off the face of the earth.” This was a matter of rhetorical emphasis. 
However, the phrase ‘an impassioned God’- יēl qannāי is a complex topic that has often been reduced to 
emotional concepts of jealousy. For a detailed study of the social fabric of the phrase, see Erin Guinn-
Villareal, “Biblical Hebrew Qinיâ and the Maintenance of Social Integrity in Ancient Israelite Literature” 




4:26:  I call upon heaven and earth this day to witness against you that you shall 
soon perish from the land that you are crossing the Jordan to possess; you shall 
not long endure in it, but shall be utterly wiped-out.  
4:27: The Lord will scatter you among the peoples, and only a scant few of you 
shall be left among the nations to which the Lord will drive you.  
4:28: There you will serve man made gods of wood and stone that cannot see or 
hear or eat or smell. 
To reiterate, the narrator/authors develop an argument in the second rhetorical 
premise  that is set up by the first rhetorical premise. Simply stated, in the future God will 
to continue to honor the promise made to the fathers in the covenant with Abraham only 
if the Israelites faithfully obey the laws and rules. Dt. 7:12 states it clearly: 
Dt. 7:12:  And if you do obey these rules and observe them carefully, the Lord 
your God will maintain faithfully for you the covenant that He made on oath with 
your fathers. 
If Israel violates the covenant, acts disloyally and/or engages in the many forms of 
apostasy that the narrator/authors enumerate, the Lord will exact heavy penalties, which 
includes death, destruction, all manner of misfortune, disease and calamity, including 
expulsion from the land. 
I have already discussed the real questions on the mind of the narrator/authors 
about Israel’s willingness and its ability to be loyal to Yahweh and follow His ways. The 
narrator/authors put the issue of apostasy front and center in the narrative as it was one of 
the  central concerns, if not the main issue on their mind. The narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy appear to think that without serious sanctions the Israelites might not be 
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expected to comply in the long term.  Apostasy was a potent issue for the narrator/authors 
of Deuteronomy because of recent traumatic historical events that placed Israel’s future 
existence as a distinct people in jeopardy.  There were critical exigencies about which the 
narrator/authors felt compelled to respond, and making possession of the land conditional 
was one of their most potent responses. By this rhetorical move, the narrator/authors shift 
responsibility for future possession of the land squarely unto the shoulders of the 
individual Israelite. The explicit verbal threats in the second rhetorical premise appear to 
have been insufficient to warn off the Israelites from bad behavior. The narrator/authors 
felt it necessary to include two hundred and twenty verses that graphically lay out in no 
uncertain terms the dire consequences of not being faithful to the Lord by engaging in 
disloyalty and apostasy. Yet the third rhetorical premise, which we will now examine, 
provides the Israelites with a rhetorical bridge which offered a solution that, while 
providing some hope for the future, did not make their situation any less contingent. 
4.5.5   The Third Rhetorical Premise 
As we begin to discuss the third rhetorical premise, let us review where our 
discussion has taken us thus far. We have seen how the narrator/authors have used the 
unique elements of Israel’s history with God to establish the univocal principle which 
they develop into the first rhetorical premise. The narrator/authors draw upon an existing 
structure of reality to accomplish a particular argumentative stance toward the audience. 
We have also seen how they changed the terms under which future possession of the land 
may proceed unabated in order to alter audience perception about the nature of their 
relationship with God. The promise, given freely to the fathers, now must be earned and 
re-earned in every succeeding generation to remain valid. The rhetorical shift which 
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occurs in the second rhetorical premise, therefore, introduces a profoundly important 
change to one of the foundational elements of the univocal principle by presenting a new 
structure of reality as a fact-of-life going forward. Here the narrator/authors have 
introduced something new that will forever constrain the Israelites in thought and action 
and which now modifies the rhetorical situation in the present for Deuteronomy’s 
addressed audience.  
In the third rhetorical premise, the narrator/authors present the audience with the 
means with which to make existential choices based on a clear hierarchy of values that 
the third rhetorical premise embodies. Let us now examine the third rhetorical premise 
more closely.  
 (3) The statutes, judgments and, teachings that God revealed to Moses and 
Moses revealed to Israel are just. It is therefore a display of the utmost of wisdom 
and discernment to follow them, and many blessings will accrue for so doing.  
The basis of the third rhetorical premise rests on one of The New Rhetoric’s 
prerequisites of argumentation, which are premises that focus on the preferable and 
consists of values, hierarchies and loci about the preferable.459 An argument of this type 
generally employs a concrete instance, relationship or linguistic form to establish a more 
abstract general principle.  It is upon such a premise that the narrator/authors construct 
arguments that assist the audience to navigate the altered structure of reality created by 
the shift that took place in the second rhetorical premise. The third rhetorical premise, as 
with the first rhetorical premise, it has an important rhetorical question found in Dt. 4:8. 
                                                          




Several related declarative statements reinforce its importance. However, Dt. 4:6 is a 
passage unique in Deuteronomy as it appeals to what The New Rhetoric calls a universal 
audience.460  Dt. 4:6 provides a more important clue for understanding Deuteronomy’s 
message than any single verse in the corpus. The third rhetorical premise is contained in 
the following verses from chapter four. 
4:1 And now, O Israel, give heed to the laws and rules that I am instructing you to 
observe so that you may live to enter and occupy the land that the Lord, the God 
of your fathers, is giving you. 
4:2: You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away 
from it, but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you.  
4:6: Observe them faithfully, for that will be proof of your wisdom and 
discernment to other peoples, who on hearing of all these laws will say, “Surely 
that great nation is a wise and discerning people.” 
4:8: For what great nation has laws and rules as just as all this teaching that I set 
before you this day? 
4:9: But take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously, so that you do not 
forget the things that you saw with your own eyes and so that they do not fade 
from your mind as long as you live.  And make them known to your children and 
your children’s children. 
4:40: Observe His laws and commandments which I enjoin upon you this day that 
it may go well with you and your children after you, and that you may long 
remain in the land that the Lord your God is assigning you for all time. 
As with the first and second rhetorical premises, the third rhetorical premise has a 
host of verses that are associated with it and which reinforce it.  These supporting verses 
                                                          




come in three parts. First, are verses that adjure the Israelites to keep the laws, rules, 
ordinances and teachings.  There are fifty verses of this type.461 Second, are the laws, 
rules, ordinances and teachings themselves. There are three hundred and six verses of this 
type.462  Third, are all the benefits and blessing that will accrue if they do follow through 
in faithfully adhering to the program. There are eighty-three verses of this type.463 There 
are four hundred and thirty-nine verses associated with the third rhetorical premise.464 
In the third rhetorical premise, the narrator/authors present Moses urging the 
Israelites to choose a set of high value outcomes by faithfully adhering to the Mosaic 
laws. The long list of positive outcomes stand in juxtaposition to the negative outcomes 
contained in the second rhetorical premise.  I pointed out in section 4.5.4 above that 
element (h) of the first rhetorical premise465 serves a triple purpose in Deuteronomy. To 
reiterate, while element (h) is essential to Israel’s univocal relationship with Yahweh, it is 
the only element that, in and of itself, creates a temporal shift from past to present and 
future. Second, it serves as a rhetorical bridge over which the Israelites may carry the 
heightened sense of obligation (to reciprocate Yahweh’s steadfast loyalty created in the 
                                                          
461 Dt. 4:1-2, 40; 5:1b, 29-30; 6:1-2, 13, 17-18a; 8:1a, 6; 10:12-14, 16-18, 20; 8:11-12; 11:1, 8a, 32; 12:28; 
13:1, 4b-5, 19; 26:16-17; 27:1b, 10; 29:1a, 8-11, 13-14, 28; 30:15-16, 20a; 31:9, 12, 22, 30. (50) 
 
462 Dt. 1:12-18; 4:26-27, 29-31, 39; 5:6-18; 6:3-9, 20; 8:17-18a; 12:1, 5-27; 14:3-29; 15:1-3, 7-23; 16:2-11, 
13-20; 17:1, 6-20; 18:1-8, 15, 17-19, 21-22; 19:2-7, 11-21; 20:1-14, 19-20; 21:1b-23; 22:1-29; 23:1-8a, 9-
26; 24:1-8, 10-17, 19-21; 25:1-16; 26:2-5, 12-15; 31:10-15, 19, 21b, 26-28; 32:46-47. (306) 
 
463 Dt. 6:24-25; 7:12-16a; 11:13-15, 18-27; 15:4-6; 19:9-10; 26:19a; 28:1-13; 30:1-14, 19-20; 33:2-29 (83)  
 
464Footnotes 460-462 (50+306+83=439). 
 
465 Element (h): Moses’ expounding God’s laws, rules, ordinances and teachings for life in the promised 
land. 
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first rhetorical premise and the psychologically unsettling modification of the promise to 
Abraham in the second rhetorical premise), into a place of relative safety. This creates a 
new structure of reality that has Israel living, but always conditionally, under the new 
framework of those laws, rules, ordinances and teachings expounded by Moses.   
In the third rhetorical premise, we find the heart of what is new in Deuteronomy.  
The shift occurs in three stages. The first rhetorical premise establishes the univocal 
principle, the second rhetorical premise modifies the first and creates conditionality and 
the third rhetorical premise creates a hierarchy of values and poses existential choices 
within the context of the written laws that the narrator/authors judge as being deadly 
serious but also realistic, as Dt. 30:11-15 explains. 
Dt. 30:11: Surely, this instruction which I enjoin upon you today is not too 
baffling for you, nor is it beyond reach. 
Dt. 30:12: It is not in the heavens, that you should say, “Who among us can go up 
to the heavens and get it for us and impart it to us that we may heed it?”  
Dt. 30:13: Neither is it beyond the sea that you should say, “Who among us can 
cross to the other side of the sea and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may 
heed it?” 
Dt. 30:14: No, the thing is very close to you, in your mouth and in your heart (lēb) 
to do it. 
Dt. 30:15: See, I set before you this day life and prosperity, death and adversity.  
The aim of this three part rhetorical move then was to re-orient and alter audience 
perceptions on a number of levels. The most significant level of reorientation, however, 
must have come at the emotional level from the sense of insecurity imposed by the new 
conditionality that was for all practical purposes being imposed upon them. It is true that 
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the narrator/authors  are asking them to make a choice but it may be understood as a 
difficult choice in any case. They stand at a pivotal moment if bear we in mind their 
‘situation.’ We can observe that in these verses the narrator/authors make their appeal to 
the rational mind not directly to the emotions. Nonetheless, the tone of the passages 
serves to relieve the high tension of the moment by suggesting that it would not be too 
difficult for them to heed the laws, rules and instructions. It is a “think about it for a 
moment” moment. They have been promised over and over that a lot of blessings will 
accrue to them if they follow the laws.466  It is well to remember that this change in tone 
comes shortly after a list of curses in Dt. 27: 15-26 and a very long list of negative 
consequences for not following the laws, rule and instructions in Dt. 28: 15-68.  The 
narrator/authors call upon the audience to make fateful choices that will affect their 
personal, familial and national wellbeing. In this situation we can appreciate the 
complexity of rhetorical arguments being made.  
4.5.6   The Narrator/Authors Reach Toward a Universal Audience  
In 4.5.5 above, I made reference to the fact that the narrator/authors opened up a 
discourse that made appeal to what The New Rhetoric calls the universal audience, and I 
want to return to that topic again.467 In Dt. 4:6, the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy 
appear to set up Israel as a model of universal emulation, if only they faithfully observe 
all the laws of Moses.  I repeat it here.  
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Dt. 4:6: Observe them faithfully, for that will be proof of your wisdom and 
discernment to other peoples, who on hearing of all these laws will say, “Surely, 
that great nation is a wise and discerning people.” 
In this verse, the narrator/authors seem to appeal to an unidentified universal 
audience of “(other) peoples,” ( hā‛ammîm; literally, the peoples) who presumably have 
become aware of Israel’s just laws and upon reflection might find themselves in 
agreement with the wise and discerning approach of the Israelites. With this passage, we 
reach a unique moment in Deuteronomy’s argumentative strategy because it raises a 
number of important new questions.  The first question is what audience of “(other) 
peoples” or “the peoples” did the narrator/authors have in mind when they wrote those 
words?  Let us review The New Rhetoric’s ideas about the universal audience as we 
consider the answer to that question. 
One of the central concepts of The New Rhetoric’s argumentation model is its 
idea about existence and the role of the universal audience.468 The concept generated a lot 
of attention from scholars and there was initially some confusion about it.469  In his last 
publication before his death in 1984, Perelman felt compelled to clarify his views on the 
topic and re-explain what he meant.470 Perelman took the position that arguments that are 
accepted only by particular audiences were relatively weaker than arguments that enjoyed 
unanimous approval, which he thought of as having greater value. Thus, the highest value 
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is reached when there is agreement by a universal audience.471 The New Rhetoric was 
opposed to the view that the philosophical adherence of a universal audience depended 
upon the existence of a reality, an objective truth, an established fact, or the plainness of 
certain theses, which every reasonable person is obliged to accept. The thesis that the 
New Rhetoric defends is that every philosopher addresses himself to a universal audience 
as he conceives it, even in the absence of an objectivity, which imposes itself on 
everyone. The philosopher develops an argumentation by which he aspires to convince 
any competent interlocutor.472 The New Rhetoric makes an important distinction between 
persuasion and conviction.  It applies the term persuasion to argumentation that only 
claims validity for a particular audience and the term convincing to argumentation that 
presumes to gain adherence of every rational being (that is, a universal audience). What it 
distinguishes as to particular audiences is character, persuasion and action, and what it 
distinguishes as to a universal audience is objectivity, conviction and intellect.473 For 
those interested in motivating people to action, persuading is more important than 
convincing because conviction is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for action. If, 
however, an individual is more concerned with the rational character of adherence to an 
argument, primary importance is directed at convincing. Thus, conviction seeks to affect 
the mind through reason while persuasion seeks to move the will.474  
                                                          
471 Perelman (1969: 31).  
 
472 Perelman (1984: 190-191) 
 
473 Perelman (1969: 29), Long (1983: 108)  
 




Returning now to Dt. 4:6 the idea expressed in it seem to stand in 
contradistinction to the entire narrative thrust of Deuteronomy that is aimed at the 
particular audience of all Israel. Taking Perelman’s ideas about the universal audience 
into consideration here, we would conclude that in Dt. 4:6 the narrator/authors somehow 
wants to convince an unidentified universal audience of “(other) peoples” to believe 
something, while in the rest of Deuteronomy they want to persuade Israelites to take 
action. One may rightfully ask why it is that throughout Deuteronomy, the 
narrator/authors go to great lengths to express their negative opinions about the moral 
decrepitude and profound error of the religious views of the nations. In the third 
rhetorical premise, however, they seem to insert an argument that deals with questions 
associated with a philosophy of religion. 475  What about the laws, rules, commandments, 
and teachings did they view as being valid to a universal audience?  Dt. 4:6 raises many 
more questions. For example, is there a context within Deuteronomy for such a 
declaration? Are there other lines of evidence in Deuteronomy that would lead one to 
believe that the narrator/authors had a larger universal audience in mind rather than the 
particular audience of the Israelites?  These questions warrant consideration and I explore 
them in my final chapter. 
 
                                                          
475 Philosophy of religion is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the philosophical study of 
religion, including arguments over the nature and existence of God, religious language, miracles, prayer, 
the problem of evil, and the relationship between religion and the other value-systems such as science and 
ethics. It is often regarded as part of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Further, philosophy of religion 
differs from religious philosophy in that it seeks to discuss questions regarding the nature of religion as a 
whole, rather than examining the problems brought forth by a particular belief-system. It is designed such 




4.6   Looking to the Past, Being in the Present and the Vision of the Future 
In the first rhetorical premise the view of the narrator/authors is looking back 
historically up to the present moment.  It seeks to create a sense of moral obligation to 
follow the teachings because of what happened in the past. The first rhetorical premise 
reiterates and reinforces the “facts” of Israel’s univocal relationship with Yahweh. It is a 
premise that makes arguments based on the structure of reality.476 The second rhetorical 
premise, for its part, looks forward to the future but introduces conditionality regarding 
future possession of the land based upon loyalty to the Lord and not engaging in 
apostasy.  It works to alter audience perceptions and create a disposition to adhere to the 
vision of the narrator/authors which is the critical importance of Israel living faithfully 
under the Mosaic Laws. The third rhetorical premise is also based a premise that seeks to 
create a new structure of reality based upon the obligation transferred from the first and 
second rhetorical premises.477  The third rhetorical premise adds to the sense of 
obligation and contingency the idea of long-term national well-being and international 
prestige based the will of the individual Israelite to commit to follow the rules, statues, 
ordinances and teachings expounded by Moses. The argument techniques that underpin 
these three rhetorical premises aim to set up critical value hierarchies and collective 
choices that the narrator/authors are intent on Israel making.  
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4.7 Establishing Hierarchies of Values: Arguing Through the Use of Models and Anti-
Models, Illustration and Examples 
I brought forward the example of Dt. 4:6 above to highlight the narrator/authors 
effort to set up the Israelites as an international model of esteem. The New Rhetoric’s 
Argument Schemes allow us to categorize these rhetorical features of Deuteronomy by 
making reference to the argument techniques of model/anti model, illustration and 
example.478  For example, in this passage the narrator/authors are also directly addressing 
the particular audience of Israelites for whom they illustrate a high value outcome if they 
follow the just laws. In other words, in doing so they will become a model of wisdom and 
discernment. The narrator/authors use illustration to increase presence in the mind of the 
audience by engaging their imagination to dispose them to choose the course of action by 
which to become that model. The narrative provides powerful and motivating visions. 
Giving the Israelites hope that they might achieve this vision of esteem is a particularly 
significant postulation given their actual rhetorical situation. Being blessed in their own 
land and living in peace might have seemed as an incredibly optimistic outcome under 
their present circumstances.  The narrator/authors had already drawn presence to lower 
value outcomes contained in the second rhetorical premise in which they would become 
an anti-model. Israel as anti-model comes into effect if she ignores God and Moses’ 
warnings and as a nation begins to commit apostasy in any of its forms of disloyalty. 
Thus, the narrator/authors pose a fateful choice to audience. Israel collectively and 
individually must determine what is preferable from what is not. The narrator/authors 
                                                          




would not have posed this choice as a hypothetical matter; rather they thought of this as a 
very real problem as we have seen in the passages cited above.479  Significantly, the 
narrator/authors have taken pains to make themselves well understood on this point. 
Israel must choose to be a model or an anti-model. The concern that the Israelites might 
make the wrong choice is of such paramount concern that the narrator/authors reiterated 
their admonitions against apostasy in nineteen of Deuteronomy’s thirty-four chapters.480  
 I want to illustrate further how the narrator/authors use the technique of creating 
models and anti-models to establish general principles and value hierarchies in order to 
encourage the Israelites to make the correct choices. Three well-known model/anti-model 
incidents recited by the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy make the same overall point 
about the consequences of disloyalty and apostasy. They are: (1) the incident of the 
golden calf,481 (2) the incident at Kadesh-barnea,482 and (3) the incident at Baal-peor.483 
The first and third incidents involved apostasy and the second incident involved 
disobedience of the Lord. All three incidents occur prior to entering the land so the 
consequences are not the same as those anticipated to apply to corporate Israel upon 
possession of the land. Nonetheless, they convey the same potent message of fateful 
choices between life and death, between model and anti-model.  
                                                          
479 See 2.3 Categories of Apostasy.  
 
480 See: 2.3 footnotes 189-195, where all forms of apostasy are enumerated in ninety-eight verses. 
 
481 Ex. 32:1-35; Dt. 9:8-22. 
 
482 Num. 13-14:45; Dt. 1:19-34. 
 
483 Num. 25:1-9; Dt. 4:3-4. 
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4.7.1 The Incident of the Golden Calf: (Ex. 32:1-35; Dt. 9:8-22) 
 The substance of the Golden Calf incident is so well-known that all of its details 
need  not be fully rehearsed here. One should note that many of the details found in Ex. 
32 are not in Dt. 9. The story unfolds as Moses is detained on Horeb for an extended 
period of time while receiving the Ten Commandments from God. Left under the 
supervision of Aaron, the Israelites had grown impatient. After forty days they begin to 
think that Moses would not return. To appease them, Aaron instructs them to take off all 
their gold earrings and bring them to him.  Aaron then melts them down and casts a 
golden calf from the molten metal. The people proclaim the golden calf as their god. The 
Israelites then built an altar and planned a festival of celebration.  God who had been 
communing with Moses on the mountain, perceives that the Israelites had already strayed 
from the path. He sends Moses down to confront the Israelites about their disloyal 
behavior. After seeing what is going on, and how the Israelites are in celebration, Moses 
smashes the two tablets the Lord had given him and begins to take action to restore order 
among the people he views as out of control.  He immediately burns the golden calf, 
grinds it to powder, scatters it upon the water and makes the Israelites drink it. Moses 
then issues the order in Ex. 32:26, “Whoever is for the Lord, come here!” Thereupon the 
Levites rally to him and they proceed to slaughter three thousand of their fellow Israelites 
including brothers, neighbors and kin. Later, in asking forgiveness for the great sin that 
the Israelites had committed, Moses prevails upon God not to abandon the whole nation 
of Israel and God agrees to “erase from the record”484 only those who had sinned against 
                                                          
484 The idiom to “erase from the record” comes from the verb מחה “to wipe clean, wipe out, annihilate, be 
removed,” ՚emḥennû missiprî  him I will erase from my record.” is found in Ex. 32:33. HALOT 567-568. 
This idiom is also found in Ps. 69:29 and Isa. 4:3.  In later reception history we find the notion developed in 
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Him. Here is established the principle that apostasy is punishable by death. The model in 
this case is the Levites who rallied to the Lord or those who did not participate in the 
celebration of the Golden Calf. Those who remained loyal lived while those who were 
disloyal, the anti-model, were wiped out immediately. 
4.7.2 The Incident at Kadesh-barnea: (Num. 13-14:45; Dt. 1:19-34)  
We can find a second case of the model/anti-model example in the citations 
above. This story relates that the Israelites had reached Kadesh-barnea after setting out 
from Horeb.  After traveling through the great and terrible wilderness, they reached the 
hill country of the Amorites.  Moses tells them that God had placed the land at their 
disposal and they should therefore go up and conquer. The Israelite leaders, feeling 
hesitant, came to Moses and asked to send twelve men to spy out the land. When the men 
return to give their report, they present a negative assessment and refuse to go up and 
conquer, thus flouting the command of God to conquer the land. Only one of the twelve 
spies, Caleb son of Jepunneh from the tribe of Judah, was willing to follow the command 
of the Lord. Later in the story, the Israelites take it upon themselves to conquer the land 
but the Lord had already warned them not to try it. As a result of their stubborn refusal to 
follow the Lord, God deems the entire Exodus generation above the age of twenty as evil 
and unworthy to see or possess the land because of their faithlessness and disloyal 
behavior. Thus, they were forced wander in the desert for forty years and die there. Only 
Caleb and his descendants lived to see the land and received their portion when they 
entered the land.  Caleb is thus set up as the model of faithfulness and given the ultimate 
                                                          
much greater in the post-biblical liturgy for Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Moses demands that his own 
life be taken if God will not forgive Israel. Tigay (2004: 186). 
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reward for a person of the Exodus generation, which was to live to enter the land 
promised to the fathers.  The eleven spies and the Exodus generation above the age of 
twenty are set up as the anti-model of those who were unfaithful and disobedient to the 
Lord. They receive a harsh punishment as God condemns them to die in the desert. This 
incident reiterates the general principle that God rewards faithfulness and loyalty, and 
severely punishes faithlessness and disloyalty. This sets-up a hierarchy of values for the 
addressed audience of Deuteronomy who are compelled to imagine how they might have 
behaved were they to have found themselves in that situation. In the rhetorical context of 
the Pentateuch, which mentions a rather large number of Israelites that went out of Egypt, 
this was a harsh punishment indeed.485 
4.7.3 The Incident at Baal-peor: (Num. 25:1-9; Dt. 4:3-4) 
The third model/anti-model example is the recollection of the incident at Baal-
peor mentioned very briefly at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy.  
Moses says: 
Dt. 4:3: You saw with your own eyes what the Lord did in the matter of Baal-
peor, that the Lord your God wiped out from among you every person who 
followed Baal-peor; 
Dt. 4:4: while you, who held fast to the Lord your God are all alive today. 
With this brief reference, the narrator/authors reveal their presumption that the 
audience knows of the details of the story in Num. 25: 1-9. 486 As the text itself states, in 
                                                          
485 Ex. 12:37-38 mentions 600,000 men on foot, aside from children plus a mixed multitude. 
 
486 In The New Rhetoric, presumptions are not as certain as facts and truths but can furnish a sufficient 
basis upon which to rest a reasonable conviction. Here the narrator/authors can presume a level of shared 
knowledge and can be assured that the example they give will be familiar to the audience and that they can 
argue from that premise. See 3.8.1(a). 
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the audience were many who were eyewitnesses to the incident. A great many of their 
brethren lost their lives because they strayed and worshipped Baal-peor and were thus 
publicly impaled on Moses’ order. They were also condemned for whoring. In this 
incident too, Moses issues the order to his officials to slay those of his men who had 
attached themselves to Baal-peor.487 God himself causes a plague to break out and it only 
stopped when the wrong doers are dead. Twenty-four thousand died because of the 
plague. The model applies to those who remained loyal to the Lord and remained alive 
while the anti-model applies to those who engaged in apostasy and whoring and who 
were wiped-out in great numbers. 
These three rhetorically historical incidents serve to establish the general principle 
that God rewards loyalty with life, which is of higher value than the anti-model of 
worship of foreign gods, or other forms of disobedience that are viewed as disloyalty to 
the lord and punishable by death (which is obviously an outcome of lesser value).  A 
model of behavior that equates loyalty with life versus an anti-model, which equates 
disloyalty with death establishes a potent hierarchy of values for the audience. 
Interestingly, in the golden calf incident three thousand died by  summary execution 
because of apostasy.  In the matter the incident at Kadesh-barnea, there was no summary 
execution, but the entire generation over the age of twenty was condemned to die in the 
desert because of the disobedience of the eleven faithless spies and the stubbornness of 
those who tried to conquer the land in spite of God’s warnings.  In the incident at Baal-
peor, twenty-four thousand died for apostasy and whoring.  Perhaps the narrator/authors 
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wanted to establish  the idea that the generation of the conquest had gained a measure of 
faithfulness in the eyes of the Lord, as the entire generation was not condemned to die in 
the wilderness because of the actions of a few.  In alignment with the third rhetorical 
premise, the ones who remained faithful are deemed worthy to enter the land, but only 
under strict sanctions, and only on a contingent basis established by the second rhetorical 
premise.488 In all three incidents, the golden calf, Kadesh-barnea, and Baal-peor, all 
occurring at critical junctures in the narrative, the narrator/authors present the Israelites as 
being of questionable reliability on the issue of faithfulness. They are very apt to stray 
from the path and the text of Deuteronomy makes this point repeatedly, culminating in 
the curses of Dt. 28:16-68.489  Nonetheless, the narrator/authors are making it a matter of 
personal agency whether or not to follow the path. 
4.8 Arguing by the Creation of Presence: The Rhetorical Impact of Visual Imagery 
In section 3.8.3 above, we discussed the critical role that presence plays in 
the conduct of argument in the NRP’s model. The NRP took the position that a 
rhetor creates presence by projecting certain important elements into the 
audience’s mind with the intention of making those elements occupy the 
foreground of the hearer’s consciousness. The rhetor highlights these subjects in 
order to inspire the mind and give it a certain orientation, the aim of which is to 
provoke immediate action. He does this by appeal to the audience’s opinions, 
convictions and commitments and confers on them a value hierarchy or rank of 
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importance.490 Let us now consider how the narrator/authors created presence so 
that we can understand its emotional and argumentative appeal. I want to give 
four examples of how the narrator/authors used visual imagery to create presence 
in the mind of the audience intended to lead to choosing high value outcomes and 
to taking action. 
4.8.1 Standing on the Other Side of the Jordan: (Dt. 1-4:45) 
Let us now return to Moses’ First Discourse Dt.1-4:45 and look at it from 
the perspective of visual imagery. In it, the narrator/authors review not only the 
history of Israel's relationship with God since the Exodus from Egypt, but all the 
hardships they faced, and all of the problems of disobedience and disloyalty that 
came up over the years. In these chapters, the narrator/authors begin to bring into 
focus the beginning of their conquest and apportioning of the land. The 
narrator/authors remind their audience that it was God’s hand that was making 
this happen as Dt. 2:24-3:20 reveals. The themes of God’s actions on behalf of 
Israel and Israel’s frequent lack of faith in the Lord is central to this narrative 
sequence as Dt. 1:26-33 highlights.  In order to highlight the significance of these 
events in the mind of the audience, the narrator/authors use dramatic visual 
imagery and familiar geographic references to create presence in the mind of the 
audience. This was intended to encourage identification, receptivity and 
adherence to the arguments that were about to come. The argument in this 
discourse, as we have detailed above, was to establish and make present Israel’s 
univocal relationship with Yahweh.   
                                                          




The narrator/authors depict Moses as speaking to vast audiences 
assembled before him under highly dramatic circumstances in the Jordan Valley.  
Moses' delivers orations to his fictionalized invoked audience, framed by the 
voice of the narrator/author, and heard by the audiences of contemporary Judeans, 
as we have discussed above.  The locations of these important past events, however, 
occur at familiar locations up and down the Jordan Valley, the Arabah, Sinai and the 
land of Israel.491  Presumably, the rhetorical audience, that is, the ones who 
actually heard the text read to them or read Deuteronomy themselves, identified 
with those stories because all the locations were within their conceptual frame of 
reference. Culturally and geographically, this was their story, homeland and God. 
This was not a legendary tale about Adam and Eve removed in time and place. 
This was a story about them in the past that resonated in their time and in their 
place, because it was the same place that these events occurred. This created an 
emotional identification with the story that heightened its presence.  
Parenthetically, for those familiar with the dramatic topography of the Jordan 
Valley, as both narrator/authors and the actual addressed audiences no doubt 
were, the Dead Sea would have been within visual range as a foreground and a high 
desert mountain range would serve as the backdrop for Moses' orations.492 Thus, 
visual familiarity with the physical setting of Moses' discourses would have 
enhanced both identification and presence. The intentional creation of presence 
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enhances certain ideas that the narrator/author wished to highlight to the audience 
and strengthens adherence to the arguments being made. The aim of this 
rhetorical devise was to foster identification, a willingness to listen, and a 
disposition to act. 
4.8.2   “Let Us Not Die:” (Dt. 5:19-27 and Dt. 9:8-10:2)  
Another example of use of dramatic visual imagery for the creation of 
presence takes place in Moses' Second Discourse. Two sequences, Dt. 5:19-27 
and Dt. 9:8-10:2, recount the dramatic events at Horeb where the voice of God 
spoke from the midst of the fire as He was giving the Ten Commandments. The 
mountain was ablaze to the farthest reaches of heaven. The verses in Dt. 5:19-27 
are a greatly condensed version of the same story found in Exodus 19-24, and 
continuing in Exodus 32-34.  The story recounts how Moses received the Ten 
Commandments493 from God and conveyed them verbally to the Israelites and 
then, after receiving the laws of the covenant 494 also conveys them verbally to 
the Israelites. The next morning, after setting up an altar, the Israelites take part 
in a ceremony where they enter into the covenant with God 495 after which Moses 
writes down all the words of the covenant.496   
The sequence begins with Moses recalling to the Israelites that they were 
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cowering in fear after hearing God's voice. At that time, they begged Moses to 
intercede on their behalf, lest they die during another close encounter that would be 
at the same time auditory, visual, numinous and terrifying. On several occasions, 
they promise to do all that the Lord had spoken,497 as they found themselves in 
the overwhelming presence of God and feared for their lives. The addressed 
audience no doubt felt a sense of identification and mutual fictionalization with 
the predicament of their ancestors. The addressed audiences probably felt that 
they too would have been completely emotionally unprepared for such an event. 
We must presume that the addressed  audiences knew the details of the story that 
the text of Deuteronomy omits.  
Dt. 5:20: When you heard the voice out of the darkness while the 
mountain was ablaze with fire, you came up to me, all your tribal heads 
and elders, 
Dt. 5:21: and said, “ The Lord has just shown us His majestic Presence, 
and we have heard His voice out of the fire; we have seen this day that 
man may live though God has spoken to him. 
Dt.5 22: Let us not die, then, for this fearsome fire will consume us; if we 
hear the voice of the Lord any longer, we shall die. 
Dt. 5:23: For what mortal ever heard the voice of the living God speak out 
of the fire, as we did, and lived? 
Dt. 5:24: You go closer and hear all the Lord our God says, and then tell 
us everything that the Lord our God tells you, and we will willingly do it. 
Once again in Dt. 5:23, we see the use of a rhetorical question, which self-
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evidently reinforces the argument that the narrator/authors are in the process of 
making about Israel’s univocal relationship with God. In highlighting these 
dramatic events, a kind of awe struck moment occurs in the text. The 
narrator/authors create by the use of visual imagery, a feeling of being in the 
great fearsome presence of God––close, personal and vulnerable. The Israelite 
witnesses of the invoked audience obviously felt their lives were at risk in that 
moment. By this device, the narrator/authors achieve a heightened sense of 
presence and mutual fictionalization in the mind of the addressed audience that is 
also intended to result in a willingness to act. Since they heard the voice of the 
living God and lived, they feel compelled to do whatever the Lord demands of 
them.  
4.8.3   The Ceremony on Mt. Gerazim and Mt. Ebal: (Dt. 27:1-26) 
 The third example of dramatic visual imagery occurs in the description of 
the ceremony that is to take place on Mt. Gerazim and Mt. Ebal once the 
Israelites have crossed the Jordan and moved up into the hill country. This 
highly-visual sequence comes near the end of Deuteronomy. Moses and the 
elders instruct the Israelites what to do when they cross the Jordan.  
Dt. 27:2: As soon as you have crossed the Jordan into the land that the 
Lord your God is giving you, you shall set up large stones. Coat them with 
plaster. 
Dt. 27:3a: and inscribe upon them all the words of this teaching. 
Dt. 27:4: upon crossing the Jordan, you shall set up these stones about 
which I charge you today, on Mt. Ebal and coat them with plaster. 
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Dt. 27:5:  There too you shall build an altar to the Lord your God, an altar 
of stones. Do not wield an iron tool over them. 
Dt. 27:6: you must build the altar of the Lord your God of unhewn stones. 
You shall offer on it burnt offerings to the Lord your God. 
Dt. 27:7: and on these stones, you shall inscribe every word of the 
teaching. 
Dt. 27:12: After you have crossed the Jordan, the following shall stand on 
Mt. Gerazim when the blessing for the people is spoken: Simeon, Levi, 
Judah, Issachar, Joseph and Benjamin. 
Dt. 27:13: And for the curse, the following shall stand on Mt. Ebal: 
Reuben, Gad, Asher, Zebulun, Dan and Naphtali. 
Dt. 27:14: The Levites shall then proclaim in a loud voice to all the people 
of Israel. 
Repeated twice in the first sequence, is the instruction to write down every 
word of the teaching. Evidently, the narrator/authors conceptualized a very 
large plastered surface to contain every word of the teaching. Thus, the 
narrator/authors evoke dramatic visual imagery for a ceremony of immense 
importance to the Israelites. A ceremony that was both the culmination of their 
long odyssey that began with the  promise to Abraham and now ended with 
their occupation of the land and the beginning of a new chapter in their lives. 
Here we see the restructuring and transformation of Israel’s structure of reality. 
 As the ceremony envisions two sets of tribes standing on two different 
mountains that faced each other across a valley, we can only presume the 
existence of some natural auditory faculty that allowed the two groups to hear 
one another. These dramatic images were, no doubt designed to engage the mind 
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and emotions of the addressed audience and create the mutual fictionalization of 
being present at such an event and thus being ready to commit themselves as 
their forbearers had been when the moment arrived. 
4.8.4 The Death of Moses: Moses as Model and anti-Model (Dt. 34: 1-8)  
We find a fourth example of dramatic visual imagery in the final framing 
sequence in of Deuteronomy which depicts the circumstances of Moses' death on 
Mt. Nebo at the summit of Pisgah.  Moses expires on the summit of Pisgah after 
the Lord shows him the whole land that he would not be allowed to enter.  
Dt. 34:1: Moses when up from the steppes of Moab to Mount Nebo, to the 
summit of Pisgah, opposite Jericho, and the Lord showed him the whole 
land: Gilead as far as Dan; 
Dt. 34:2: all Naphtali; the land of Ephraim and Manasseh; the whole of the 
land of Judah as far as the Western sea; 
Dt. 34:3: the Negeb; and the Plain—the Valley of Jericho, the city of palm 
trees—as far a Zoar. 
Dt. 34:4: This is the land of which I swore to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, “I 
will assign it to your offspring.”  I have let you see it with your own eyes, 
but you shall not cross there. 
Dt. 34:5: So Moses the servant of the Lord died there, in the land of Moab, 
at the command of the Lord. 
Dt. 34:6: He buried him in the valley in the land of Moab, near Beth-peor; 
and no one knows his burial place to this day. 
Dt. 34:7: Moses was one hundred and twenty years old when he died; his 
eyes we undimmed and his vigor unabated. 




God punished Moses for his failure to uphold His sanctity at Meribah by 
striking the rock rather than order it as God had instructed him.498 Consequently, 
Moses was condemned by God to die on the other side of the Jordan and never to 
enter the promise land. Moses’ burial in the valley near Beth-peor occurred at a 
location where a serious act of disobedience and punishment occurred. Moses 
restored order in that case. It is therefore a double irony that Israel's greatest 
prophet is buried in a place that no one knows the location. This was Moses, 
God’s unequaled and faithful prophet and servant, who led the Israelites out of 
slavery, and who led them for forty years through the wilderness wanderings. 
With exquisite irony, God lays Moses to rest with other nameless Israelites who 
had also been disobedient to the Lord in the valley of Beth-peor. Here, both the 
presence of Moses as model and anti-model come together in equal measure.  
Recognizing the esteem in which Moses was regarded by the people, and perhaps 
sensing the danger of extreme adulation of the prophet were his burial location 
identified, adulation that might border on apostasy, the narrator/authors have God 
bury  Moses in a completely obscure grave.  This point too was probably not lost 
on the audience that could actually see the vicinity of Mt. Pisgah whenever they 
made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. These powerful and dramatic scenes and 
narratives served the rhetorical purpose of awakening in the audience a 
disposition to act in accordance with the teachings. 
 
                                                          




In this chapter four we have seen how particular aspects of Perelman’s 
Argument Schemes and ideas may usefully be applied to provide structure and a 
new vocabulary for understanding the rhetorical argumentation that occurs in 
Deuteronomy. We can also now appreciate that the entire corpus of Deuteronomy 
can be embraced as a rhetorical unit within Perelman’s theory. Let us now 
proceed to the final chapter of this study, Chapter Five: Conclusion––The 
Enduring Legacy of Deuteronomy: Embracing the Particular and Reaching for 
the Universal.  In this final chapter, we will return to a subject that I raised in 
3.7.2 and 4.5.6 above regarding the narrator/authors reaching out to a universal 
audience. In this final chapter, we will examine the different lines of evidence 
that suggest that the narrator/authors had certain lofty universalistic ideas and 











  Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
   The Enduring Legacy of Deuteronomy: 
                       Embracing the Particular and Reaching for the Universal 
 
Abstract 
 In this study, we have analysed how the narrator/authors argued rhetorically and 
we were able to describe the structure they created thanks the work of Chaim Perelman, 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and the other researchers mentioned in this study. We have been 
able to reveal the existence and arrangement of the three main rhetorical premises that the 
narrator/authors constructed and through them come to understand that Deuteronomy 
may be seen as a singular rhetorical unit united thematically across all internal boundaries 
of the text. Significantly, we noticed in our study of Deuteronomy’s audience that Dt. 
4:6-8 was a unique statement in the narrator/authors vision of a new structure of reality 
for Israel’s future.  Dt. 4:6-8 clearly addressed a universal audience and this raised the 
obvious question as to whether or not there were other lines of evidence to suggest that 
the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy were thinking beyond the particular audience of 
Judeans when they composed their work. In this chapter which concludes our study we 
will continue to explore the significance of the address to a universal audience in 
Deuteronomy by examining each of the three main rhetorical premises we have identified 
to search for evidence of the type of notions of universality that the narrator/authors may 
have had in mind.  
5.1 Embracing the Particular: The Audience is Everything 
In The New Rhetoric, the audience is the ultimate arbiter of the value and validity 
of the arguments made by the rhetor.499  In Deuteronomy, the primary focus of its 
narrative was the situational needs of the audience of Judeans that were to receive the 
                                                          




text. That is why we can say that aside from God, Moses and the narrator/authors, the 
audience is everything in Deuteronomy. While God is presented as eternal and 
transcendent, Moses and the narrator/authors were presented as existentially ephemeral. 
The audience, however, was presented by design, as the renewable resource in the 
complex of time, place and situation and thus, what was meant to endure. The 
narrator/authors emphasis on teaching and learning of tôrâ by the generation of Judeans 
who received it and their role as active participants in passing it on to the next generation 
who would receive it from them allows us to comfortably reach this conclusion.  When 
one adds reception history to the biblical narrative, the matter can be said to flow in a 
certain way: Divine intervention by God, human mediation by Moses, ongoing 
possession by the people of a sacred document that the narrator/authors told the Israelites 
not to add or subtract from it.500 In describing the flow in this way, however, we need to 
separate between the rhetoric of the text and what actually occurred for Deuteronomy it 
to arrive to its final form.501  
 5.2 Reaching Toward the Universal 
There exist several lines of evidence in Deuteronomy that reveal the 
narrator/authors had more universal goals in mind when they undertook in their 
compositional efforts.  In section, 4.5.6 above, I made reference to the The New 
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Rhetoric’s and Perelman’s ongoing discussion of the notion of a universal audience.  I 
pointed out that the narrator/authors made a direct appeal to this notion in Dt. 4.6, which 
is reinforced by Dt. 4:7-8. Let us look at those two verses again: 
Dt. 4:6: Observe them faithfully, for they will be proof of your wisdom and 
discernment to other peoples, who on hearing of all these laws will say, “Surely, 
that great nation is a wise and discerning people.” 
Dt. 4:7: For what great nation is there that has a god so close at hand as is the 
LORD  our God whenever we call upon Him? 
Dt. 4:8: Or what great nation has laws and rules a just as all this teaching that I set 
before you this day? 
In those three verses, the narrator/authors set up Israel as a model of wisdom and 
discernment in the eyes of the “peoples” if they faithfully observe all the just statutes, 
judgments and instructions commanded for them. The narrator/authors’ clear reach 
toward a universal audience in those passage is open to a number of interpretations which 
I now want to explore  
The most uncomplicated way to begin to address this question is to recall that The 
New Rhetoric took the stance that arguments addressed to a universal audience were 
stronger than those addressed only to a particular audience.502  Perhaps, the 
narrator/authors thought that by making such statements they were strengthening the 
credibility of their arguments in the eyes of the Judean audience. They may been 
asserting the idea of a broad universal appeal for their “just” laws, or their emergent 
monotheistic views for “rhetorical” purposes, while not necessarily trying to 
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conceptualize in what way this might be the case. This is one possible but unlikely 
interpretation because as members of a class of literate elites they were no doubt aware of 
and most likely in contact with other similar literate elites in neighboring lands and were 
no doubt aware of their thinking on matters of gods, divine images and worship practices. 
This would argue that they did not make their statements in a vacuum but rather with 
intention of their views becoming known.  Another interpretation is that the 
narrator/authors sensed what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and others were well aware 
of––that the type of philosophically based rhetorical argumentation they advocated had a 
certain inherent weakness. The weakness that Perelman recognized is similar to Plato’s 
critique of the Sophists which was that argumentation that did not proceed from or seek 
to establish self-evident objective “Truths” left an audience subject to manipulation by a 
rhetor.  Perelman had several objectives in mind as he developed his concept of the 
universal audience. His primary one was to better distinguish between merely effective 
and genuinely valid arguments. Perelman was trying to avoid becoming vulnerable to the 
charge that The New Rhetoric too, was only a form of flattery, pandering to particular 
audiences with particular interests, desires, and plans.503  The narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy, however, studiously avoided the pitfall of being overly particular by not 
letting anything important to their message come out of anyone’s mouth without the 
imprimateur of God or  Moses. Apparently, the narrator/authors were also aware of the 
problem we are discussing. Thus, it was because the narrator/authors attributed the words 
they were conveying to a divine source that they were able to avoid the charge of 
unethical audience manipulation, even though they were the ones inventing the discourse! 
                                                          




We should ask whether or not Deuteronomy would have had the same force and effect if 
it was written with just the Levitical priests as the authors, without Moses or God in it, or 
if it had been attributed to a particular Judean king. It thus became a question of 
believability and authority. It is very likely, then, that by believing that God and Moses 
were their frame of reference, they felt a sense of legitimacy that compelled them to 
address themselves to the universal audience of other literate classes given the 
international character of their political and religious environment. The narrator/authors 
may have thought that the arguments they had in mind were entirely “reasonable” in that 
context, so as to begin a philosophical conversation around the issues they chose to put in 
the foreground by giving them presence in their composition. We should also not rule out 
they were also motivated by political considerations as well, such as working to 
rhetorically inspire the Judeans to seek a future with a different kind of allegiance without 
directly challenging the political hegemony of their Neo-Assyrian overlords. 504  
 Whether or not an argument is “reasonable,” was in Perelman’s view something 
equivocal. Obviously, what was considered “reasonable” varies in time and in space and 
what is reasonable for a particular audience may not be reasonable for a universal 
audience.505 Perelman wrote:  
Thus it is that the word “reasonable” in a philosophical discourse affirms the 
concurrence of the universal audience when the same word in the sentence of a 
judge affirms only the agreement of the people of his environment and of his 
time. But the discourse of a  philosopher himself and his conception of the 
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universal audience is not the discourse of a god—of a universal and eternal 
truth—but that of a man, inevitably conditioned by the understandings, the 
aspirations, and the problems of his milieu. Hence, the inevitable pluralism in 
philosophy where incontestable truth does not exist. The universal audience that 
one seeks to convince must necessarily include the orator himself who is the 
principle judge of the value of his arguments. This is the reason why such a 
discourse must be sincere, honest, and cannot consist of a manipulation of the 
audience.506 
So, what may have seemed “reasonable” to our narrator/authors may not have 
seemed so to an audience outside their immediate environment of Israelites, but they 
nonetheless had their own concept about matters of universality.  As this line of 
reasoning relates to argumentation in Deuteronomy, the narrator/authors formulated 
arguments that, first and foremost, sought to persuade the particular audience of Israelites 
to take action. They wanted them to recognize where their own self-interests lay in their 
immediate situation and save themselves from destruction by taking personal 
responsibility for the future of the collective body politic. At the same time, however, it 
seems that they did have some specific ideas in mind that they regarded as not only 
“reasonable” to a wider audience, but universally valid as well. We can suppose that, in 
part, their appeal to a universal audience was tangentially aimed at the Neo-Assyrians 
with whom they had the immediate occasion to interact on matters of religion and politics 
and the same might be said about their later interactions with the Babylonians.507  
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The divine source, and therefore the unassailable purity of their message and 
motives, perhaps, in their minds opened up the opportunity to expand their horizons by 
presenting a serious challenge to the intellectual and cosmological structure of reality of 
other societies in the ancient Near East.  The question became at that stage, how and 
around what issues they might conceptualize and construct arguments to a wider audience 
that they realized did exist. We need to bear in mind, however, that there is no standard of 
universality. Thus, we need to try to place ourselves in the role of the narrator/authors 
and think about their rhetorical situation and their historical context as we begin to 
imagine how they went about the construction their own universal audience. 
5.3 Universalizing Elements in the First Rhetorical Premise  
 
(1) Israel has a unique and univocal relationship with Yahweh in which he has 
shown steadfast loyalty to Israel and now demands loyalty and faithfulness in 
return. 
As we begin our search for the universalizing element in the first rhetorical 
premise stated above, let us bear in mind that The New Rhetoric, proposes that there are 
several methods of constructing a universal audience. They begin, however, with the 
notion that all universal audiences begin with a particular audience. The rhetor then must 
perform certain imaginative operations on his speech or text in order to give it a universal 
character.508 According to Crosswhite, one of The New Rhetoric’s methods, which seems 
particularly useful as a starting point for our analysis of Deuteronomy, is the idea that the 
                                                          




rhetor needs “to set aside all the particular, local features of the audience and consider 
only those features of the audience one considers universal.”509   
If we now consider the individual elements of Deuteronomy’s first rhetorical 
premise, that is, elements (a) through (h) above,510 one could argue that individually most 
of them are particular to the storyline and do not necessarily, at first glance, have 
universalistic qualities in and of themselves. In this case, however, taken as a whole I 
think it is not possible to eliminate the particular to get to the universal, because they are 
not presented in Deuteronomy or in the Hebrew Bible as elements disconnected from one 
another. For this reason, it seems that an opposite approach is required in the case of 
Deuteronomy. In fact, we must add the particulars to understand the universality of the 
message that the narrator/authors convey.  Let us bear in mind that within the context of 
our discussion––when we are looking for a universal element––we are looking for 
something that may propose, or bring into existence, a different structure of reality in the 
eyes of the peoples or immediate neighbors. Therefore, let us take a closer look at the 
narrative context of verse Dt. 4.6 and then begin to consider why it has universal appeal. 
Dt. 4:5:  See, I have imparted to you statutes and judgments as the Lord my God 
has commanded me, for you to abide by in the land that you are about to enter and 
occupy. 
Dt. 4:6:  Observe them faithfully, for that will be proof of your wisdom and 
discernment in the eyes of the peoples, who on hearing all these laws will say, 
“Surely, that great nation is a wise and discerning people.” 
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Dt. 4:7:  For what great nation is there that has a god so close to it as is the Lord 
our God whenever we call upon him? 
Dt. 4:8:  Or what great nation has statutes and judgments as just as all of this 
instruction that I set before you today?  
Dt. 4:9: But take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously, so that you do 
not forget the things you saw with your own eyes and so that they do not fade 
from your heart as long as you live. And make them known to your children and 
your children’s children.  
Dt. 4:10: The day you stood before the Lord your God at Horeb, when the Lord 
said to me, “Gather the people to Me that I may let them hear My words, in order 
that they may learn to revere Me as long as they live on earth, and may so teach 
their children.”511 
Dt. 4:11: You came forward and stood at the foot of the mountain. The mountain 
was ablaze with flames to the very skies, dark with densest clouds. 
Dt. 4:12: The Lord spoke to you out of the fire; you heard the sound of the words 
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5.3.1 How Knowledge of the Divine is Acquired 
Ryan O’Dowd has written about the universal distinctiveness of these passages. In 
them, the narrator/authors reveal their views on epistemology as it relates to acquiring 
knowledge about the immanence and transcendence of their God, Yahweh. 
The divine knowledge that Israel gained in Egypt and the desert takes on 
universal distinctiveness as expressed in the ‘inner frame’ of Deuteronomy 4:5-8 
and 4:32-39 (where the outer frame is 4:1-4 and 4:40-49). The opening frame 
(4:5-8) promises Israel that if she keeps the commandments it will be her 
‘wisdom’ and ‘understanding’ in the sight of the nations (v.6, twice). Obedience 
also communicates the ‘nearness’ (qrb) of Israel’s God whenever she calls upon 
him: ‘For what great nation is there that has a god so qrb to it as Yahweh our God 
is to us…(v.7). Finally, obedience confirms the ‘righteousness’ of the rules and 
statues (4:8b) and Torah (4:8c) which Moses sets before them ‘this day.’ 
Deuteronomy thus continues to build upon this insistence that how and what one 
knows is tied to the ethics of obedience. There is inherent virtue required to 
‘know’ this God.512 
In these passages, Israel acquired its knowledge of God in two different ways. 
First, what  they come to “know” about Yahweh, they gain because Deuteronomy’s 
invoked audience saw it directly demonstrated in front of their own eyes in Egypt and 
afterward. The second is that later generations have eye witness testimony upon which to 
rely. The above passages themselves evoke a duality of transcendent and immanence as 
does the scene of Yahweh speaking out of the fire at Horeb in Dt. 4:11-12.  This 
constituted acquisition of knowledge based on sight, sound and the emotional experience 
of being a witness to and participant in unprecedented events that were transformative for 
                                                          




all Israelites. These events transpired prior to receiving the Ten Commandments at 
Horeb.513  This was knowledge acquired through the experience of the senses, that is, 
through the filter of the rational mind and it is therefore “reasonable” to rely on it. 
Therefore, knowledge in Deuteronomy is not something pre-existing but is rather 
acquired through direct experience. 
 The second way that the Israelites acquire knowledge of their God, after 
receiving the Law, is through obedience to those statutes, judgments, and instructions 
given by God through Moses. This is knowledge gained through actualization, that is, 
through and by the act of obeying the laws of the tôrâ, teaching the future generation and 
remembrance. In fact, O’Dowd writes, actualization is the goal of Deuteronomy’s 
injunctions to ‘teach’ and remember. Deuteronomy enjoins the community to teach the 
next generation, using the Hebrew root למד / lamad, “to teach,” (D-stem) “to learn” (G-
stem) sixteen times.513F514 If actualization is the path to knowledge of the “truth” about 
Yahweh, then it is the opposite of how knowledge of the “truth” gets acquired in Plato’s 
view. Plato thought that “truth” was best apprehended through isolated contemplation of 
something that was a pre-existing thing to be discovered. In fact, we will recall that the 
Sophists, who were well aware of the limitations on the acquisition of knowledge, sought 
to ground abstract notions in the actuality of everydayness. 514F515  The narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy appear to take the same approach. They ground knowledge of God in 
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events experienced directly and through adherence and obedience to His laws by which 
they can experience Yahweh’s immanent presence and transcendent protection.516 
The third universalizing element in Deuteronomy, closely related to the first and 
second one, comes in referentially in verse Dt. 4:9. This is God’s and Moses’ struggle 
with Pharaoh, his courtiers, wise men, sorcerers and magicians, prior to the Exodus as 
told in Ex.7:1-12:51) which demonstrates Yahweh’s transcendence over the gods and 
nation of Egypt. The narrator/authors of Deuteronomy operate under the presumption that 
not only does their audience already know these stories, but many were eyewitness to 
them.517 Central to the message of this struggle is the demonstration of Yahweh’s 
transcendent power over Pharaoh and all that Egypt represents. Many times, God is 
deliberately acting to rule the heart of Pharaoh for the purpose of revealing His 
unmatched power by “multiplying his signs” so as to make the Pharaoh act against his 
own interests.518  According to the biblical narrative, Pharaoh and his advisers are 
compelled to recognize Yahweh’s power over them.519 The visual imagery of this 
dramatic confrontation, in fact, creates presence for the idea that the God of a people 
enslaved by the mighty Pharaoh is transcendent over Egypt’s spiritual structure of reality.  
 Here again we see the use of the metaphor of the heart, this time Pharaoh’s heart, 
as a key player in this drama. 
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Ex. 7:3:  But I will harden the Pharaoh’s heart, that I may multiply My signs and          
marvels in the land of Egypt. 
Ex. 7:4: When Pharaoh does not heed you, I will lay My hand upon Egypt and 
deliver My ranks from the land of Egypt with extraordinary chastisements. 
Ex. 7:5: And the Egyptians shall know that I am the Lord when I stretch out My 
hand over Egypt and bring out the Israelites from their midst. 
Extending The New Rhetoric’s model/anti-model argumentation device to this 
context, we can see that Moses and Aaron who are following God’s instructions have 
become a model in the eyes of the Israelites. As for the Pharaoh, who is opposing God’s 
intentions, he is placed in the role of the anti-model doomed to destruction. We only have 
to recall how Pharaoh, his warriors, chariots and horse men met their end to know that 
this was one of the main points of the storyline.520 That which was demonstrated to both 
the Egyptians and the Israelites was not  through words alone, but primarily through 
Yahweh’s mighty deeds.  It was this type of knowledge, that is the assertion and actuality 
of Yahweh’s demonstrable singular transcendence and immanence 521 that is referred to 
in Dt. 4.9 and which the narrator/authors did not want the Israelites to ever forget.522 This 
was the starting point of fear, reverence and love for Yahweh repeatedly demanded by 
Yahweh throughout Deuteronomy.523  
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To summarize, there are three important universalizing aspects of the “Israelite 
experience” that are bound up with the first rhetorical premise that the narrator/authors 
were giving presence in Deuteronomy:  (1) knowledge of Yahweh’s transcendence and 
immanence is acquired through the direct experience of the senses by demonstration to 
the Israelites;524 (2) knowledge and experience of God’s presence is acquired through the 
actualization of obedience to tôrâ, teaching the next generation and remembrance of 
Yahweh’s great deeds on their behalf; (3) Yahweh’s willingness to revel His universal 
qualities of immanence and transcendence through His deeds.   
5.4 Universalizing Elements from the Second Rhetorical Premise  
(2) The unconditional promise of the land to the fathers is now made conditional. 
Continued possession of the land is contingent upon faithfully following Moses’ 
law, rules, ordinances and Teachings and not engaging in any form of  disloyalty 
especially apostasy, as it is a matter of life and death. 
We began our discussion in the Introduction of this study by saying that apostasy 
was the primary rhetorical problem in Deuteronomy. We defined the scope of apostasy in 
chapter two by laying out all the practices associated with it that the narrator/authors 
wanted to exclude from Israelite thought, practice and presence in the land.525  The 
second rhetorical premise stated above ties the prohibition against engaging in apostasy 
with continued possession of the land. The narrator/authors had to find a way to argue 
against practices they wanted to depict as a growing threat to Israel, practices that had 
deep roots in both Israelite and Canaanite culture, and throughout the ancient Near 
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East.526 A significant element of their rhetorical situation was the presence of the Neo-
Assyrians. I am not arguing the Neo-Assyrians were imposing their religious practices on 
the Judeans.  Opinions differ on that subject. Studies done in the 1970s concluded that the 
Neo-Assyrians had not imposed their religion upon their vassals.527 This conclusion has 
been undergoing a reappraisal in recent years and a different picture may be emerging.528 
Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to say that the destruction of the northern 
kingdom of Israel and the submission of Judah to the Neo-Assyrians as a vassal kingdom 
was without impact on the lives of the surviving Judeans up and down the social 
hierarchy. I am arguing, as have others, that in the era of Deuteronomy’s creation, 
apostasy had become particularly acute due to multiplying effect of the Neo-Assyrian 
presence and the international character of the era. Clearly, there were a number of 
competing forces, pressures and influences as well as long-standing cultural traditions 
that were in transition. It was the impact of these forces that, not surprisingly, appear to 
have elicited a strong theological response from the religious circles of Israelites and 
Judeans who directly experienced it.529  
Current scholarship recognizes that the religious pluralism in the land puts the 
rhetoric in Deuteronomy somewhat at odds with certain aspects of the religious life that 
pre and co-existed the era of Deuteronomy’s creation.530 While we certainly cannot write 
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a general history of Israelite religion based upon Deuteronomy alone, Deuteronomy was 
nonetheless an important part of the religious and intellectual history of the late-
monarchic era and afterward and a source of much useful information about the era of its 
creation. As such, at a minimum Deuteronomy represents a distinct rhetorical “turn” in 
Judean and Israelite religious philosophy on a number of fronts as a response their 
rhetorical situation. This background to Deuteronomy’s creation fostered a response 
wherein its representation of apostasy shows clear intent to take Israelite religion in 
decidedly new and universalistic directions. Mark Smith has identified this period as one 
characterized by Israel’s rejection of the religious translatability that existed in the Late 
Bronze and early Iron Ages due to the strong cultural impact of Assyrian influences.531 In 
the context of our discussion, the narrator/authors viewed apostasy as a huge situational 
problem among others, and addressed it rhetorically within the framework of larger 
programmatic goals for the Israelite people that they defined in Deuteronomy.  
There is another side to the struggle against apostasy, however, that goes largely 
unexplored, and that is its cosmological and therefore universalistic implications.  
Apostasy, as I have been using the term, refers to the renunciation of particular religious 
or political beliefs. What this renunciation means in Deuteronomy is that Yahwistic 
Israelites of the Exodus generation would actually abandon their own belief system, and 
adhere to particular concepts and practices mentioned throughout Deuteronomy that are 
represented as “foreign” and as coming from the indigenous inhabitants of the land they 
were about to dispossess, as well as from the nations that surrounded Israel.532 Let us 
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explore this topic in terms the structure of reality that the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy wished to extirpate from the practice and consciousness of the Israelite 
population.  
In fact, there are five categories into which we can place the narrator/authors’ 
polemic against apostasy. The Hebrew Bible citations for these categories are found in 
section 2.3 above.533  
1. Bowing down to serve other gods: This includes being lured away to serve 
other gods, particularly from the nations surrounding Israel, intermarrying 
with foreigner citizens, or learning about their religious practices. 
2. Prohibition against making idols or images of any kind: This includes, divine 
images, images of man or woman, beasts, insects, fish, winged creatures, 
anything that flies in the sky, molten images made by hand, sacred posts, 
stone pillars, any image of heaven including the moon, stars and the heavenly 
host above, or waters below. 
3. Prohibition against engaging in mantic practices: The ban includes, 
consigning a son or daughter to the fire, augury, soothsaying, divination, 
sorcery, casting spells, consulting ghosts or familiar spirits, or inquiring of the 
dead. 
4. The requirement to destroy foreign religious symbolism:  This includes, 
tearing down their altars, smashing their pillars, cutting down and burning 
their sacred posts, consigning their images to the fire, not coveting the gold or 
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silver from destroyed idols or images, destroying and obliterating all the sites 
where the nations worship, wherever they are found in the land. 
5. Derisive terminology related to foreign gods and practices: Terms such as, act 
corruptly, abhorrent, abominable, alien, detestable, futilities, demons, no-
gods, become a snare, something proscribed were used to refer to the practices 
of the “foreign” nations. 
If we attempt to reduce the above categories further, we could say that there are: 
(1) the narrator/authors’ opinions about foreign worship in general, (2) the types of 
behaviors and practices that they forbid, and (3) instructions about what to do when one 
encounters these things. The narrator/authors of Deuteronomy are rejecting aspects of the 
polytheistic structure of reality of which Israelite culture had long been a part. They also 
express a strong desire to extirpate that way of thinking, even if it involved physical acts 
of violence against their own citizens.534 Therefore, we can understand from this aspect 
of the discourse that this was not a theoretical discussion on their part, and in fact, was 
not slated to be part of any persuasive discussion at all. They wanted to smash and burn 
all “foreign” representations of the divine, whatever they were and wherever they were 
found, and kill all those engaged in such matters. This rejection occurs within a set of 
theological arguments that juxtaposes the injunctions against apostasy with an emerging 
one-God worldview, which was beginning to find clear expression in Deuteronomy.535  
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It is no coincidence, then, that the beginning of the Second Commandment, Dt. 
5:8-9, which forbids the making of any kind of image, immediately follows Dt. 5:7b, the 
First Commandment that insists that Israel worship no other god than Yahweh, as these 
two these themes are tied together in Deuteronomy.536 
 Dt. 5:7b: You shall have no other gods besides me. 
Dt. 5:8: You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image, any likeness 
of   what is in the heaven, or on the earth below, or in the waters below the 
earth. 
Dt. 5:9: You shall not bow down to them or serve them. 
 
It is also no coincidence that the first law of Deuteronomy’s Code (Dt. 12-26) is 
Dt. 12:2-3, the law that requires the smashing, burning and obliterating places and objects 
of foreign worship and divine representation.  It was so important to the narrator/authors 
that it occupied first place in the Law Code. Thus in Deuteronomy, we are witnessing 
both the emergence of an iconoclastic one-God structure of reality which required the 
rejection of all divine representation through images coupled with the assertion of an 
aniconic conception of Yahweh.537  The Israelite idea of the imageless transcendent 
divinity, whatever its origin,538 was meant as a serious challenge to the existing structure 
of reality that allowed for the open-ended multiplicity of divine representation and to that 
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aspect of the cosmological order of the ancient Near East that embraced that concept.539 
This was no small matter, as this stance had both profound theological importance and 
potentially serious political ramifications. John Walton has written that in the polytheistic 
view, 
The order of the cosmos in the ancient Near East was focused on the world of the 
gods. Organization had been brought to the divine realm through the birth of 
deities, and assignment of roles in the ordered world. The gods lived in a society 
with hierarchical structures by which they related and operated. The equivalent of 
civilization operated at this level, and the features of that civilization were an 
important part of the ordered cosmos.540 
On the practical level, the physical manifestation of a man-made divine image 
“functioned in the cult as a mediator of divine presence. It was the means by which 
humans gained access to the presence of a deity.”541 This is the view and the part of the 
ancient cosmological order that Deuteronomy violently rejects. This is the reason for the 
narrator/authors to want to draw a clear relationship between adherence to the laws and 
the rejection of polytheistic forms of worship especially the prohibition against images of 
all kinds.542   
Karel van der Toorn has suggested that perhaps the laws of the Torah were meant 
to serve as a substitute for divine images.  He suggests that later, in the Babylonia period, 
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a functional correspondence existed between the divine image among the surrounding 
nations and the Torah among the Israelites.543 Van der Toorn writes: 
The question is not, or not only, whether Israelites worshipped images, but 
whether     they had symbols which for all practical purposes served as divine 
images for them. This was the case, I submit, for the Torah. In the book of 
Deuteronomy, there is a direct relation between the prohibition of images and the 
propagation of the written law.544 
If we accept the idea that the narrator/authors were engineering a radical shift in 
Israelite cultural norms, about their God and how the Israelites should worship Him, then 
they needed to be prepared to have something with which to replace common practice 
that the Israelite audience could grasp and then hold on to for dear life. That was the 
whole point and the narrator/authors knew this was going to be a huge leap. Because it 
would take a huge commitment and dogged persistence, they made sure to insist that the 
adults constantly be involved in learning and contemplation every day and in every place, 
morning until night and that is why they put so much stress upon the education of their 
children.545 Here, as van der Toorn has suggested, the connection between the adherence 
to the written laws and the prohibition against images, finds its significance going 
forward.  
The significance of the narrator/authors’ response to their rhetorical situation 
having taken written form is the decisive innovation in Israelite religion that guaranteed 
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its survival.  Edgar W. Conrad points out that the Hebrew Bible represents books as 
having their origin in writing, and the written word is represented as the basis of 
orality.546 There is much more complexity to written/oral dynamics, but such 
explorations are beyond the scope of this present study.547 After being written and placed 
in “good hands,” the document then becomes available, on occasion, for the general 
population to hear it read and explained to them orally.548  The book in Conrad’s thinking 
did not lead to silence, but rather to speech, and it is clear that this was the intention of 
the narrator/authors. If we want to identify symbolic representations in Deuteronomy that 
might arguably become stand-ins for divine images, we can cite Dt. 6:6-9. 
 Dt. 6:6: Let the words that I command you today be upon your heart. 
Dt. 6:7: Impress them upon your children.  Recite them when you stay at home,               
and when you are away, when you lie down and, when you get up. 
Dt. 6:8: Tie them as a sign on your hand and let them serve as mark on your 
forehead; 
Dt. 6:9: inscribe them on the doorpost of your house and on your gates.549 
From the above discussion, we can see how the problem of apostasy in 
Deuteronomy came to represent a conscious struggle against a central aspect of the 
cosmological order of the ancient Near East. It presented an open challenge to the idea of 
the validity of the structure of reality that embraced an open-ended multiplicity of divine 
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representation through images. This is at the heart of the universal element in the Second 
Rhetorical Premise. The ban on images and practices associated with them had, in 
principle, practical consequences for the life of everyday Israelites who were challenged 
to embrace Deuteronomy’s religious norms. But, this change in concept, over time raised 
an unprecedented theological challenge to the adherents of the traditional religions of the 
ancient Near East and beyond––a challenge that not only resonated down through history, 
but eventually prevailed in Western civilization to a remarkable degree. It is in this sense 
that one can speak of a deliberate act by Israelite theologians which became an axis of 
intellectual and religious history.  
5.5 Universalizing Elements from the Third Rhetorical Premise 
(3) The statutes, judgments and teachings that God revealed to Moses and Moses 
revealed to Israel are just. It is therefore a display of the utmost wisdom and 
discernment to follow them, and many blessings will accrue for doing so. 
 In looking for the universal element in the third rhetorical premise stated above, it 
should be remembered that it was based upon premises that focus on the preferable and 
consists of values, hierarchies and loci of the preferable.550 The narrator/authors 
specifically mention in Dt. 4:8 that the statutes, judgments and all this teaching are “just” 
 ṣaddîqim), and this characterization helps us narrows down our search / צדקים)
significantly. Thus, the element or elements of potential interest to a universal audience 
in the third rhetorical premise have something to do with Israel’s ideas about the general 
                                                          




topic of justice, or how justice functions in its society, or how it functions in its religious 
structure of reality, or all of the above.  
It is significant that the narrator/authors of Deuteronomy link the pursuit of justice 
with thriving and remaining in the land.551 In The New Rhetoric’s lexicon,552 this idea 
establishes a value hierarchy that sets up a choice for the Israelites to maintain high 
ethical standards in their social interactions, by pursuing justice, or face expulsion.553 
This is also an important clue that tells us that we are looking in the right place. It 
becomes a matter of national importance then when perpetrating injustice is called out as 
abhorrent to the Lord your God.554 
Let us now examine the general notion of how justice is pursued in Deuteronomy 
by looking at the contexts where concern for it is expressed. We have seen in footnote # 
510 above, that the terms statutes, judgments, and other terms like laws, rules, 
ordinances, and commandments are often used interchangeably, thus making it difficult 
to say exactly which was which, except when the text uses specific vocabulary.555 There 
may have been distinct differences between those terms that the narrator/authors 
understood, but it is difficult to establish clear differentiating criteria for saying one 
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statement is a “law”(חקים / ḥūqqîm)556 and another a “judgment,” (משפטים / mišpāṭîm)557  
a “commandment” (מצוה / miṣwā) 558or an “instruction” ( תורה / tôrâ ). 558F559 This does not 
present us, however, from noticing that some distinctions can be drawn, whatever the 
terminology one might wish to apply to a specific verse, set of verses, or a short pericope. 
It is easy to notice that there are various types of statements found in Deuteronomy’s 
narrative sections and in the Law Code that have different characteristics.  For example, 
there are imperative statements that are both straight forward and clear as we find in 
Dt.16:18-20.559F560 
In the case of Dt. 16: 18-20 we have an example of a set of directions that are 
unambiguous. Such and such is what you will do when you enter the land.  Whether these 
passages are a law, statute, ordinance, etc., is hard to tell. What we can say is that they 
appear to have the characteristic of a direct order or command.  These verses portray the 
Israelites as a nation concerned with matters of justice.  
Dt. 16:18: You shall appoint magistrates and officials for your tribes, in all the 
settlements that the Lord your God is giving you, and they shall govern the people 
with due justice ( צדק   .(mišpat-ṣedeq / משפט 
Dt. 16:19: You shall not judge unfairly: you shall show no partiality; you shall not 
take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the discerning and upset the pleas of the 
just (דברי צדקים  / dibrê ṣaddîqim). 
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559 HALOT: 1710-12: instruction (as synopsis or embodiment of instructions), decision, established 
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560 See Dt. 7:5, 25. 
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Dt. 16:20: Justice, justice (צדק צדק / ṣedeq ṣedeq) shall you pursue, that you may 
thrive and occupy the land that the Lord your God is giving you. 
 By contrast, there is another category of statements that offer guidance in 
circumstances that may be somewhat ambiguous, or not immediately clear-cut. These 
statements offer a method to clarify particular conditional situations that have arisen in 
order to remain in a state of adherence to the covenant and to administer fair justice. In 
this regard, we can cite Dt. 17:2-9. 
Dt. 17:2: If there is found among you, in one of your settlements that the Lord 
your God is giving you, a man or a woman, who has affronted the Lord your God 
and transgressed His covenant 
Dt. 17:3: turning to the worship of other gods and bowing down to them, to the 
sun or moon or any of the heavenly host, something I never commanded–– 
Dt. 17:4:  and you have been informed or have learned of it, then you shall make a 
thorough inquiry. If it is true, the fact established, that abhorrent thing was 
perpetrated in Israel, 
Dt. 17:5:  you shall take the man or the woman who did that wicked thing out to 
the public place and you shall stone them, man or woman, to death. 
Dt. 17:6:  A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two or more 
witnesses; he must not be put to death on the testimony on one witness. 
Dt.17:7: Let the hands of the witnesses be the first against him to put him to 
death, and the rest of the people thereafter. Thus, you will sweep out evil from 
your midst. 
Dt. 17:8: If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over 
homicide, civil law, or assault––matters of dispute in your courts—you shall 
promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God has chosen 
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Dt. 17:9: and appear before the Levitical priests or the magistrate in charge at that 
time, and present your problem. 
In this case, we have a set of judicial procedures for determining guilt that can 
deal with an instance of apostasy occurring in one of the settlements. The procedures 
outlined are ones that could stand up to modern judicial scrutiny. Accusation, 
investigation, a trial that requires more than one witness to convict, verdict, and sentence 
if guilt is established. The passages do not indicate whether or not a judge or magistrate 
was required, even though it is a capital case involving life and death. This set of 
procedures also allows for a court of appeals for those cases that are too baffling for the 
local magistrates in Dt. 17:10-19. 
5.5.1 The Ways of the Israelites: Justice at the Heart of Religion 
In the preceding section above, I highlighted two separate sets of verses that deal 
with the topic of justice. Let us take a closer look at some additional contexts where the 
narrator/authors use words with the root (צדק /ṣdq),561 with the meaning “justice,” and 
related synonyms or grammatical forms using that root. The narrator/authors use words 
with this root thirteen times in various contexts––seven times in Deuteronomy’s narrative 
sections and six times in its legal code.562  In addition, it is necessary to chronicle the 
instances in Deuteronomy where questions of justice are at stake where the root (צדק / 
ṣdq) is not involved.  
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 The first time the narrator/authors use a word with the root (צדק / ṣdq) in 
Deuteronomy is in Dt. 1:16-17. This occurs when God orders Israel to leave Horeb and 
head for the hill country of the Amorites. At that time, Moses complained to God about 
the burden of dealing with all the troubles the Israelites continually brought to him. God 
instructed him to how to organize the Israelites for the journey and it was in this context 
that Moses appoints magistrates for the tribes. In this case, the key phrase means 
“administer justice or pass justice upon them.” Israelite judges are to render equitable and 
impartial justice, whether those in conflict are Israelite natives, strangers or rich or poor 
persons.  
Dt. 1:16: I charged your magistrates at that time saying, “Hear out your fellow 
men and administer justice (שפטתם צדק / (šĕpaṭtem ṣedeq). 562F563 between any man 
and his fellow Israelite or stranger. 
Dt. 1:17: You shall be impartial in judgment: hear out low and high alike. Fear no 
man, for judgment is God’s. And any matter that is too difficult for you, you shall 
bring it to me and I will hear it. 
 The next set of verses come in the context of a retrospective in Dt. 6:24-25.  Here 
the narrator/authors anticipate a time when future children will ask about the decrees, 
laws and rules that God had commanded, and the reason for following them. Here, the 
word צדקה (ṣĕdāqâ), is understood in this context as “acting with justness.”563F564 Here the 
concern is to act justly before the Lord through observance of His commandments. 
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Dt. 6:24: The Lord commanded us to observe all these laws, to revere the Lord 
our God, for our lasting survival, as is now the case. 
Dt. 6:25: We will be acting with justness before the Lord our God if we faithfully 
observe all these commandments, as He commanded us. 
The next set of verses in this sequence comes, in the context of the conquest of 
the land in Dt. 9:1-7. The narrator/authors have God putting a check on the false pride the 
Israelites might be feeling regarding their success in subduing and dispossessing their 
enemies. In this case, the phrase (בצדקתך / bĕṣidqātĕkā) is best understood as “your just 
deeds.”565 
Dt. 9:4: And when the Lord your God has thrust them from your path, say not in 
your heart “The Lord has enabled us to possess this land because of our just 
deeds;” rather, it is because of the wickedness of those nations that the Lord is 
dispossessing them before you. 
Dt. 9: 5: It is not because of your just deeds or your uprightness that you will be 
able to possess their country; but it is because of the wickedness of those nations 
that the Lord your God is dispossessing them before you, and in order to fulfill the 
oath the Lord  made to your fathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.566 
Another example displaying Israel’s concern for justice is Dt. 24:12-13 where 
loans and pledges are addressed. A creditor may not enter the house of the debtor to seize 
his pledge. He must remain outside and let the man who made the pledge bring it out to 
him. Dt. 24:12-13 describes the special consideration that a needy man must receive if he 
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pledged his garment or cloak for a debt. In these verses, the word (צדקה / ṣĕdāqâ), again 
has the sense of “acting justly.” 566F567  
Dt. 24:12 If he is a needy man, you shall not go to sleep in his pledge; 
Dt. 24:13: you must return the pledge to him at sundown, that he may sleep in his 
cloak and bless you; and you will be acting justly before the Lord your God 
 In another case, which addresses fair dealing in commerce, Dt. 25:13-16 insists 
upon  completely honest weights and measures, and in particular the abhorrent nature of 
dealing unjustly. Here, in Dt. 25:15, the phrase ( צדקו  šĕlēmâ wāṣedeq) has the / שלמה 
meaning of being “completely accurate, or accuracy.”567 F568 
Dt. 25:13: You shall not have in your pouch double stone weights, larger and 
smaller. 
Dt. 25:14: You shall not have in your house double corn measures, larger and 
smaller. 
Dt. 25:15: You must have completely accurate stone weights, you must have 
completely accurate corn measures, so that your days may be lengthened on the 
soil that the Lord your God is giving you. 
Dt. 25:16: For it is abhorrent to the Lord your God, everyone who does those 
things, everyone who does injustice. 
In reviewing these instances of where and how the narrator/authors apply the 
concept of justice in Deuteronomy, when the root (צדק / ṣdq) is used, we see that it is 
applied across a range of topics. We can say that there are three different aspects, 
relations, or levels of justice that are touched upon in the above sets of passages.  First, 
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there is an expectation that magistrates will  render impartial justice for all who appear 
before them to adjudicate their disputes whether their status be high or low, stranger or 
needy.  Second, there is an expectation for citizens to act justly toward their fellow 
countrymen––be they strangers, the needy, male or females slaves, widows or the 
fatherless––in all their various social interactions, whether or not a legal authority is 
present to compel it. This tells us that the narrator/authors recognized an inner sense of 
ethical consciousness to be generally present in the population. Third, there is a 
theocentric framing of the topic, which expressed the expectation that citizens act justly 
before the Lord by observing His commandments.  
Significantly, if we now take a closer look at Deuteronomy’s Law Code (Dt. 12-
26) as a unit, we find that there are thirty-nine sets of passages, each set representing one 
topic, involving one hundred and fifty-five verses that deal with some aspect of justice or 
social equity.569 Of those thirty-nine sets of passages or topics, three deal with legal 
procedures in court proceedings and involve twenty-one verses.570 Of the remaining 
thirty-six sets of passages or topics, one hundred and thirty-four verses deal with legal, 
ethical, or issues involving matters of social justice or equity between individuals, but 
without use of the root (צדק/ ṣdq). Below are listed a series of examples. 
Dt. 14:27-29 deals with the case of providing for the needs of the Levites in the 
community. Every third year, Israelites will bring out the full tithe but let it remain in 
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their settlement, so that the stranger, widow and the fatherless may come and eat their 
fill.571 
Dt. 15:1-3 and 7-11 deals with the case of remission of debts every seven years.  
The passages enjoin creditors from dunning a fellow Israelite, but they are allowed to dun 
a foreigner. An Israelite is enjoined not to harden his heart and not to shut his hand 
against a needy kinsman; rather, he must open his hand and lend him sufficient for 
whatever he needs. 
Dt. 15:12.  Though shocking to our modern sensibilities, Deuteronomy 
recognized the existence of slavery between Israelite citizens. However, the slave must be 
released after six years and is not to be sent away empty-handed. The slave owner must 
provide to the released slave out of the flocks, threshing floor and vat that the Lord has 
provided him. The slave owner is reminded that the Israelites were once slaves in 
Egypt.572 
Dt. 16:13-15 instructs the Israelites to include their sons and daughters, male and 
female slaves, the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless and the widow in their festivities 
after the ingathering from their threshing floors. 
Dt. 24:19-21 offers three instances during the ingathering of fields, olives trees 
and grape vines where the farmer is enjoined from going over those fields, olive trees or 
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572 Of course, any interaction over the question of slavery cannot be associated with justice in our modern 
sense of the word. Nothing about slavery is just. But, we are not judging the Israelites by our modern 
standards of justice, but rather by their own standards, however much we may object to them. It brings to 
mind Perelman’s thoughts about the contingent status of what is thought to be reasonable. 
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vineyards a second time. What remains, he is to leave for the stranger, the fatherless, and 
the widow. The farmers is then asked to remember that the Israelites were slaves in 
Egypt, and therefore they should observe this commandment. 
Dt. 25:7 provides a death penalty for one who kidnaps a fellow Israelite, who then 
enslaves that person or sells him. 
Key passages in these various texts are Dt. 6:24-25, 16:18-20, and Dt. 25:15-16. 
These are the passages that make the explicit connection between the pursuit of justice 
and Israel’s  ability to survive and thrive in land they were about to occupy.  Dt. 25:16 
goes so far as to say that perpetrating injustice is abhorrent to the Lord––thus placing 
injustice in the category of behaviors like apostasy that are intolerable to Yahweh and 
that jeopardize continued residency in the land.  
From our brief review of seven of the thirty-nine contexts in which matters 
involving justice are at stake, we can observe how our narrator/authors express a high 
degree of concern for the topic, both in the number of times it is highlighted in the text, 
and in the breadth of the subjects it covers.  Be it in a law court where magistrates are 
required to render impartial justice, or trials over apostate behavior, the freeing of slaves, 
providing for the needy, strangers, widows, and fatherless, or in other non-adjudicated 
interactions among the population at large, the concept of justice being served is expected 
to be understood at the individual level throughout society. The legal statements in 
Deuteronomy seem to assume an inherent sense of ethics in character of the individual 
Israelite, but not without exception, otherwise why would magistrates be necessary.  
Walton has written that in the ancient Near East the people were informed by a socially 
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attuned conscience and, that ethical responsibilities and not morality were the basis of 
conscience.573  
To sum up our findings from the third rhetorical premise, we have seen that Dt. 
4:8’s claim of “just” laws is not made without foundation from the perspective of the 
narrator/authors. Our review of Deuteronomy’s broad concern with social justice shows 
that it was deeply embedded in the narrator/authors’ thinking. Because of it substantial 
occurrence, it can stand as another source of its thematic unity which cuts across all 
internal divisions of the text and also as the basis of their universalistic claim.   
5.6   The Narrator/Authors Construct their Universal Audience on Three Points 
 From our review of the universalizing elements found in the three rhetorical 
premises we can now say that the narrator/authors constructed their vision of a universal 
audience based on three points: epistemology, cosmology, and the centrality of social 
justice in its legal code: 
(1) Epistemology: In the first rhetorical premise, we have seen the 
narrator/authors present the issue of how Israelites were to acquire knowledge 
of the divine. Knowledge of divine immanence and transcendence was not 
acquired through any  divinatory methods or association with divine 
representation by images but through the senses of sight, hearing, and rational 
common sense, especially knowledge apprehended by direct personal 
experience.  Israelites infer God’s universal transcendence by personal witness 
                                                          




of God’s deeds in prevailing over the polytheistic spiritual reality represented 
by the Pharaoh of Egypt in the Exodus story. 
(2) Cosmology:  In the second rhetorical premise, we have come to understand 
that the prohibition against engaging in behavior considered to be apostasy 
was at its core meant as a challenge to the cosmological stance that embraced 
the notion that the divine may be apprehend through the open-ended 
multiplication of divine images, divination and mantic practices.  The 
Israelites through the words of the narrator/authors lay claim to a 
cosmological order that allows for a single transcendent aniconic divinity. 
(3) Social Justice:  In the third rhetorical premise, we have come to see that the 
claim made in Dt. 4:8, that there is something particularly “just” about Israel’s 
laws, has as its basis the large amount of actual legal material in the corpus 
that concerns itself with social justice. The text of Dt. 4:6 claims that faithful 
observance of the laws and rules will be proof of Israel’s wisdom and 
discernment, and that other peoples who hear about it would agree with that 
assessment. In the opinion of the narrator/authors, the special “just” character 
of those laws was their basis for claiming their universal validity. 
I would like to return for a moment to what we have said about the universalizing 
element of the second rhetorical premise. The negation of the validity of idea of the open-
ended multiplicity of divine representation through images would of necessity raise a 
huge challenge to the cosmological order of the ancient Near East that was both 
theological and practical, and carried with it profound ramifications that are closely 
related. The absence of such an option in the religious structure of the ancient Near East 
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would of necessity left a gap in the sense of deciding what the focus of religious practice 
and worship of a divinity ought to entail. The answer to this question is found in the third 
rhetorical premise, which presented the positive consequences of adherence to the Mosaic 
statutes, judgments and instructions and by not engaging in any forms of apostasy as we 
now understand its meaning. This brought into focus the narrator/authors’ objective, 
which was to present the Israelites with a value hierarchy and a choice of which vision to 
embrace. By creating this choice and posing it in terms of a hierarchy of values, they 
could begin to navigate the consequences of: (1) the invalidity of the idea of the open-
ended multiplicity of divine representation through images, and (2) the banning of all 
forms of polytheistic religious practice. We can say that the focus on learning the written 
laws and faithfully adhering to them for all the reasons that the narrator/authors provided 
in the narrative offered a replacement for what was being invalidated.  According to 
Deuteronomy, the everyday concern with trying to please the gods, or their images, or 
trying to figure out their will at any particular moment and in any particular circumstance 
by numerous divinatory methods was no longer relevant. For the Israelite, Deuteronomy 
directly addressed the questions of the very nature of God, and how He was to be thought 
of, and how the everyday Israelite was to worship Him. It was by these provocative ideas 
that the narrator/authors constructed their universal audience. 
5.7 Final Comments and Findings 
 We have covered a lot of ground in this study, from a brief review of the 
beginnings of Greek and Hebrew rhetoric up to and including the rebirth of rhetoric in the 
twentieth century and the birth of rhetorical criticism in bible studies beginning in the 
1970s. We can appreciate the utility of using an interdisciplinary approach to 
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understanding, situation, audience, informal argumentation, and rhetorical discourse in 
contingent circumstances. We have identified many concepts that have allowed us to look 
at and describe the rhetorical argumentation presented in Deuteronomy in new ways, and 
perhaps we now understand it differently than before. 
There are two primary findings of this study. The first is that Deuteronomy can be 
understood a single rhetorical unit. Its rhetorical structure can best be comprehended by 
the three main premises articulated above which can account for the entire corpus. One 
can describe its premises, methods of argumentation and audiences by the terminologies 
that are available in The New Rhetoric. My second finding is that the narrator/authors of 
Deuteronomy were addressing two main but different audiences in the text. The first 
audience was particular to the Judeans in the era of its creation and which was meant to 
address its situational requirements. The second audience was a universal one. It was 
through their appeal to a universal audience that the narrator/authors established their 
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